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Abstract
The current shift from industrial mass production to new forms of ICT-supported 
production has questioned established principles and structures of learning in and 
for production. The purpose of this study was to explore the current change in 
production-related learning and to fi nd concepts to describe it. This was achieved 
by analyzing the logic behind the main forms of learning in and for production 
that preceded the ICT revolution. The limitations of these forms in the current 
situation were considered and a new principle was developed. It was assumed that 
forms of learning in and for production were tightly connected to the historical 
development of forms of production and should therefore be studied historically. 
The study explored the extent to which the main theories of organizational learn-
ing on the one hand, and theories of the historical development of production on 
the other, could explain the historical change in learning in and for production. The 
analysis showed that theories of organizational learning did not provide adequate 
concepts for explaining the historical changes in learning, while those concerning 
the historical development of forms production did explain the context of the cur-
rent change in learning in and for production. Moreover, they supported the idea of 
historical change in learning but they did not provide concepts for describing more 
specifi cally the changes taking place in the learning processes. 
A genetic method involving fi nding the initial abstraction of the phenomenon 
was used to conceptualize the change of learning in and for production. On the 
basis of previous research carried out in the tradition of cultural-historical activ-
ity theory, the adoption, application and development of generalized operations 
objectifi ed in tools and concepts were taken as this initial abstraction.
Interpreting learning as the production of production-relevant generalizations 
highlighted the importance of analyzing the historically varying artifacts used in 
production and production control. Three variants of mass production developed 
during the long wave of economic development based on the motorization of the 
economy (1941-1990): the Fordist-Taylorist model, the socio-technical model and 
the model of fl exible mass production. Methodologically, the research focused on 
analyzing the development of the fi rst installations of these forms of learning in 
and for mass production as the ”ancestors” of the three families of later applica-
tions of the same principle.
It was found out that the basic form, or the ”ancestor”, of learning in mass pro-
duction was the new distributed system of optimizing the methods for performing 
repeated tasks. This type of generalizing was based on the varying ways individuals 
were performing the same task. In Taylor’s system, specialized planning offi cers 
analyzed this variation with the help of time-and-motion studies, and objectifi ed 
the result in a new type of artifact, the work standard, which comprised the ”one 
best method” to perform the task. The generalized operations embedded in the 
standard were thus results of a process of empirical generalization.
The analysis revealed four dominant forms of learning in and for production 
that preceded the ICT revolution: craft-type learning based on perceptual-func-
tional generalizing, in which the generalized operations were mainly preserved as 
social practices and forms of implements used in the work, and three variants of 
distributed systems of generalizing in and for mass production, all of which were 
based on the division of labor in producing production-relevant generalizations, 
and the use of representations as a means of preserving the generalizations. The 
analysis showed that all these distributed processes of generalizing were based on 
abstract-empirical methods of generalization, which in turn were based on a com-
parison of the cases. The object of generalization in Taylor’s system was a task. 
Socio-Technical Systems Design and the fl exible manufacturing system expanded 
this object and changed the interaction between the parties from unilateral con-
trol to peaceful coexistence in the socio-technical system, and further to creative 
dialogue in fl exible mass production. 
A developmental experiment was carried out in order to further understanding 
of the kind of learning in and for production needed in ICT-supported operations 
a developmental experiment was carried out. The Change Laboratory method was 
used to prompt and support a collaborative process of theoretical-genetic gener-
alization in the form of expansive learning activity. This kind of learning involves 
the practitioners in a process of expansive re-conceptualization and remediation 
of activities through questioning current practices and inquiring into the system-
ic causes of problems in the daily activity. The experimental application of the 
Change Laboratory in Finnish Post Ltd. demonstrated that, with the help of an ex-
ternal interventionist, the post carriers were able to institute a theoretical-genetic 
process of generalization concerning the principle of their activity that produced 
a viable new model of postal delivery in turn. On the other hand, the new form 
of learning did not become a stabilized practice, but succumbed to the strong 
infrastructure of the mass-production-type distributed system of generalizing in 
the organization. There was thus a remarkable move fi rst toward theoretical-ge-
netic generalizing and then reverting back to abstract-empirical generalizing. This 
contradiction could be seen as a methodological challenge for further research on 
learning in and for production as well as for its practical development.
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11 The need to understand the nature 
of learning in and for production
1.1 Learning in and for production as a historically changing 
phenomenon 
It was only yesterday that we began to pitch our camp in this country of labo-
ratories and power stations that we took possession of this new, this still un-
fi nished, house we live in. Everything round us is new and different – our con-
cerns, our working habits, our relations with one another. Our very psychology 
has been shaken to its foundations, to its most secret recesses. Our notions of 
separation, absence, distance, return, are refl ections of a new set of realities, 
though the words themselves remain unchanged. To grasp the meaning of the 
world of today we use a language created to express the world of yesterday. The 
life of the past seems to us nearer our true natures, but only for the reason that 
it is nearer our language. (Saint Exupery, 1941, p. 70)
Antoiné de Saint Exupery is describing the fast and pervasive nature of the change 
that was brought about through technological invention and the mechanization 
of production about sixty years ago. That change seems to have features similar to 
the information-technological revolution of today. Although people are similarly 
confused about the change, its nature is different.
One reason behind the pervasive change described in the quotation was the 
closer interaction between science and production that started in the early 20th 
century. New science-based production branches emerged, but science was also 
applied in the traditional areas. The fi rst industrial research laboratories were es-
tablished. New applied research fi elds appeared between basic research and practi-
cal engineering (Berner, 1981, 105–114) and new forms of mediating activities de-
veloped between production and scientifi c research (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 
2001; Freeman & Louca, 2001).
2Another reason behind the change was standardization. Industrial plants that 
were in the vanguard of progress began to standardize their products, their modes 
of action, and their tools. In the new era of mass production progressive standard-
ization and rationalization became the most important means of survival for com-
panies in the competition. Organizations – usually large plants with thousands of 
workers – learned through successive cycles of rationalization and standardization 
the most effective ways to produce standard products. 
Today, in the emerging information society, companies that use and produce 
information and communications technology (ICT) are in the vanguard of eco-
nomic progress. Centralized plants that were the typical units of mass produc-
tion have been replaced by dispersed global networks of production organizations 
(Castells, 2000). ”Knowledge workers”1 have taken the place of industrial workers. 
Surviving in the current competitive climate depends more and more on compa-
nies’ abilities to produce new knowledge and innovative products and services. 
The competition is all about continuously designing and producing new genera-
tions of products (Peters, 1992, p. 315).
The rise of information and communication technologies is currently changing 
production structures in all branches of the economy.  Companies manufacturing 
software products, chips, computers, and the like have, in a short time, become the 
dominating sector, crucial to the economic development of society. ICT is being 
applied increasingly in all societal organizations but the ICT revolution has prob-
ably not yet reached its peak. The structures of the emerging forms of production 
and economic activity are still embryonic.
Mastering global production networks and the challenges of increasing col-
laboration and knowledge creation call for new methods of developing work, as 
well as new forms of learning. The ongoing transformation of production has 
raised discussion about the nature of learning in organizations, as well as about 
the methods of development and consultancy needed to master the new forms of 
production (Adler & Cole, 1994; Kyrö & Enquist, 1997; Tienari, 1999). Research-
ers have tried to fi nd new, more adequate ways of conceptualizing, explaining, 
and promoting collaborative learning. (Agyris & Schön, 1996; Dierkes, Berthoin 
et al., 2001; Nonaka-Takeuchi, 1995; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Powell, 1996; Toiviainen, 2003)
The importance attached to organizational learning in management discourse 
is a good indicator of the increasing challenges of collective learning created by 
1
 Drucker (1994) points out that, at the end of the 1900s, knowledge workers made up a third 
of the workforce of the United States – a greater proportion than industrial workers ever com-
prised in the country.
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the new competition in the information society. Peter Senge’s ideas of the fi ve 
disciplines of the ”Learning Organization”, for instance, were very popular among 
business managers in the early 1990s. According to this doctrine, managers should 
analyze the processes and problems of their organizations using systems thinking. 
They should learn to think of the causal textures in their organizations as circular 
rather than linear cause-and-effect relationships. 
The idea of the learning organization became so popular in business-manage-
ment circles that it was hard to fi nd any well-known company that did not aspire 
to be a ”learning organization” in the late 90s (Gherhardi, Nicolini & Odella 1999, 
p. 103). The wealth of publications on organizational learning (Crossan & Guatto, 
1996) also refl ects the growing need for theoretical understanding and practical 
mastering of the processes of collective learning. Theories of organizational learn-
ing have nevertheless been criticized for not meeting the challenges of enhancing 
the mastery of learning in organizations. Huber (1991) criticizes the research for 
its inability to create guidelines for increasing its effectiveness and other researchers 
(Jones, 1995; Tsang, 1997) have since expressed concerns about the lack of practical 
value in the results of the increasing amount of research that is being carried out.
It seems that production, learning and developmental work are at present con-
verging in a new way: ”While you perform knowledge work, you learn. And you 
must learn minute by minute to perform knowledge work effectively.” (Tapscott, 
1996, p. 198). As early as in 1988, Shoshana Zuboff pointed out that learning had 
become a dominant feature of daily work:
Learning is the new form of labor. It is no longer a separate activity that occurs 
either before one enters the workplace or in remote classroom settings (…) 
Learning is the heart of productive activity.  (Zuboff, 1988, p. 395)
The rapid increase in the use of consultants could also be seen as a sign of the 
qualitative change in the learning challenges fi rms encounter, although some of 
the increase in the number of independent consultants is probably due to the 
outsourcing of developmental activities. In fact, helping organizations to learn 
and change has become big business (Toivonen, 2004). The use of management 
consultants has increased dramatically since 1980, notably in North America.2 A 
similar growth trend, although not so strong, is also to be seen in Europe. The es-
timated world market for these services was 25,000 million dollars in 1992 (Kyrö 
& Enquist, 1997, p. 11).
2 In 1994, there were 137, 000 management consultants in the United States alone. (Kyrö & 
Enquist, 1997, p. 11)
4From its very beginning, the main task of management consulting has been to 
apply scientifi c knowledge in business (Kyrö & Enquist, 1997, p. 12). Consultants 
were applying technical and economic knowledge until the end of the 1970 when 
the value of knowledge in other disciplines especially in social sciences began to 
be appreciated. Consultants are increasingly being invited to help in carrying out 
major transformations of fi rms’ activities rather than to give advice on opera-
tive matters. Tienari (1999, p. 174) notes that consulting fi rms are now emphasiz-
ing integrated change programs rather than fashionable management doctrines 
or ”fads”. Consulting is turning away from the recommendation of incremental 
improvements towards the implementation of programs of rapid strategic change 
that combine expertise from many doctrines. Although management consultants 
typically discuss the transformations they are helping to carry out in terms strate-
gic change rather than of learning, it is obvious that collective learning is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the success of such transformations.
Experiences of change programs are not encouraging, however. Porras and Rob-
ertson (1983) carried out a meta-analysis of a large number of studies on change. 
They discovered that fewer than 40% of them produced positive changes in the de-
pendent variable of interest. Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector (1990, p. 159) found that, 
in one third of the cases they studied in-depth, a major resource-intensive change 
effort actually made the situation worse. They argued that most top-down change 
programs, which were still the dominant form of change efforts in the 1980s, did 
not work because they were guided by faulty conceptions of change and learning. 
Two developments seem to dominate the recent discussion on organizational 
learning and change management. First, the traditional forms of individual train-
ing and learning do not meet the new challenges because production, develop-
mental work, and learning are converging. Second, the challenges of learning and 
development are connected to the ongoing ICT revolution. 
In order to secure continuous mastery of their activities and their learning, 
actors in fi rms have to carry out various actions of learning such as analyzing and 
solving problems of production, as well as designing and implementing improve-
ments. These actions are often taken in relatively well-established ways according 
to a stable division of labor and using established methods. Their patterns could 
be characterized as institutionalized forms of learning in and for production.3  Insti-
3 I use the term ”learning in and for production” for the distributed and collaborative ways of 
learning that enable collective mastery and development of a productive activity.  ”Work-based 
learning” is for my purposes too limited as it focuses attention to individual’s learning.  ”Organi-
zational learning” refers to collective learning, but takes an institution rather than a productive 
activity as the unit of analysis.  
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tutionalization is understood here as the formation of relatively enduring social 
structures composed of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements 
that are closely intertwined (Scott, 2001, p. 48). Institutions are transferred to new 
generations by various types of carriers, such as symbolic systems, relational sys-
tems, routines, and artifacts. As Latour has (1991) pointed out, the development of 
technological artifacts is essential in the stabilization of forms of action.
My thesis is that institutionalized forms of learning in and for production are 
closely related to the prevailing form of production. In this study, I maintain that 
the revolution in information and communications technology not only affects the 
amount, content and type of learning necessary for mastering production, but also 
makes the old institutional forms of learning obsolete as production models change. 
Consequently, new types of learning actions and new institutional forms of learn-
ing in and for production are needed, and are also currently emerging.
In order to understand institutional forms of learning in and for production, 
we have to study them as historically changing phenomena. The purpose of this 
study is to create conceptual tools for understanding the nature of the ongoing 
historical transformation of learning in and for production. More specifi cally, the 
study purports to answer the following three research questions.
1. How can the ongoing qualitative transformation of the content and the insti-
tutional forms of learning in and for production be conceptualized and lo-
cated historically?
2. What were the principles and general structures of the dominant forms of 
learning in and for production preceding the ICT revolution?
3. What is the major limitation of these principles of learning in and for produc-
tion that are typical of mass production in current situation and how can this 
limitation be overcome? 
1.2 The structure of the study
This study is a theoretically oriented search for concepts to describe the principles 
and structures of change in the institutionalized forms of learning in and for pro-
duction. It comprises both a historical analysis and an empirical experiment. Be-
low, I explain the purpose and methodological premises of the analyses presented 
in each of chapters that follow. 
I will begin Chapter 2 by evaluating the contribution of the four most infl uen-
tial theories of organizational learning to the understanding of the ongoing change 
in the institutionalized forms of learning in and for production. After that, I will 
6present three historical theories that explain the historical developments in forms 
of production in Chapter 3, and analyze how these theories relate to the change of 
learning in and for production. Using the results of the analyses in chapters 2 and 
3 I will construct an activity-theoretical framework for analyzing the development 
of learning in and for production in Chapter 4. This framework is based on the 
idea of viewing learning as appropriation, development and the use of practice-rel-
evant generalizations that are objectifi ed in artifacts that mediate actors’ interaction 
with the object of the activity.
Using the concepts developed in Chapter 4, I will then analyze the logic and 
structure of three prevalent forms of learning in and for production by studying 
how they were created. First, in Chapter 5, I will consider the system developed 
by F.W. Taylor as a prototypical form of the distributed system of generalizing ap-
plied in mass production. Socio-Technical Systems Design is thereafter analyzed 
in Chapter 6 in an attempt to create an alternative system of generalizing in condi-
tions of mass production. Third, Chapter 7 considers continuous improvement 
in processes as the distributed system of generalizing in fl exible manufacturing. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the historical analysis.
In Chapters 9–11 I will assess the limitations of the system of generalizing that 
is typical of mass production. The Change Laboratory method, which represents 
a different type of generalizing, was used as an intervention method in the  devel-
opmental experiment of the study. Chapter 9 gives the theoretical background of 
the Change Laboratory, and Chapter 10 reports and assesses the contradictions 
that arose when the method was used in practice in an effort to develop postmen’s 
work in Finnish Post Limited in 1996. Chapter 11 summarizes the results of the 
study.
72 Historical changes in theories of 
organizational learning
2.1 Four representative theories 
In this chapter I will analyze the contributions of the four most infl uential theo-
ries of organizational learning4 to the understanding of the historical change in 
institutional forms of workplace learning. The main question concerns the kind 
of conceptual tools that the theories provide.
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1978; 1996) are probably the research-
ers who fi rst systematically used the concept of organizational learning. Argyris’ 
background is in psychology. His early research focused on the unintended conse-
quences of formal organizational structures and on individuals’ chances of chang-
ing those consequences. Schön’s background is in philosophy, especially Deweyan 
pragmatism. He has studied organizational learning and knowledge in practice 
and in the refl ective practice of professionals. These two researchers have been 
collaborating since the early seventies and have written three books together. Their 
theory of organizational learning fruitfully combines their different points of view 
about learning and action in that they see it as a process in which the governing 
values that direct the action are changed.
Richard Cyert, James March and Herbert Simon consider organizational learn-
ing from the perspective of decision-making. They are well-known representatives 
of ”the Carnegie behavioralists”, who are interested in describing how individuals 
and organizations act and make decisions in the real world. They have developed 
the concept of ”bounded rationality” to depict the way organizational actors act 
when facing and dealing with ”the uncertainties and ambiguities of life”. Richard 
4 I assume that these four theories are of general signifi cance. Although Zuboff expresses excep-
tional views regarding the adequacy of learning in and for production she does not introduce 
any particular theory of learning. The learning-organization theory introduced by Senge is not 
actually a theory of learning either, but is rather an application of systems thinking to manage-
ment.
8Cyert has studied behavioral economics, economics in general, decision theory 
and management. James March, the principal developer of the approach, is known 
for conceiving of the behavioral theory of fi rm, and for his contributions to orga-
nization theory. According to the Carnegie behaviorists, organizations learn from 
the ways in which individuals experiment, draw inferences and code lessons of 
history into the established routines of the organization. They see organizational 
learning as the refi nement of organizational routines. 
Argyris and Schön and the ”Carnegie behaviorists” developed their theories in 
the 1960s. Nonaka and Tackeuchi’s (1995) theory of knowledge creation is more 
recent. Ikujiro Nonaka is a Professor and Hirotaka Takeuchi is Dean of the Gradu-
ate School of International Corporate Strategy at Hitotsubashi University in To-
kyo. Nonaka has had a long career in management, social science and business 
research, while Tackeuchi is especially interested in knowledge management and 
conducts research on the characteristics of innovative activities in Japanese com-
panies. Nonaka’s and Takeuchi’s widespread theory focuses on knowledge creation 
in organizations, and especially in the development of products. This is not about 
organizational learning, but rather concerns the process by which corporate or-
ganizations create competitively valuable knowledge. It relies on Michael Polany’s 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge creation is also a pro-
cess of organizational learning: organizations learn by creating new knowledge.
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger analyze organizational learning in terms of 
”communities of practice”. Their theory was fi rst published in the book: ”Situated 
Learning: Legitimate peripheral participation” (1991), and later developed in sepa-
rate works (Lave, 1993, 1997; Wenger, 1998). Jean Lave is a social anthropologist 
and much of her work has focused on the ”re-conceiving” of learning, learners, 
and educational institutions in terms of social practice. Etienne Wenger did his 
Ph.D. on artifi cial intelligence. According to their theory, learning always involves 
individuals’ gradually deepening participation in a community of practice. Conse-
quently, organizational learning comes to be seen as the process of sustaining the 
interconnected communities of practice that make an organization effective.
In this chapter I will present the main concepts and the lines of reasoning of 
these theories using the following fi ve questions as my analytical tools.
1. What is organizational learning according to the theory?
2. What triggers organizational learning?
3. What are the main forms of organizational learning?
4. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between individual and 
collective learning?
5. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between organizational 
learning and historical change in the form of production?
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2.2 Organizational learning as change in theories of action and values
Argyris and Schön depict their approach to organizational learning as normative 
and practice-oriented. Their purpose is to describe the patterns of behavior that 
threaten organizational learning, and also to provide concepts for changing those 
patterns. The research method is inductive: the authors typically present data and 
analyses of particular classroom interventions, and make generalizations in the 
form of propositions.   
According to Argyris and Schön (1996, p. 8), organizational actions are deci-
sions and acts that individuals take and carry out on behalf of an organization. An 
observable action that is new to an organization is the most decisive test that, in 
that particular instance, organizational learning has occurred. 
The authors conceptualize organizations as agencies that make decisions, dele-
gate authority and monitor membership. Manufacturing plants, schools, churches 
and government bureaus are examples of such agencies. Formal organizations are 
collective vehicles for the regular performance of recurrent tasks. The members’ 
behavior is, in crucial respects, governed by rules that are grounded in the society’s 
legal system and are, to some degree, explicit. Informal organizations, on the other 
hand operate without a formal plan or an identifi ed leader. They work out their 
situation-specifi c tasks through talk and gestures on the spot, at the site and with 
the available materials. Complex bureaucracies comprising detailed roles, rules, 
tasks procedures and hierarchies are cooperative systems that are governed by the 
constitutional principles of organizational policy (ibid., pp. 10–11).
Individuals in organizations are not passive recipients, but active inquirers of 
these principles. Following Dewey’s ideas, Argyris and Schön maintain that an in-
quiry proceeds from doubt to the resolution of doubt in a process that intertwines 
thought and action. Doubt arises from an experience of a problematic situation, 
triggered by a mismatch between the excepted results of an action and what is ac-
tually achieved. Such a mismatch blocks the fl ow of spontaneous activity and gives 
rise to thought and further action aimed at re-establishing that fl ow. 
The results of organizational inquiry may change individuals’ thinking and the 
way they design organizational actions. They design their actions on the basis of 
their theories of action. Such theories may take two different forms, both of which 
are learned early in childhood and later supported by features of societal and orga-
nizational culture (ibid., 1996, pp.75–76). An ”espoused theory of action” refers to 
the theory of action that an individual advances in order to explain or justify his or 
her pattern of activity. ”Theory-in-use”, on the other hand, is implicit in a certain 
pattern of action. The researcher constructs it by observing action and identifying 
recurrent patterns (ibid., 1996, p. 13). 
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Each member of an organization constructs his or her own individual repre-
sentation of the theory-in-use of the whole organization, but the individual actor’s 
view is always incomplete. He/she strives continually to complete his/her picture 
of the organization’s theory-in-use by redescribing it continuously in his/her rela-
tions with other members. According to Argyris and Schön, the organization is 
like an organism in which each of the cells contains a particular, partial, changing 
image of itself in relation to the whole (ibid., 1996, pp. 15–16).
Because organizations are large and complex, their members cannot rely only 
on face-to-face contacts. Individuals need external references to guide their pri-
vate adjustments. Artifacts such as physical objects, tools, products and working 
materials diagrams, drawings, photographs, buildings, fi les, and records describe 
existing patterns of activity and serve as guides for future action. Organizational 
learning changes the images in the mind, and also in the maps, memories, and 
programs of the organizational environment. Argyris and Schön crystallize their 
view of what organizational learning is in the following.
Organizational learning occurs when individuals within an organization experi-
ence a problematic situation and inquire into it on the organization’s behalf. They 
experience a surprising mismatch between expected and actual results of action and 
respond to that mismatch through a process of thought and further action that leads 
them to modify their images of organization or their understandings of organiza-
tional phenomena and to restructure their activities so as to bring outcomes and 
expectations into line, thereby changing organizational theory-in-use. In order to 
become organizational, the learning that results from organizational inquiry must 
become embedded in the images of organization held in the members’ minds and/
or in the epistemological artifacts (the maps, memories, and programs) embedded 
in the organizational environment. (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p 16) 
Argyris and Schön identify three types of organizational learning. Single-loop 
learning is the product of organizational inquiry that changes strategies of action 
or the assumptions underlying the strategies in ways that leave these assumptions, 
the governing values, unchanged. Single-loop learning is typically suffi cient where 
organizations have to continually detect and correct errors. Double-loop learning is 
the product of inquiry through which the organization changes the values behind 
its theory-in-use, as well as its strategies and assumptions (ibid., pp. 20–21). The 
third type of organizational learning is a specifi c type of double-loop learning that 
is closely linked to the conditions under which individuals interact in organiza-
tional inquiry. The authors call it organizational deuterolearning and it refers to the 
organization’s capacity to learn how to learn. 
Argyris and Schön believe that in situations of mismatch between action strat-
egy and outcome all people utilize similar theories-in-use in the fi nal analysis. 
They call these common theories-in-use Model I and Model II. When human be-
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ings deal with issues that are embarrassing and threatening, they strive to satisfy 
through their actions the governing values of Model I in four ways: defi ning their 
goals and trying to achieve them, maximizing winning and minimizing losing, 
minimizing the generation or expression of negative feelings, and being rational. 
Almost all, over 99 percent, of the people Argyris and Schön studied used this 
general model. The action strategies that the participants adopted in order to sat-
isfy these governing values consisted of designing and managing the environment 
unilaterally, owning and controlling the task, protecting themselves unilaterally, 
and also protecting each other from being hurt. This suggests that members of an 
organization act defensively and that its behavioral world5 consists of defensive 
interpersonal relationships. The individuals lean on defensive norms such as mis-
trust, lack of risk, conformity, external commitment and diplomacy and only test 
their theories of action privately, and not at all publicly. 
The governing values behind Model II include valid information, free and in-
formed choice, and internal commitment. Every signifi cant action is evaluated 
in terms of the degree to which it helps the individuals involved in the activity to 
generate valid and useful information and to share problems in a way that leads to 
productive inquiry. The related action strategies involve sharing power with any-
one who has competence and who is authorized to make decisions concerning the 
implementation of the action in question. The defi nition of the task and control 
over the environment are also shared with all relevant actors. Individuals do not 
compete to make decisions for others, to achieve one-upmanship, or to outshine 
others for the purposes of self-gratifi cation. Their degree of defensiveness within 
groups and among groups will tend to decrease as they function as agents of or-
ganizational learning. The assumptions and norms at the heart of organizational 
theory-in-use may surface, be publicly confronted, tested, and restructured. In the 
behavioral worlds of Model II, the social virtues taught early on in the individu-
als’ life, such as helping, supporting and respecting others, strength, honesty, and 
integrity, are more developed than in Model I (ibid., pp. 117–121).
According to Argyris and Schön, individuals using Model I or II create a cor-
responding organizational learning system (O-I or O-II). These systems are made 
up of structures, such as channels of communication, information systems, the 
spatial environment, procedures and routines, which enable a certain kind of or-
ganizational inquiry. Individual theories-in-use help people to create and main-
tain a certain kind of learning system and the system, in turn, contributes to the 
reinforcing and restructuring of individual theories-in-use. The crucial question 
5 By the term behavioral world Argyris and Schön mean the qualities, meanings, and feelings 
that express the degree of win/lose in games between members within an organization.
12
of organizational learning according to the theory is the shift from Model I to 
Model II, which will lead to a new kind of learning system (ibid., p. 29).
O-I learning systems involve a web of feedback loops that inhibit organiza-
tional learning. A conversation intended to be constructive can, given Model-I 
action strategies, lead to defensive reactions despite the participant’s positive in-
tentions and attempts to correct the error. Such a mismatch between outcomes 
and expectations reinforces and escalates the defensiveness. Argyris and Schön call 
this pattern of action strategies the primary inhibitory loops. The loop comes out 
during face-to-face discussions. Defensive and dysfunctional responses are trig-
gered within such a loop, and information that tends to obscure error is produced. 
Not being able to discuss important issues is a typical example. A primary inhibit-
ing loop may escalate into a secondary inhibiting loop the main components of 
which are organizational defensive routines. These are actions and polices that are 
intended to protect individuals from experiencing or an organization as a whole 
from identifying embarrassment or threat (ibid., 1996, p. 99–100). The defensive 
routines create areas of undiscussable topics, but the very undiscussability also 
becomes undiscussable. The members of the organization are in a double-bind 
situation6: ”If we do not discuss the defensive routines, then the routines will con-
tinue to proliferate. But if we do discuss them, we are likely to get into trouble” 
(ibid., 1996, p. 101).
Thus the challenge is to create an organizational learning system, O-II, that is 
based on Model II theory-in-use. The force driving double-loop learning is the 
discrepancy between theory-in-use and the espoused theory of organizational 
action. However,  because people are programmed with Model I theories-in-use 
from childhood, the O-II learning system cannot evolve spontaneously. Double-
loop learning has to be triggered using deliberately certain maps and rules in a 
process of open inquiry, in which practitioners are enabled to identify and discuss 
their defensive reasoning. 
The intervention method that Argyris and Schön developed focuses on pri-
mary and secondary loops that originally evolved as responses to threatening and 
embarrassing mismatch situations. The individually constructed theories-in-use 
that refl ect these loops are an essential object of the intervention method. This is 
why the focus in the interventions is on the change in the individual’s cognitive 
structures and mental models – not on the learning systems. 
The aim of the intervention is to start the process of open inquiry in the orga-
nization, in which the action researcher promotes the learning processes. Argyris 
6 The authors use the concept created by Gregory Bateson
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and Schön claim that a classroom situation provides a more robust test of the fea-
tures of their theory than questionnaires and interviews because the participants 
are able to provide the instructor with behavioral data that can be used to test the 
theory of organizational learning. Because the participants are dealing with their 
defensive routines, they begin to feel stuck. This feeling leads them to struggle to 
learn new skills, and also to explore their core values.
The data used during the interventions typically consists of transcripts of dis-
cussions, and recordings that are made during work meetings or intervention ses-
sions. The recorded data is picked up from interaction situations that tend to stim-
ulate feelings of embarrassment or threat. Participants are asked to write down in 
one column of a sheet of paper their conversation concerning a problem they have 
in their work. They then record their thoughts and feelings that remained unex-
pressed during the conversation in the adjoining column. In Argyris’ and Schön’s 
view, what the interlocutors write provides directly observable data about their 
theories-in-use. The recorded thoughts – and feelings – give insight into the par-
ticipants’ self-censoring processes (ibid., 1996, pp. 77–78). 
Argyris and Schön do not present any specifi c theory of intervention, but rath-
er report illustrative case examples of interventions they have carried out in ”a 
large electronics fi rm”, and ”in an industrial fi rm”7. The most comprehensive one 
was ”in a leading consulting fi rm of senior executives” and was intended to help 
the whole organization to move from an O-I to an O-II learning system. In their 
case description they explain the design of the intervention8, the feedback process, 
the construction of an action map, the analysis of the discussions and the learning 
experiments. The objective of the whole process was to reveal the limitations of 
the learning systems and to create a new one. 
The authors confess openly that the O-II learning system represents an ideal 
state ”that may never be achieved” but only approximated. It tends not to become 
fi xed and rigid because it continually questions the status quo (ibid., 1996, p. 112). 
Although they believe that the system is not fully developed in any real productive 
organization, they try to show its potential and beginnings by giving illustrative 
case stories from their interventions.
7 Argyris and Schön do not reveal the real names of the fi rms, not do they also describe the daily 
work the participants do.
8 The intervention (Argyris and Schön, 1996,151) is designed around fi ve goals: discovering 1) 
the degree to which the participants’ theory-in-use is consistent with Model I, 2) the degree to 
which their use is consistent with defensive reasoning, 3) the designs they have in their heads, 
4) the degree to which they discourage valid refl ection on their actions, and 5) the defensive 
routines that exist in the organization. In order to reach these goals, the researchers also had to 
engage themselves in re-education.
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They do not analyze the actual production activities of the organizations, but 
rather focus on discussions concerning certain mismatch situations in the past. 
There is a thorough study of organizational learning through discussions during 
classroom intervention sessions. 
Argyris and Schön (ibid., p. 72) believe that organizations are in continual 
transaction with their changing internal and external environments. Organiza-
tional objectives, purposes, and norms are always potentially in confl ict with each 
other. Changes take place and confl icts arise again and again, but learning is not 
connected to specifi c historical changes. The concept of the two learning systems 
that was originally developed by Schön does not refer to the analysis of any specifi c 
historical phase in the development of an organization either. In their view, the re-
sults of double-loop learning cannot be measured against predetermined criteria, 
and their theory incorporates no criteria or concepts for evaluating the develop-
ment of an organization. Organizational learning can only be adequately analyzed 
within an intervention, and thus they do not study it before and after. 
Below is a brief summary of the answers found in Argyris and Schön’s theory 
to the questions presented at the beginning of this chapter.
1. What is organizational learning according to the theory?
Organizational learning is a change in the theory in use of organizational members 
as an outcome of an individual’s inquiry into organizational actions on behalf of 
the organization. Double-loop learning includes the specifi c kind of inquiry that 
changes and the values behind the theory-in-use. This form of organizational learn-
ing is connected to the shift from learning system O-I to learning system O-II. 
2. What triggers organizational learning? 
Organizational learning is triggered by mismatch situations in which the outcome 
of an action does not meet expectations.  O-I learning systems launch loops that 
inhibit learning. These loops can be transformed by means of intervention that 
helps individual members of an organization to identify their defensive reasoning 
and routines and to change the values governing their theories-in-use.
3. What, according to the theory, are the main forms of organizational 
 learning?
Single-loop learning, double-loop learning and organizational deuterolearning, in 
other words learning to learn, are the main types of organizational learning. 
4. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between individual and 
collective learning? 
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The interaction between individual and collective learning depends on the theo-
ries-in-use of the individuals. Individuals engaged in learning system O-I cannot 
correct their theories-in-use collectively, but apply espoused theories that deviate 
from those in use. Because all individuals generally use similar theories-in-use, 
double-loop learning is only possible through planned classroom intervention 
thatreveals and changes the governing values behind such theories. 
5. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between organizational 
learning and historical change in the form of production?
The authors do not discuss the content of organizational actions or the produc-
tion carried out in the organization. They do not make any reference to histori-
cal development in general, or to the relationship between organizational learn-
ing and historical forms of production in particular. The concepts of single- and 
double-loop learning, and of the O-I and O-II learning systems, are conceived of 
as general and as independent of historical changes. They are normative concepts, 
which depict forms of organizational learning in any organization.
2.3 Organizational learning as a change of routines
Rules, aspirations, decision-making, and learning in organizations have been the 
objects of studies that are based on ”the behavioral theory of the fi rm”. The rep-
resentatives of this approach, headed by James March, Richard Cyert, and Her-
bert Simon, have criticized the economic theories that presume that organizations 
behave rationally and that organizational action is based on explicit preferences, 
expectations about future outcomes, and choices based on expectations (March, 
1988, pp. 2–3). 
Cyert and March’s book (1963; 2001) A behavioral theory of the Firm has be-
come a classic in organization theory. It presents a theory of the business fi rm and 
the way in which it makes economic decisions.  The theory takes the fi rm as its 
basic unit, the prediction of the fi rm’s behavior as its objective, and the actual deci-
sion making as its basic research commitment (Cyert & March, 2001, p. 19).
March’s main research interest over the years has been the pursuit of intelli-
gence by individuals and organizations (Augier, 1999, p. 24):
Almost everything I’ve done is concerned one way or another with the pursuit 
of intelligence by individuals and organizations. Decision-making is one way in 
which individuals and organizations pursue intelligence; learning is another 
way – both learning from ones own experience and learning from others; 
variation and selection is another way. Theories of adaptation or action 
might be a broader term than theories of decision-making.
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March and Cyert argue that they can analyze the processes of decision – mak-
ing in the modern fi rm in terms of three groups of variables: organizational goals, 
organizational expectations and organizational choice. The organizational goals 
of a business fi rm are series of independent constraints imposed on it through 
a process of bargaining among potential coalition members and elaborated over 
time in response to short-run pressures. Goals arise in such a form because the 
fi rm is, in fact, a coalition of participants with disparate demands, changing foci 
of attention and a limited ability to attend to all organizational problems simul-
taneously (March & Cyert, 2001, p. 50).  According to the theory, organizational 
expectations are the result of inferences drawn from available information. Organi-
zational choice is made in response to a problem by using standard operating rules, 
which are procedures for solving the kind of problems that the fi rm has managed 
to solve in the past. As time passes by and experience changes through organiza-
tional search and learning, so do the standard operating procedures. The variables 
that affect choice are those that infl uence the defi nition of a problem within the 
organization, those that infl uence the standard decision rules and those that affect 
the order of consideration of alternatives (ibid., p.163).
The general starting point of decision-making is that the fi rm always has to 
operate ”under uncertainty in an imperfect market” (ibid., p. 162). Uncertainty is 
a feature of the organizational decision-making with which the organization has 
to live. In the case of a business fi rm, there are uncertainties with respect to the be-
havior of the market, the suppliers, the attitudes of shareholders, and the behavior 
of competitors. The point is that organizations tend to avoid dealing with these 
uncertainties.
According to March (1998), organizations and their environment adapt to each 
other by means of several intertwined processes. Organizational learning means 
that they exhibit adaptive behavior over time. It has no particular starting point 
and there are no specifi c phenomena that trigger learning because learning is a 
sub-process of continuous decision-making (ibid., 1998, p. 176).
The behavioral theory of the fi rm (March, 1981; March, 1999) represents at-
tempts to analyze how decisions actually come about in organizations as well as in 
individuals. Choices are made without much concern for preferences. Decision-
making actions refl ect images of behavior, and decision makers routinely ignore 
their own fully conscious preferences. They act not on the basis of subjective es-
timates of consequences and preferences, but on the basis of rules, routines, pro-
cedures, practices, identities, and roles. They follow traditions, hunches, cultural 
norms, and the advice or actions of others (March, 1999, p. 22). The processes of 
decision-making are more important than the outcomes: ”Decision making is, in 
part, a performance designed to reassure decision makers and others that things 
are being done appropriately” (March, 1981, p. 232). This is the reason why orga-
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nizational learning that deals with knowledge does not always lead to improve-
ment in performance or to growth in organizational intelligence.
According to the behavioral theory of the fi rm, organizational learning is count-
ed among organizational routines. Simon and March (1958, p. 142) defi ne routines 
as a set of activities in which the making of choices has been simplifi ed by the devel-
opment of a fi xed response to defi ned stimuli. ”If search has been eliminated, but a 
choice remains in the form of a clearly defi ned and systematic computing routine, 
we will still say that activities are routinized”. Routines are not automatic responses, 
but rather resemble grammars that allow fl exible response patterns.
The generic term ”routines” includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, 
strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and 
through which they operate. It also includes the structure of beliefs, frameworks, 
paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and contradict 
formal routines. Routines are independent of the individual actors who execute 
them and are capable of surviving considerable actor turnover (Levitt & March, 
1988, p. 320).
Routines are transmitted to the organization and its members through so- 
cialization, education, imitation, professionalization, personnel movement, merg-
ers, and acquisitions, and they are recorded in its collective memory ”that is of-
ten coherent but sometimes jumbled, that often endures but is sometimes lost 
(ibid.).
Routines are based on interpretations of the past more than on anticipations of 
the future. Interpretations of earlier experiences provide more or less valid infor-
mation about the organization’s history. The ”experiential lessons of history” are 
captured in routines in a way that makes the lessons accessible to organizations 
and individuals who have not themselves experienced the history. They occur 
through trials and errors and the conscious search for better solutions (ibid.).
By translating experience into rules and using these rules as a basis for action, 
an organization modifi es its behavior in a coherent way. Within this framework, 
Levitt and March see organizational learning as ”the encoding of inferences from 
history into routines that guide behavior”. Organizational learning is, in this re-
spect, the continuous refi nement of rules and routines.
Although advocates of the behavioral theory of the fi rm have explained rou-
tines and rules as the basis of organizational learning, they have not been interest-
ed in how the routines in organizational practices evolve over time (Zhou, 1993). 
The defi nition of ”routine” in the theory is so wide that it is diffi cult to operation-
alize it for empirical research. 
Organizational learning, according to March, consists of two main, partly op-
posite processes: exploitation – the use and adaptation of knowledge already at 
hand (routinization, selection, risk aversion, execution) - and exploration – the 
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search for new knowledge (experimentation, variation, risk taking, search). An 
organization that engages only in exploitation will improve its knowledge in an 
increasingly obsolete technology or strategy while one that engages only in explo-
ration will never gain any return from its discoveries. The achievement of an ef-
fective mixing of continuity and change is possible by developing intellectual and 
social structures that sustain a tension between the delights of exploration and the 
delights of exploitation (March, 1991, p. 87).
Intelligence, on the one hand, calls for a mix of these processes, but on the 
other hand learning also tendso to eliminate one the another. Where success is 
diffi cult to achieve or sustain, it is easy for an organization to fall into the trap of 
changing strategies too rapidly to achieve competence in any one of them. This 
cycle of failure and experimentation produces an organization that under-invests 
in exploitation. The successes of exploration are systematically less certain, more 
distant in time, and more distant in space than the success of exploitation. Learn-
ing, which tends to be especially responsive to successes in the temporal and spa-
tial neighbourhood of action, tends to favor exploitation and leads the organiza-
tion to under-invest in exploration. Using the idea of these two modes of learning, 
March developed the argument that adaptive processes, by refi ning exploitation 
more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but 
self destructive in the long run of organizational development. 
Initially, March and Cyert assumed that the rules by which an organization 
adapts its self in the environment may be decision rules, attention rules, or goal-
formulation rules. In the introduction of The Pursuit of organizational Intelligence 
(1999), March identifi es four types of rule development: 1) contractual, in which 
rules are chosen consciously by actors who have calculated the expected conse-
quences of their actions; 2) experientially learned, when the organization modifi es 
rules for action incrementally on the basis of environmental feedback; 3) imita-
tive, when  decision makers copy them from other organizations; and 4) the evolv-
ing collection of invariant rules.
March also discusses how organizations implement rules. In their fi rst model 
of learning, Cyert and March assumed that the search for better solutions is stimu-
lated as soon as existing programs no longer guarantee the achievement of the 
organization’s goals, which are formulated as aspiration levels. This conceptual-
ization proved to be limited because it neglected the link between individual and 
organizational learning. March and Olsen (1975) solved the problem by changing 
the unit of analysis from the organization to the individual. They presented a new 
model of the cycle of organizational learning.
In this model (see Figure 2.1), the cycle of adopting a new rule consists of four 
stages: (a) individual actions based on certain beliefs of the individual; (b) these 
individual actions lead to organizational actions that produce certain outcomes; 
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(c) these outcomes are interpreted as an environmental response, with success be-
ing distinguished from failure, and a link is drawn between actions and perceived 
outcomes; (d) this reasoning leads to new beliefs. March and Olsen also point out 
some barriers that can interrupt this cycle. These are indicated by boldface type 
and pairs of parallel bar lines in Figure 1 (March & Olsen, 1975, p. 158).
Figure 2.1 The cycle of organizational learning (March and Olsen, 1975, p. 158)
The fi rst type of rupture occurs when individual members of a fi rm are prevented 
by certain organizational conditions from adapting their behavior to their beliefs. 
Prevailing role defi nitions or standard operational procedures, for example, may 
create these conditions (ibid.). ”Role-constrained experiential learning” occurs 
when members of an organization are convinced that new actions have to be initi-
ated because environmental conditions have changed but the individuals are not 
able to change their actions. ”Audience experiential learning” occurs when indi-
viduals are able to change their own behavior but they are unable to affect the 
rule-guided actions of others (Rupture 2 in Figure 1). The third type of rupture in 
the learning cycle is caused by misinterpretation of the consequences of organi-
zational actions. The members of the organization cannot accurately assess what 
effects the executed organizational actions will have on the environment and on 
the results. They tend to interpret data as justifying the actions taken in response 
to certain problems that were identifi ed. ”Learning under ambiguity” occurs when 
the changes in the environment cannot be correctly identifi ed. The organizational 
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members are not able to make sense of the environment or to explain why certain 
changes happened (rupture 4 in Figure 1) (ibid.).
The creation and modifi cation of the rules that make up this action cycle are, 
according to March and Olsen, the results of experimentation. They see organi-
zational learning as consisting of three steps: variation through experimentation, 
selection based on inferences drawn from experiments and retention through the 
formulation of rules that produce successful actions and that can be passed on to 
the other members of the organization (ibid.). Rule creation is based on conscious 
experiments, while implementation is based on experience. 
The answers to my questions below summarize the theory:
1. What is organizational learning? 
Organizational learning is the continuous refi nement of corporate routines; to be 
more exact, it is the ”encoding of inferences from history into routines that guide 
behavior”.
2. What triggers organizational learning? 
Organizational learning and decision-making are continuous processes. They have 
no specifi c end or beginning. Dissatisfaction is more important from the point of 
view of learning than satisfaction, however.
3. What are the main forms of organizational learning? 
The main types of organizational learning are exploration and exploitation. The 
knowledge at hand is learned through exploitation and the knowledge that has not 
yet been applied or created is learned through exploration. Organizational learn-
ing is based mainly on experience, but also on experiment. 
4. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between individual and 
collective learning? 
The relationship between individual and collective learning is ambivalent in their 
theory. March and Levitt state that organizational learning is ”more than indi-
vidual learning”. On the other hand, March and Olsen present a learning circle in 
which organizational learning is seen from the point of view of individual adapta-
tion. Individual learning affects organizational learning when an individual can 
change the beliefs of other individuals or change the organizational routines.
5. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between organizational 
learning and historical change in the form of production? 
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Although organizational routines change over time incrementally, the process of 
organizational learning is understood in this theory to be independent of the his-
torical changes in the form of production. 
2.4 Organizational learning as the creation of new knowledge
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) point out how important it is for modern organiza-
tions to create new products, new methods, and new organizational forms. What 
is more fundamental still, they think, is to understand how organizations create 
knowledge that makes such creations possible (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 50). 
Referring to Peter Drucker they point out that in the new economy knowledge 
has become the most important resource in competition between companies: the 
creation of new product innovations requires new knowledge. This change of em-
phasis makes the new society unique (ibid., p. 6). 
Traditional Western epistemology has focused on ”truthfulness” as the essen-
tial attribute of knowledge. Nonaka and Tackeuchi, however, consider knowledge 
to be the dynamic human process of justifying personal beliefs toward the truth 
(ibid., p. 58) and new knowledge is created when existing knowledge is converted 
along two dimensions, the epistemological and the ontological (ibid., p. 58).
In explaining the epistemological dimension they refer to the Michael Polanyi’s 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. They see tacit knowledge as per-
sonal and context-specifi c, and therefore hard to formalize and communicate. 
Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, refers to knowledge that is transmittable 
in formal, systematic language. Human beings acquire knowledge by actively cre-
ating and organizing their own experiences. Knowledge that can be expressed in 
words and numbers represents only the tip of the iceberg of the entire body of 
knowledge (ibid., p. 60). Human beings create knowledge by involving themselves 
with objects, through self-involvement and commitment. 
To know something is to create its image or pattern by tacitly integrating par-
ticulars. In order to understand the pattern as a meaningful whole, it is neces-
sary to integrate one’s body with the particulars. Thus indwelling breaks the 
traditional dichotomies between mind and body, reason and emotion, subject 
and object, and knower and known. Much of our knowledge is the fruit of our 
own purposeful endeavors in dealing with the world. (Nonaka & Tackeuchi, 
1995, p. 60) 
The ontological dimension of knowledge creation consists of organizational pro-
cesses that amplify the knowledge created by individuals and make it organiza-
tional. According to Nonaka and Tackeuchi, the knowledge-creating entities may 
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be individual, group, organizational or inter organizational, but individuals are 
the key actors. They see an organization as a stable structure that supports indi-
viduals’ actions and provides the context for them.
In a strict sense knowledge is created by individuals. An organization cannot 
create knowledge without individuals. The organization supports creative indi-
viduals or provides contexts for them to create knowledge.” (Nonaka & Tackeu-
chi, 1995, p. 59)
They also consider tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge complementary. By 
combining the two dimensions they created a matrix model of four modes of 
knowledge conversion: socialization, externalization, combination and internal-
ization.
According to Nonaka and Tackeuchi, the origin of the knowledge-creation 
process lies in organizational intention, which is defi ned as the organization’s as-
piration to reach its goals. They refer to Weick and Neisser, who argue that know-
ing occurs only in the context of purposeful activity, and that an organization’s 
interpretation of environmental information has an element of the self-fulfi lling 
prophecy because it has a strong will to actualize what it wants to become (ibid., 
p. 74). Learning, in this sense, is based on the adoption of a specifi c organizational 
strategy and goals. In practice, knowledge-creation processes start when managers 
have taken a decision about the development of a new product and give the assign-
ment to a design team.
The role of middle managers is important in the knowledge-creation process. 
They are the people who remake reality, or engineer new knowledge, according 
to the company’s vision. They become effective knowledge engineers if they are 
equipped with the topnotch capabilities of project coordination and management. 
Nonaka and Tackeuchi suggest a new management model they call the middle-up-
down model, in which the middle managers are at the very centre of the knowl-
edge creation (ibid., p. 124).
The spiral of knowledge creation (ibid., pp. 62–70) begins with the conversion 
of the tacit knowledge of one group into the tacit knowledge of another group. 
This conversion is called socialization, which is the process of sharing experi-
ences and creating shared mental models and technical skills. The key to acquir-
ing tacit knowledge is experience: learning through observation, imitation, and 
practice.  The next phase is the construction of explicit concepts by externaliz-
ing tacit knowledge. Knowledge explication is triggered by dialogue or collective 
refl ection. An often-used method is to combine deduction and induction, or to 
use metaphors or analogies. The third phase is combination, which is a process of 
systematizing concepts into a knowledge system. Documents, meetings, telephone 
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conversations and computerized communication networks are used as media in 
combination. Reconfi guration of explicit knowledge by sorting, adding, combin-
ing, and categorizing leads to a new kind of explicit knowledge, which is eventually 
internalized and converted into tacit knowledge. When experiences are internal-
ized in individuals’ mental models and technical know-how through socializa-
tion, externalization and combination, they become valuable assets. This cycle of 
knowledge creation is repeated over and over again in complex processes such as 
the development of new products.
Figure 2.2 Four modes of knowledge conversion (Nonaka & Tackeuchi, 1995, p. 62)
According to Nonaka and Tackeuchi (1995, p. 70), organizational knowledge cre-
ation involves  continuous and dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge. This interaction is shaped by shifts between different modes of knowl-
edge conversion, which are in turn induced by several triggers. The socialization 
mode starts with building a ”fi eld” of interaction. Externalization is triggered by 
meaningful dialogue or collective refl ection. The combination mode is triggered 
through collaboration with newly created knowledge. Learning by doing triggers 
the internalization.
Because the knowledge-creation spiral requires certain conditions in the orga-
nization Nonaka and Tackeuchi (ibied., pp. 70–90) also introduce an integrated 
fi ve-phase model incorporating the time dimension in their theoretical frame-
work (Figure 3). The sequence of phases begins with socialization, in other words 
sharing tacit knowledge. The next phase, creating concepts, is the process of ex-
ternalization in which tacit knowledge becomes explicit. The shared tacit men-
tal models are now verbalized in words and phrases, and fi nally crystallized into 
explicit concepts. The third phase, justifying the concepts, involves determining 
whether the newly created concepts are truly worthwhile for the organization and 
Tacit knowledge
Tacit knowledge
Explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge
Socialization
Internalization Combination
Externalization
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society. The fourth phase, building an archetype, means the conversion of the jus-
tifi ed concept into something tangible and concrete, and the fi fth phase involves 
the cross-leveling of knowledge. Organizational knowledge creation is a never-
ending interactive and spiral process that upgrades itself continuously and occurs 
both intra-organizationally and inter-organizationally.
Figure 2.3 A fi ve-phase model of the organizational knowledge-creation process (Nonaka 
& Tackeuchi, 1995, p. 84)
Nonaka and Tackeuchi suggest that two types of organizational structure were 
in oscillation during the 20th century: bureaucracy and task-force. Bureaucratic 
structures are highly formalized, specialized and centralized, and work effectively 
for routine operations. Task-force management, on the other hand, is fl exible, 
adaptive, dynamic and participative, and is effective in carrying out well-defi ned 
tasks within a predefi ned time. In their view, as knowledge and innovation have 
become necessary to companies, a new organizational structure, a ”hypertext or-
ganization”, is needed. A Hypertext organization is a synthesis of the bureaucratic 
and task-force structures, and its purpose is to enable an organization to create 
knowledge. The effi ciency and stability of the bureaucracy is combined with the 
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effectiveness and dynamism of the task-force organization. It also contains a third 
layer, the knowledge base, in which the knowledge generated in the two organiza-
tional structures is recategorized and conceptualized in relation to the fi rm’s cor-
porate vision, culture and technology (Nonaka & Tackeuchi, 1995, p. 241). A hy-
pertext structure is a necessary prerequisite for continuous knowledge creation.
Below is a summary of the fi ve features of the theory in terms of the answers it 
gives to my questions.
1. What is organizational learning? 
Organizational learning is the creation, justifi cation, and cross levelling of new 
concepts. 
2. What triggers organizational learning? 
The theory does not explicate any driving force behind organizational learning. 
Learning begins when a manager gives an assignment to a design group. Knowl-
edge creation is a result of adopting organizational goals, because the organization 
”has a strong will to self-actualize what it wants to become.” 
3. What, according to the theory, are the forms organizational learning? 
The forms of learning are the processes of knowledge conversion: socialization, 
externalization, combination and internalization. 
4. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between individual and 
collective learning? 
New knowledge is created fi rst and foremost collectively by groups of designers. A 
Hypertext organization can support the knowledge-creation process.
5. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between organizational 
learning and historical change in the form of production?
Nonaka’s and Tackeuchi’s theory is an attempt to respond to the current historical 
change in the business environment, but it does not deal otherwise with historical 
changes in production. Learning is about creating new knowledge in order to de-
sign and produce new products for the market in which knowledge -creation has 
become an essential element of competition and profi t making. 
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2.5 Organizational learning as the development of communities of 
practice
Lave and Wenger (1991) propose in their book ”Legitimated Peripheral Learning” 
that learning involves a deepening process of participation in a community of 
practice. Wenger extends this framework in ”Learning, identity, meaning” (1998) 
by using the term the social perspective of learning. This more general concept is 
a result of the further development of the concept of practice, and its connection 
to the analysis of the development of an individual’s identity. Wenger proposes a 
framework for thinking about learning in terms of communities, their practices, 
the meanings they make possible, and the development of identities. He also ex-
plores the implications of their joint framework for the design of organizations 
and organizational learning.
The Lave and Wenger theory of ”legitimate peripheral learning” was originally 
based on their ethnographical studies on the apprenticeships of midwives, tailors, 
quartermasters, and butchers, and on non-drinking alcoholics. They emphasized 
the fact that learning is situational and embedded in a practice: it is an integral 
part of a generative social practice in the lived-in world. They proposed the con-
cept of legitimate peripheral participation as a general descriptor of human en-
gagement in social practice that entails learning as an integral constitutient (Lave 
& Wenger, 1991, p. 35). 
Communities of practice are everywhere, according to the theory. Human be-
ings are generally involved in a number of them – whether at work, in school, at 
home, or in civic and leisure interests. People are core members in some groups, 
in others more on the periphery. Learners inevitably participate in communities 
of practice, and the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move 
toward full participation in the one in question. A person’s intentions to learn are 
engaged and the meaning of learning is confi gured through the process of be-
coming a full participant in a socio-cultural practice. This social process includes 
the learning of knowledgeable skills (ibid., p. 29). A community of practice is an 
intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, not least because it provides 
the interpretive support necessary for making sense of the cultural heritage. Thus 
participation in the cultural practice in which knowledge exists is an epistemologi-
cal principle of learning (ibid., 1991, p. 98).
Strictly speaking, the social perspective of learning is not a theory of organi-
zational learning. However, Wenger’s purpose is to show that placing the focus on 
participation has broad implications in terms of what it takes to understand and 
support learning. For individuals, it means that learning is a question of engaging 
in and contributing to the practices of their communities, while for communities 
it is a question of refi ning their practices and ensuring new generations of mem-
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bers. For organizations it is a matter of sustaining the interconnected communities 
of practice through which the organization gains knowledge and thus becomes 
effective and valuable as an organization (Wenger, 1998, pp. 7–8).
Wenger maintains that learning is inseparable from practice. Although the 
characteristics of communities of practice vary, the people involved are brought 
together by what they have learned through their mutual engagement in common 
activities. A community of practice differs from a community of interest or a geo-
graphical community in that it involves a shared practice.  
Being alive as human beings means that we are constantly engaged in the pur-
suit of enterprises of all kinds, from ensuring our physical survival to seeking 
the most lofty pleasures. As we defi ne these enterprises and engage in their 
pursuit together, we interact with each other and with the world and we tune 
our relations with each other and with the world accordingly. In other words 
we learn. 
Over time, this collective learning results in practices that refl ect both the pur-
suit of our enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices are 
thus the property of a kind of community created over time by the sustained 
pursuit of a shared enterprise. It makes sense, therefore to call these kinds of 
communities communities of practice. (Wenger, 1998, p. 45)
Wenger and Snyder (2000) describe more concretely how communities of practice 
differ from formal work groups, project teams, and formal networks. The purpose 
of a community of practice is to develop its members’ capabilities: to build and 
exchange knowledge. The members select themselves and the community of prac-
tice holds together because the members have passion, commitment and identifi -
cation with the group’s expertise. Communities of practice are sustained as long 
as there is interest in maintaining the group. Wenger and Snyder (2000) also use 
examples of product-delivery consultants and line technicians to describe how 
they can exist entirely within a business unit, and how they can stretch across 
divisional boundaries. 
Wenger (1998) characterizes the concept of practice from the viewpoint of do-
ing, but not just doing in and of it self. He views doing in a historical and social 
context that gives meaning and structure to what participants do. Thus practice 
is always a social and cultural practice (1998, p. 47), and learning is fi rst and fore-
most the human’s ability to negotiate meanings. The notion of meaning refers to 
experience, while practice is about the meaning of experiences of everyday life. 
Human life involves the constant negotiation of meanings: people produce mean-
ings that extend, redirect, dismiss, reinterpret, modify or confi rm, or negotiate 
anew – the histories of meanings of which they are a part.
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Negotiating meanings involves the whole person in a dynamic interplay be-
tween participation and reifi cation. The term participation describes the social 
experience of living in the world in terms of membership in social enterprises. It 
is personal and social. It is a complex process that combines doing, talking, think-
ing, feeling and belonging. It includes the whole persons, including their bodies, 
minds, emotions and social relations. It can involve all kind of relations, confl ic-
tual as well as harmonious, intimate as well as political, competitive as well as co-
operative. Participation shapes human experience and it also shapes communities: 
the transformative potential goes both ways. It is broader than mere engagement 
in practice. Offi cials are not offi cials only when they are working in their offi ces 
(ibid., pp. 55–57).
Any community of practice produces abstractions, tools, symbols, stories, 
terms, and concepts that reify something of that practice in a congealed form.  The 
notion of reifi cation is used to convey the idea that what is in a concrete material 
object is not in itself a concrete, material object. It refers to the processes of giving 
form to human experience by producing objects that congeal this experience into 
”thingness”. In so doing, people create points of focus around which the negotia-
tion of meaning becomes organized. Writing down a law, creating a procedure and 
producing a tool are similar processes. A certain understanding is given a form. 
This form then becomes a focus for the negotiation of meaning, as people use 
the law to argue a point, use the procedure to know what to do, or use the tool to 
perform an action (ibid., pp. 57–59).
Wenger points out that, as an analytical concept, community of practice is a 
limited category for describing the very large society of the global economy, and 
also smaller ones such as a company, factory or school. He views these kinds of 
social confi gurations as constellations of interconnected practices (ibid., pp. 122–
125), and in this sense he views organizations as constellations of interconnected 
communities of practice.
Wenger emphasizes the connection between practice and identity.  The devel-
opment of human identity, even in the context of a specifi c practice, is not just a 
matter that is internal to that practice, but also involves the participants’ position 
and the position of their communities in broader social structures. He maintains 
that the characteristics of practice can be construed as the characterization of the 
identity that inherits its richness and complexity. 
Non-participation is also a central aspect of the formation of individual iden-
tity. People not only produce their identities through the practices they engage in, 
they also defi ne themselves through the practices they do not engage in (ibid., p. 
164). Being an outsider, or a peripheral participant, or being marginalized, may be 
forms of non-participation. In order to make sense of the formation of identity 
and learning he distinguishes three modes of belonging. Engagement means active 
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involvement in the mutual process of negotiation, imagination means creating 
images of the world and seeing connections through time and space by extrapolat-
ing from one’s own experience, and alignment involves coordinating participants’ 
energy and activities in order to fi t within broader structures and to contribute to 
broader enterprises. 
Wenger maintains that engagement, imagination, and alignment create rela-
tions of belonging that expand identity through space and time. Each of them 
requires a different kind of work, and each gives rise to various kinds of communi-
ties. The work of engagement is the work of forming communities of practice. It 
requires from the participants the ability to take part in meaningful activities and 
interactions in the production of sharable artifacts, in community-building conver-
sations, and in the negotiation of new situations. The work of imagination requires 
the ability to disengage – to move back and look at our engagement through the eyes 
of an outsider. It demands some degree of playfulness. The work of alignment re-
quires from the participants the ability to coordinate perspectives in order to direct 
energies to a common purpose. The challenge is to connect local efforts to broader 
styles and discourses in ways that allow learners to invest their energy in them (ibid., 
pp. 183–188). He concludes that the notion of belonging is a basis for talking about 
learning, identity, and power in social terms at the same time. 
Communities of practice do not take knowledge as an object: it is a living part of 
the practice even when it is documented. Knowledge is a matter of competence with 
respect to valued enterprises, such as singing in tune, fi xing machines, and growing 
up as a girl or a boy.  What is called general knowledge is not privileged with respect 
to other kinds of knowledge. The generality of any form of knowledge always lies in 
its power to renegotiate the meaning of the past and the future in constructing the 
meaning of present circumstances (ibid., p. 4; Lave and Wenger, 1991, pp 33–34).
The community of practice acts as a locally negotiated regime of competence. 
Within such a regime, knowing can be defi ned as competent participation in the 
practice. To become even a peripheral member of a community of practice means 
doing some learning along the three dimension of competence: the ability to en-
gage with other members of the community and respond to their actions (mu-
tuality of engagement), the ability to understand the enterprise of a community 
of practice deeply enough and to take some responsibility (accountability of the 
enterprise), and the ability to make use of the repertoire of the practice to engage 
in it (negotiability of the repertoire) (ibid., pp. 136–137).
Learning is not only a matter of competence, but also a matter of experienc-
ing meaning.  For learning to be possible in practice, there must be interaction 
between an experience of meaning and a regime of competence. Although expe-
rience and competence are both constituents of learning, they do not determine 
each other. Competence may drive experience and experience may drive compe-
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tence. This two-way interaction is crucial to the evolution of practice. In it lies the 
potential for transforming both experience and competence, and thus for learn-
ing, individually and collectively. Wenger characterizes learning – taken to be the 
transformation of knowing – as a change in alignment between experience and 
competence, whichever of the two takes the lead in causing realignment at any 
given moment (ibid., pp. 138–139).
Communities of practice provide a context not only for the learning of new-
comers, but also for new insights to be transformed into knowledge. They are 
privileged loci for the acquisition of knowledge when they are contexts that can 
give newcomers access to competence, and also invite personal engagement. They 
may also be privileged loci for the creation of new knowledge when they serve as 
good contexts within which to explore radically new insights.
Wenger highlights the close interaction between competence and experience 
as a continuous source of learning: ”If they settle down into a state of locked-in 
congruence, the learning slows down, and practice becomes stale” (ibid., p. 214). 
He calls the communities of practice that can keep this tension alive learning com-
munities, a concept to which he ascribes many meanings (ibid., pp. 214–221):
 Learning communities will become places of identity to the extent that they 
make identity formation trajectories. 
 Learning communities have a strong core but they let peripheral and core 
activities interact, because it is in the interactions that they are likely to fi nd 
the new experiences and new forms of competence necessary to create new 
knowledge. 
 Learning communities can combine modes of belonging .
 Learning community confronts structural issues of identifi cation and nego-
tiability both internally and externally. 
 Learning community is fundamentally involved in social reconfi guration.
 
Wenger further emphasizes that learning cannot be designed. It belongs to the 
realm of experience and practice and moves on its own terms.
Learning changes who we are by changing our ability to participate, to belong, 
to negotiate meaning. And this ability is confi gured socially with respect to 
practices, communities and economics of meaning where it shapes our identi-
ties. (ibid., p. 226)
Thus, communities of practice cannot be designed either. They cannot be legis-
lated into existence or defi ned by decree. Practice itself is not amenable to design. 
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In other words, one can articulate patterns or defi ne procedures, but neither the 
patterns nor the procedures produce the practice as it unfolds. One can design 
work processes but not work practices.
Although learning cannot be designed, Wenger thinks that it can be facilitated. 
The design from this perspective has to be a dialogue, a design from the inside, 
not from the outside. He rather talks about ”architectures” for learning, which lay 
out basic questions and basic components that must be provided in any design 
for learning. He maintains that no community can fully design the learning of 
another, and no community can fully design its own learning. The design cannot 
clearly separate conception and realization, but must instead combine different 
forms of knowledge so that they inform each other.
Organizations can do what they do or learn what they learn only through their 
practices. Communities of practice differ from organizational entities along three 
dimensions: they negotiate their enterprise, arise evolve and dissolve according to 
their own learning, and shape their own boundaries.
Neither design nor teaching can cause learning. What ends up being learned 
may or may not be what was taught, or more generally what the institutional or-
ganization intended. Learning is an emer gent, ongoing process, which may use 
teaching as one of its many structuring resources. In this regard, teachers and in-
structional materials be come resources for learning in much more complex ways 
than through their pedagogical intention (ibid., p. 267).
1. According to the theory, what is organizational learning? 
Wenger and Lave’s social perspective on learning suggests that learning in and for 
organizations means that the communities of practice within them sustain and 
develop.
2. What triggers organizational learning?
The constant tension between competence and experience triggers learning. The 
authors conceptualize this in ”Legitimate peripheral learning” as the contradiction 
between newcomer and old-timer within a community of practice. 
3. What are the main forms of organizational learning? 
Although the social theory of learning maintains that learning is a temporal pro-
cess, it does not defi ne specifi c forms, stages or phases. Learning has no specifi c 
end or beginning. It is continuously connected to the development of practices. 
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4. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between individual and 
collective learning? 
The very nature of learning is collective.  Both individual and organizational learn-
ing are impossible without individuals’ participation in communities of practice.
5. How does the theory conceptualize the relationship between organizational 
learning and historical change in the form of production? 
Wenger and Lave do not recognize any historical changes in forms of learning. 
On the contrary their main argument is that the age-old form of apprenticeship 
is a general form that has to be sustained and facilitated. In other words, learning 
through peripheral participation has to be legitimated. 
2.6 The inadequacy of organizational learning theories in understand-
ing the current change in learning in and for production
My purpose in this chapter has been to analyze the kind of conceptual tools the 
four most infl uential theories of organizational learning provide for understand-
ing the nature of current historical change in learning in and for production. The 
results of my analysis are summarized in Figure 4.
The following overall conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.
1. Theories of organizational learning conceptualize the phenomenon in com-
pletely different ways.
2. The theories do not address the question of historical changes in organiza-
tional learning.
3. The theories do not provide categories for conceptualizing the ongoing chang-
es in production and in learning in and for production. They do, however, 
provide, abstract models and normative principles of learning: O-II learning 
systems, achieving a balance between exploration and exploitation, the learn-
ing community, and hypertext organization.
Learning in Organizations is conceptualized in the theories as a change of govern-
ing values, as refi nement of routine, as sustaining the interconnected communities 
of practice, or as creating new knowledge. The driving force behind it is either not 
explicated at all or is seen quite differently, as are the forms of learning and the 
relation between individual and collective learning.
The differences between the theories are so profound that one could ask to 
what extent they are dealing with the same phenomena.
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The common feature in all of them is their ahistorical and abstract nature. 
They search for universal mechanisms of organizational learning and abstract his-
torical specifi cities. The other side of the universality aspect, however, seems to be 
a certain kind of limitedness. The theories seem to limit the concept of organiza-
tional learning to formal aspect its contents. The assumption is that the forms and 
contents are independent of each other, and that organizational learning processes 
are universal.
Table 2.1 The dimensions of the four theories of organizational learning 
Argyris & Schön March & Levitt Wenger & Lave Nonaka & 
Tackeuchi
What is 
organizational 
learning?
Inquiry that leads 
to changes in 
organizational 
theories-in-use 
and the values 
that govern them
Change of rules/ 
routines in a 
fi rm; 
Sustaining 
interconnected 
communities of 
practice within an 
organization
The creation of 
new knowledge 
and concepts 
What triggers 
organizational 
learning?
Mismatch 
between the 
expected and 
actual outcomes 
of an action
Not 
conceptualized: 
rather 
dissatisfaction 
than satisfaction
Tension between 
experience and 
competence 
Management’s 
decision to launch 
a design process
What are the 
main phases 
or forms of 
organizational 
learning?
Single-loop 
learning,
double-loop 
learning, and
organizational 
deuterolearning
Exploration and 
exploitation;
Role-constrained 
learning, 
audience 
learning,
superstitious 
learning, and 
learning under 
ambiguity
Not explicated Phases of the 
knowledge-
creation cycle: 
socialization, 
externalization, 
combination, 
internalization 
How is the 
relation 
between 
individual 
and collective 
learning 
conceptualized?
Individuals inquire 
on behalf of the 
organization, 
which is a 
regulative agency 
Ambiguous; 
individuals in a 
fi rm encode their 
interpretations of 
historical lessons 
into routines 
that guide the 
behavior of the 
fi rm
Both 
individual and 
organizational 
learning is based 
on individuals’ 
participation in 
communities of 
practice 
The creation of 
new knowledge 
is a collaborative 
process to which 
the individual 
participants 
contribute
How does 
the theory 
conceptualize 
the relationship 
between 
organizational 
learning and 
historical change 
in the form of 
production?
Not explicated; 
organizational 
learning is 
described in 
universal and 
ahistorical terms
Not explicated; 
decision-making 
and learning 
processes are 
universal, not 
specifi c to a 
historical period 
Learning has 
been similar 
as long as 
communities of 
practices have 
existed 
Not explicated, 
although 
the theory is 
substantiated by 
reference to the 
current change 
in the business 
environment
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Prange (1999) criticized theories of organizational learning for not having been 
able to produce a coherent body of knowledge. Nevertheless, this could highlight 
the pluralistic character of reality and, contrary to common sense, imply that there 
exists outside of the actors a ”real world” with its own unique qualities. 
The problem is that there seems to be no common object in the research on or-
ganizational learning. Researchers who base their work on one theory or another 
do not necessarily study the same phenomenon. They do not share any categories 
for describing the object of their study. Because they consider the phenomena 
of organizational learning from quite different points of departure, they produce 
results that are incompatible and make comparison and discussion between the 
theories impossible. Holzkamp (1978) aptly described the same methodological 
problem in psychology.
Theoretical randomness (…) is not characterized by the existence of many dif-
ferent theories that are directed at different objects outlined from each other, 
but there exist many theories that are incompatible with their main concepts, 
theories that claim to have universal validity and that are directed every time 
at the same object as if they were competing with each other. It is not possible 
on the basis of any scientifi c criteria unambiguously to determine, what kinds 
of theories are acceptable and which are to be discarded.(…) Each of the theo-
ries, which compete with each other, claims validity in a certain area (however 
narrow an area it is) of reality universally, in other words, without restricting 
any validity requirements. The validity given under other conditions by other 
theories becomes so precluded. (Holzkamp 1978, p. 135, translated by JP)
Holzkamp (1978, p. 108) points out that given the lack of shared basic categories 
as opposed to the development of a science, there is an increase in the number of 
incompatible theories, a direction that he calls epistemological anarchism. He has 
developed a method, the purpose of which is to overcome this problem that he 
calls as the ”logical-historical method”. It incorporates logical, logical-historical and 
real-historical analysis.
The method does not mean implementing formal methodological canons into 
random content. The aim is rather to reveal real material developmental pro-
cesses concerning the essence of an object in the developmental logic of its 
becoming. (Holzkamp, 1978, p. 108, translated by JP)
The four infl uential theories of organizational learning described above illumi-
nate some aspects of the concept, but they do not provide concepts for analyzing 
historical changes in the logic of learning in and for production, nor in the devel-
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opmental logic of these changes. I will turn in the next chapter three theories that 
deal with historical change in production in order to determine what explanatory 
resources they provide for understanding historical change of learning in and for 
production.
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3 Learning in theories of the historical 
development of production
3.1 Three theories explaining historical change
In this chapter I will examine three theories that could shed light on historical 
change in the context of learning in and for production. The fi rst one is set out 
in Freeman and Louçã’s (2001) study on the relationship between technological 
innovation and the long cycles in the development of capitalism9. The authors 
analyze the interrelationships between developments in the economy, technology, 
and institutions. By explaining the dynamics of economic development and the 
changes in the forms of economic activity the theory provides a general societal 
context for understanding changes in learning in and for production. The second 
theory, Paul Adler’s (2001) analysis of the historical transformation of managerial 
doctrines, provides the means for bridging the gap between general social develop-
ment and production by describing changes in management doctrines.10 Thirdly 
Victor and Boynton’s (1998) model of historical forms of work and the ”the right 
path” in the development of production links the qualitative changes in produc-
tion with changes in learning.
9 Freeman and Louçã’s theory is important in the context of learning in and for production 
because they emphasize economics as a historical science and the need to analyze the qualita-
tive difference between periods of capitalist development. They reject approaches that employ 
mechanistic and purely econometric methods and those that focus only on the ‘trends’ in ag-
gregate GDP. They also criticize Regulation theorists (Boyer, 1988) and Social Structure Accu-
mulation theorists (Gordon, 1986) for concentrating on the precise defi nition or evolution of 
economic periods rather than their nature and developmental connections.
10 Adler’s study is based on Barley and Kunda’s  (1992) theory according to which rational and 
normative management rhetoric is associated with economic long-waves and technologies. Ra-
tional rhetoric dominates during periods of expansion, and the normative approach returns 
with the downturn. Abrahamsson (1997) confi rmed this theory using bibliometric and eco-
nomic data
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3.2 Freeman and Louçã’s theory of techno-economic paradigms
Long waves of economic growth 
Freeman and Louçã argue that we are witnessing a deep technological revolution 
based on a cluster of innovations in information technology: the computer and soft-
ware, microelectronics, the Internet, and the mobile telephone. Industries based on 
these innovations mushroomed in the United States in the 1990s and accounted for a 
major part of the growth in the entire economy (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 301). 
The pervasiveness of the current technological revolution in the economy and 
in society is comparable to the breakthrough of mass production after the Second 
World War. Since the institutional and social changes associated with this techno-
logical revolution are still unfolding, and are at a relatively early stage of develop-
ment, it is not yet possible to describe the nature of the change. The fragile and 
unstable nature of the economy brought about by ongoing changes such as capi-
tal-market infl ation, privatisation, and changes in stock-market ownership does 
not make forecasting easier. One thing seems clear, however. The new economy is 
based on the continuous production of innovations.
One of the most dynamic fi elds in organizational and institutional innovation 
is the fi nancial market. The competition is ferocious: it is necessary to capture 
the savings in all their forms by multiplying new bank products, rearranging 
the systems of alliances and redefi ning the shape of the service. The capital 
market infl ation is at the very centre of this drive for innovation, as it is both 
its cause and its consequence. Innovation requires more innovation, and the 
infl ationary process requires more funds, and consequently further changes. 
(Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 302)
Freeman and Louçã argue, in their ”reasoned economic history”, that successive 
technological revolutions have caused dramatic changes in the economy and in 
the whole of society. Technological inventions play a crucial role in these transfor-
mations, but they also involve issues of social capability based on institutions that 
facilitate the international diffusion of technological knowledge and its national 
application. 
Freeman and Louçã base their theory on Nikolai Kondratiev’s observations 
concerning long waves of economic growth. They see these waves as a phenom-
enon typical of the capitalist mode of production with its upswing and down-
swing phases. They introduce new content to the study of long waves by analyzing 
the degree of ”match” between the techno-economic and the socio-organizational 
elements of the economy: a good match explains the upswings and increasing 
mismatch the downswings. 
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Technological innovations hold center stage in the long waves of economic 
development. Nevertheless they are not isolated events, but are always and neces-
sarily related to the availability of material, energy, components, skills, and infra-
structure. The development of particular innovations is important, but the deci-
sive factor in terms of economic development is the clustering of complementary 
innovations. Economic growth is driven by different clusters of technologies in 
different eras, and different institutional structures are needed to exploit and sup-
port these technologies. 
The relationship between science and technology is an interactive one and new 
constellations of innovations depend on advances in both.  Freeman and Louçã 
show how these new constellations of technology and social institutions emerge, 
spread and ultimately come to dominate society for a few decades before, after a 
period of several decades of great turbulence, giving way to a new constellation. 
They analyse the processes of technological, structural, and social change that give 
rise to long waves of economic development.
In each long wave, a set of innovations makes one or a few core inputs (iron, 
coal, steel, oil, electronic chips) into the economy, such as the cheap and univer-
sally available resources that give rise to a vast array of new combinations of pro-
duction factors. The new innovations and branches of production arising from 
the core input become the major industries in each economic wave.
The new products utilizing these core inputs and some complementary inputs 
stimulate the rise of other new industries that become the ones to carry the growth 
in the upswing. The rapid growth and great market potential of ”the carrier indus-
tries”, provide a major impetus to the growth of the entire economy. The carrier 
branches of the fi ve long waves were the cotton textile industry, the production 
of steam engines, railways, the production of electrical products, the automobile 
industry, and computer-software production. (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 147)
A new infrastructure (from canals to information highways) has to be built to 
serve the needs of the new industries, and this stimulates and facilitates further the 
rapid growth of both the carrier branch and the major industry. Other branches of 
the economy (induced branches) are compelled to follow in the wake of the lead-
ing sectors, which included service stations, repair shops, garages and distributors 
in the case of automobiles, and later the development of mass tourism and ”fast 
food” restaurants.
The structural transformation arising from these new industries, services, 
products and technologies is associated with a combination of organizational 
innovations and transformations in the social institutions that design, use, pro-
duce, and distribute them. New principles and rules for managing and organiz-
ing production using the new technology will gradually emerge and become the 
self-evident ”common sense” of management. Freeman and Louçã (2001, p. 147) 
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call this new approach to management and organization a ”new techno-economic 
paradigm”. Once it has emerged and has demonstrated its effectiveness, it has a 
wider infl uence on society, affecting government and the general culture as well 
as business fi rms. The same new principles may also prove effective in the old 
industries. For example, mass and fl ow production techniques developed in the 
automobile and oil industries could also be applied in the food and the catering 
industry. Computer systems are used in practically all industries and services. 
The technological revolutions, periods of upswing and downswing, and the 
major institutional changes in the fi ve long waves of economic growth are pre-
sented in Table 3.1.
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Such a widespread process of structural and organizational change could hardly 
take place in a smooth and gradual way. The new techno-economic-paradigm is 
not easily accepted universally despite its evident superiority and profi tability in 
many applications: the strong vested interests associated with the previous domi-
nant paradigm, and the regulatory regime and the cultural norms associated with 
the institutions involved, are inhibitory factors. 
Thus the downswing of the long wave is a period of great turbulence character-
ized by the rapid growth and high profi tability of some new fi rms and industries, 
together, with slowing growth, declining trends and stagnation in others, and by 
political confl ict over the appropriate regulatory regime. Monetary disorder, rela-
tively high levels of unemployment, and tariff disputes are typical of these tran-
sitional periods of structural adjustment. The mismatch between the old institu-
tional framework and the new constellation of technologies is resolved in various 
ways in different countries and different industries (ibid., p. 148). The growth in 
new constellations may also be constrained in various ways by the old institutional 
and social framework, which is more resistant to change than the technology itself 
(ibid., 2001, p. 151).
Freeman and Louçã show how rapid growth in the major industries that pro-
duces the ”core inputs”, and how the ”carrier branches” act as exemplars for an 
entire historical period. They considered the emergence of new core inputs, major 
industries, and carrier branches recurrent phenomena, but the ways in which they 
affect society are unique. They emphasize the fact that every techno-economic 
paradigm leads to a specifi c way of managing and organizing production. 
It seems fairly obvious that the diffusion of the constellation of major technical 
and organizational innovations through the economic and social system must 
cause profound changes in the structure as well as in the occupation and skill 
profi les and management systems. Moreover, precisely because each constella-
tion is unique they will have very different effects in each technological revolu-
tion. (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 338)
They also highlight the essential role of learning in economic growth: because the 
mechanisms of economic growth during each Kondratiev wave are unique, every 
technical revolution also creates historically unique challenges and opportunities 
for learning (ibid., 2001, p. 338). 
What have been changing are the ways of learning and accumulating knowl-
edge and passing it on, interacting with changing ways of organizing produc-
tion, and regulating economic activities and social behaviour. Learning by do-
ing, even if it was once mainly learning by gathering and eating, has always 
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been with us. Learning by producing and using have been with us since the 
early use of tools of various kinds. Learning by interacting has always been with 
us. These are persistent human activities across all the civilizations. What have 
changed are the modes of learning, and the ways in which different modes of learn-
ing interact with each other. (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 132, italics JP)
In the two following sections I will describe in more detail the technological revo-
lutions and the qualitative transformation of the ”techno-economic paradigms” 
of industrial production.
The paradigm change from water-powered mechanization to mass production
The innovations that created the fi rst and second long waves of economic growth 
took place in Britain, and since then the new waves have started in the United 
States. The fi rst constellation of technical and organizational innovation was 
based on the water-powered mechanization of industry. Iron and raw cotton were 
the core inputs of this wave. Cotton spinning with the new Jenny machine and 
many other innovations were supported by the building of canals and turnpike 
roads. New entrepreneurs from very different backgrounds, with Arkwright at the 
head of them, combined the innovations of the time by installing machinery in 
purpose-built premises. Similar constructions, called factories, spread in a short 
time all over Britain. The use of new innovations such as the waterwheel was dem-
onstrated in technological experiments, and some scientifi c articles were written 
about those that were tried out in the factories.  From the beginning of the fi rst 
Kondratiev wave, called the First Industrial Revolution, entrepreneurs planned 
ideal factories together with scientists. The workers in the factories also played a 
key role in making innovations in cotton production. 
Iron and coal were the core inputs of the second Kondratiev wave. Railways 
became a carrier branch in the steam-powered mechanization of industry. Trains 
and steam-powered ships began to replace the previous transport and commu-
nications structure. Railway companies were the fi rst large companies ever.11 The 
management systems that were developed during that time, which focused specifi -
cally on punctuality, functional specialization and hierarchies, were important in 
the next wave when huge organizations emerged in other industries too. As en-
trepreneurs increasingly used machines in their plants, the specifi c skills required 
to operate them also increased. The solution that management most commonly 
11 In Britain the explosion in the public use of railways even surprised the entrepreneurs. 
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adopted was to delegate the responsibility for managing production to skilled craft 
workers or foremen, often in the form of a subcontract for a group of workers and 
machines.12
The third long wave, from 1895 to 1940, was based on the electrifi cation of in-
dustry and transport. Steel and copper were important raw materials in the manu-
facture of electrical products such as batteries, electric motors, generators, multi-
core cables, illumination for public buildings, arc lights for streets, and telephones. 
The spread of telephones and typewriters began the process of offi ce mechaniza-
tion, characteristic of the development of bureaucracy in large fi rms.  Electricity 
and chemistry were areas in which scientifi c research began to be directly and 
intimately related to industrial development. Machines for producing machines 
and heavy engineering also began to feature in the economy of that age. 
In the two earlier waves, the average factory workforce consisted, on average, 
of about one hundred skilled machine operators. During the third wave, the fac-
tories became giants.13 The rise in fi xed costs, associated with increasing capital 
intensity, put pressure on companies to sustain or improve profi tability by using 
the physical capacity of their workers more fully and controlling the fl ow of ma-
terials and components. The management models of the industrial giants derived 
almost entirely from the railways – the carrier branch of the previous wave.14 By 
introducing the scientifi c management method to a growing class of professional 
managers, Frederic Taylor provided the rationale for a whole set of organizational 
innovations and new management institutions. The main organizational inno-
vation of the third Kondratiev wave was the new management bureaucracy that 
was based on professionalization and specialization, which replaced the previous 
contract-based system.
12 This devolution went so far in some English fi rms that the skilled workers identifi ed with 
management to a considerable extent, and it was not unknown for some to arrive at work wear-
ing top hats. Although this solution worked fairly well in many industries for many decades, it 
came under increasing strain towards the end of the century (Freeman & Louçã 2001, p. 215).
13 For example Krupp’s factories employed 100 workers in 1848, 1,000 by 1857 and 8,000 in 
1868. 
14 Carnegie, an architect and manager of a giant fi rm, had previously worked for the railways. He 
introduced rigorous statistical cost systems, which were one of the earliest and most signifi cant 
achievements of the new management style: cost sheets were his primary instruments of control 
and costs were his obsession. ”Watch the costs and the profi ts will take care of themselves.” He 
had very detailed cost data, which were used to control departments and foremen and to check 
the quality and mix of raw materials. They were also used to make improvements in processes 
and products, so that technical advance and cost cutting moved together hand in hand. Carnegie 
was a millionaire by 1880. Freeman & Louca’s point is that economies of scale, technical and 
organizational innovation, productivity, and profi tability were all interdependent. 
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The upswing of the third Kondratiev wave was followed by an especially hard 
and long crisis of structural adjustment in the downswing from 1918 to 1940, 
which was a period between two world wars. However, these international con-
fl icts and sharp political struggles within countries were closely intertwined with 
the rise of new technologies based on oil which became the core input of the new 
techno-economic paradigm: mass production. The products of its carrier braches 
were automobiles, tanks, and aircraft.15
According to Freeman and Louçã, the downswing of a long wave is not just a 
period of slower growth in aggregate production, but also one of structural adjust-
ment and the rise of a new constellation of technologies. The production of oil, 
aircraft and tanks, as well as of automobile and consumer durables, increased very 
rapidly during the downswing. The rise of the automobile industry in the United 
States aggravated still further the uneven development of the world economy as 
well as the internal structural problems within the United States. 
The fourth Kondratiev wave was based mainly on the automobile industry as 
the carrier branch, and the oil industry as the producer of the core input.  The 
period began back in the 1920s and 1930s, but high growth was possible only after 
the Second World War as the new social institutions that supported the use and 
spreading of the new technology were created. The most important new institu-
tions were limited companies, and hire-purchase and unemployment-insurance 
organizations.
The availability of cheap and abundant petroleum made the motorization of 
the world economy possible in the twentieth century. Originally, the oil industry 
was developed fi rst and foremost as a source of kerosene for lighting and heavy 
fuel oil for heating. A series of inventions and innovations were needed before 
gasoline could be separated in suffi ciently large quantities of good enough quality 
and at low enough cost to provide it on the scale needed for the mass use of au-
tomobiles. In a hundred years, from 1860 to 1960, oil production rose from three 
million barrels to 7.7 billion barrels per year, and the price fell to very low levels.
The fi rst internal combustion engines were developed in France and Germany 
in the 1860s and 1870s. After many trial inventions, the fi rst truly mass-produced 
automobiles were developed by Henry Ford in Highland Park in Detroit between 
1908-1914. Ford took advantage of Frederic Taylor’s ideas but developed the doc-
trine further: discipline was strict in his factory and unions were banned. 
15 The authors note that the Second World War was the fi rst motorized war, with panzer divi-
sions forming motorized infantry divisions: the decisive battle, in which the tanks were used, 
took place in Kursk in 1943. 
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The introduction of the moving assembly line in manufacturing the T-model 
Ford in 1913 was a culminating point in the development of the new techno-eco-
nomic paradigm, mass production. It was only possible as a combination of the 
new inventions that Ford introduced: machines and presses that could cut, shape 
or stamp out each one of the components. Freeman and Louca quote Womack, 
Jones & Roos (1990), explicating how the new method changed the work on the 
shop fl oor radically. 
The assembler on Ford’s mass production line had only one task - to put two 
nuts on two bolts or perhaps to attach one wheel to each car. He didn’t order 
parts, procure his tools, repair his equipment, inspect for quality, or even un-
derstand what the workers on either side of him were doing. Rather he kept his 
head down and thought about other things. The fact that he might not even 
speak the same language as his fellow assembler or foremen was irrelevant… 
the assembler required only a few minutes training. (Womack, Jones & Roos, 
1990, p. 31)
It was inevitable in Ford’s system that some of the produced parts were defective. 
A typical solution was not to improve the skills or add to the responsibilities of the 
production-line workers, but to have an inspection and ”re-work” department at 
the end of the line.
The United States was the technological leader in the cluster of innovations 
that predominated in the fourth Kondratiev wave. It completely took over the 
world automobile industry in the 1920s.
The Model T was truly designed as a car for the masses. The reduction of the 
price of the car was an essential part of Ford’s doctrine, contrary to other manu-
facturers who, according to Freeman and Louçã, sold their products at the highest 
prices in their respective industries. Ford’s doctrine emphasized mass consumption 
to counterbalance mass production. The car was deliberately designed for ease 
of maintenance and ease of operation. It was very robust and could be used on 
rough roads. Ford assumed that many of his early customers would be farmers, 
with experience of farm machinery and some tools to hand (Freeman & Louçã, 
2001, p. 276).
By 1935, over half of all American families owned an automobile and by 1989, 
84 percent did so. Each wave of technical change had widened the range of con-
sumer goods. The spreading of products changed consumer behavior radically. 
The increase in the purchasing power of a large number of people was greater than 
in any of the previous Kondratiev waves. The golden age of growth in the quarter 
century after the Second World War saw the biggest increase in GDP and in per 
capita consumption ever recorded. 
473 Learning in theories of historical development of production
The immense success of the mass-production paradigm made other American 
fi rms introduce the assembly line and many American-mass production plants 
were established in Europe in the post-war years. The Europeans were not merely 
imitators of American technology and management, however, they were also in-
novators. Mass services grew rapidly in most European countries, and later in Ja-
pan, in the long boom after the Second World War. 
Technical innovations in the automobile industry were accompanied by orga-
nizational and managerial changes. The Taylorist-Fordist model dominated man-
agement for more than half a century, and it was only late in the twentieth century 
that this doctrine began to give way to a new style of management thinking and 
new forms of organization. 
The automobile industry as the carrier branch of the economic growth with its 
major industry, infrastructure, and induced branches16 constituted a huge propor-
tion of the total national output of the leading industrial countries by the 1960s, 
perhaps as much as a third of all production. Yet these industries and services 
barely existed before 1900. They represented a fundamental structural as well as 
technological revolution, and massive cultural change (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, 
p. 298). The shock of the 1973 oil crisis was all the greater when the very survival 
of this mass-production regime appeared to be threatened by the loss of its core 
input – oil. The rise in oil prices in the 1970s threatened the dominance of the 
United States in the world market. The main reason was not the blossoming of the 
European economy, but the meteoric rise of Japan’s industry.
For half a century American and European producers had simply accepted de-
fects and rejects as an inevitable cost of mass production, which they believed was 
greatly outweighed by the benefi ts of a vast output of cheap and fairly effi cient 
machines. One of the main objectives of the Japanese producers who challenged 
the Fordist system after the Second World War was to make a drastic reduction in 
the number of defective parts or subsystems.
Freeman and Louçã point out that the main reason for that was the Japanese 
principle of  ”reverse engineering”, which practically affected the R & D strategies 
of the major Japanese companies. Japanese management engineers and workers 
grew accustomed to thinking of the entire production process as a system, and of 
thinking in an integrated way about product and process design. This capability 
to redesign an entire production system has been identifi ed as one of the major 
16 These include the diesel engine and tractor industries, the aircraft industry and airlines, and 
all their component suppliers, the oil, petrochemical and synthetic to material industries, the 
highway and airport infrastructures with the supporting repair maintenance, and mass-distri-
bution services.
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sources of Japanese competitive success in industries as diverse as shipbuilding, 
automobiles, and colour television.
By 1989 Japan was producing more cars than the United States. The American 
producers were successful in imitating some key features of the Japanese produc-
ers and by the late 1990s the US industry had regained world leadership. Japanese 
fi rms also invested in their own plants in North America.
Mass-production principles were questioned in many ways during the down-
swing period of the fourth wave in 1970-1990. The increasing number of strikes 
in the late 1960s was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the form of work 
relations and the management style of mass production. The system was no lon-
ger the key to high economic growth. In the circumstances of low growth, mass 
unemployment and structural unemployment increased. 
Some writers in the late 1970s also maintained that growth had slowed down 
because science and technology had reached their limits as a productional force, 
and their contribution to production would begin to decrease. This was not the 
case, however. Growth was not limited by technology. On the contrary, there was 
a growing need to change the limits that the institutional and social framework of 
the specifi c technological regime of mass production was placing on growth based 
on emerging new technologies. Scientists and technologists saw unlimited hori-
zons, and promising innovations were developed in bio-technology, information 
technology and materials technology. The new paradigm of the age of information 
and communications technology was emerging. 
Towards the computerization of the economy
The institutional and social changes associated with the ICT revolution, according 
to Freeman and Louçã, are at present at a relatively early stage of development. 
The carrier branches of this age are ”obviously” computer and software industries, 
supported by telecommunications and the Internet. 
The new ICT-based products represent a technically reliable and economically 
effi cient mode of growth on a large scale, and this new technological constellation 
could take over as the chief engine of economic growth. The most infl uential of 
these new developments was the advent of the computer and the Internet. The 
stock of personal computers reached over 100 million in 1997 in the US, over 50 
million in Europe, and 25 million in Japan. This scale of diffusion was only pos-
sible because of the huge price fall and improvements in design, performance and 
user-friendliness.
The core input of the new long wave came from microelectronics: chips. The 
manufacture of semi-conductors is a very complicated and diffi cult process re-
quiring more than a hundred different steps of coating, baking and etching. 
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These steps are not well-understood and easily replicated on different equip-
ment or in different facilities, and they impose demanding requirements for 
a particle free manufacturing environment. Product innovation depends on 
process innovation to a much greater extent than is true of automobiles… 
New equipment, with operating characteristics that are not well understood, is 
needed in order to manufacture a new product. The complexity of the manu-
facturing process also means that isolating and identifying the causes of the 
yield failures requires considerable time and effort. (Appleyard et al., 1996 p.5; 
Freeman and Louçã, 2001, p. 309)
The universal availability of computers as the carrier branch of the new techno-eco-
nomic ICT paradigm, the introduction of local area networks, and rapid changes 
in product and process design eroded the old mass-production paradigm. Because 
of rapid and easy access to information, some layers of management became un-
necessary and top-heavy. The new style of management became widespread and 
contrasted with the Fordist style in many respects. C. Perez outlined the elements 
of organizational change from mass production to ICT as follows (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Changes in the techno-economic paradigm (Perez 1989; Freeman and Louçã, 
2001, p. 325)
Fordist ICT
Energy-intensive Information-intensive
Design and engineering in drawing offi ces Computer-aided designs
Sequential design and production Concurrent engineering
Standardized Customized
Rather stable product mix Rapid changes
Dedicated plant and equipment Flexible production systems
Automation Systematisation
Single fi rm Networks
Hierarchical structures Flat horizontal structures
Departmental Integrated
Product with service Service with products
Centralization Distributed intelligence
Specialized skills Multiskilling
Government control and sometimes 
ownership
Government information, coordination and 
regulation
Planning Vision
The contribution of Freeman and Louçã’s theory to the understanding of the 
change in learning in and for production 
Freeman and Louçã’s theory strongly supports the thesis that learning in and for 
production changes historically. According to the theory we are currently witnessing 
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the transition from mass production to the ”IT-based network economy”. Although 
the transformation has not yet reached its mature phase, the emerging new para-
digm has already led to changes in the forms of learning in and for production.
The theory suggests that the development of work includes both stable periods 
of established techno-economic paradigm and periods of qualitative transforma-
tion. The transformation from one paradigm to another goes through crises and 
takes a long time. We could assume that each techno-economic paradigm also 
comprises specifi c structures and dynamics of learning in and for production that 
correspond with the challenges set by the new constellation of technology and the 
new institutional forms. 
Freeman and Louçã maintain that the institutions of the old paradigms do not 
completely disappear when new ”carrier branch” emerges in the economy.  This 
implies that different institutional forms of learning in and for production may 
prevail at the same time in working life.
However the theory does not provide concepts for analysing forms of learning 
in and for production in detail: the authors describe the various forms of learn-
ing during each Kondratiev wave and during the crises between them in general 
terms. Nevertheless it serves very well as a general background for understanding 
and analyzing the changes in the institutional structures and dynamics of learning 
in and for production.
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Commitment
Control
WW
HR
SM
EI
SR
BPR
Collaborative
interdependence
Legend:
WW = Welfare Work
SM  = Scientific Management
HR  = Human Relations
SR = Systems Rationalization
EI = Employee Involvement
BPR = Business Process Reengineering
3.3 Paul Adler’s analysis of the historical evolution of management 
doctrines
The well-known organizational scientist Paul Adler reviewed the development of 
management doctrines and incorporated into a single narrative several contradicto-
ry but partially valid views of the long-term evolution of work organizations in the 
20th century. He argues that the story has followed a zig-zag path between on one 
hand an emphasis on control on the one hand and on worker commitment to more 
collaborative interdependence on the other (see Figure 3.1). His analysis focuses on 
the United States and shows how the proponents of control and commitment tried 
to combine these opposing needs of management during the last century. He bases 
the periodization in his analysis on Kondratiev’s theory of long waves.17
17 The general idea of Process Mapping, a tool used in both scientifi c management and STS was 
brought into non-routine operations in forms such as IDEF, CMM, ISO 9000, and clinical guide-
lines in medicine.
Figure 3.1 A trend toward collaborative interdependence (Adler 2001)
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The United States was ”catching up” Britain’s technological lead in the downswing 
of 1873–1895 that Freeman and Louçã called the ”steam powered mechanization 
of industry and transport”. According to Adler, the fi rst set of managerial innova-
tions – welfare work – emerged during this period. Welfare work did not touch 
work organization directly, but rather aimed at shaping values, building basic 
skills, and improving physical health, and thereby promoting loyalty.
It used company schools, employee magazines, company churches, company 
cafeterias. While some of the specifi c practices of early welfare work subse-
quently disappeared, many others persisted and were developed further by the 
human relations. (Adler, 2001, p.12) 
The upswing of the third wave in 1895–1918 that was based on the electrifi cation 
of industry and transport gave rise to Scientifi c Management – a family of inno-
vations designed to systematize management from the shop fl oor to the execu-
tive suite. It introduced techniques of production planning, work analysis, time 
standards, and piece rates. Using call centers as an example, Adler points out that 
similar work-study practices also prevailed fi fty years later.
The deep depression that marked the age of the electrifi cation downswing in 
1918-1940 witnessed the emergence of the Human Relations school of thought. 
It sought to broaden the role of the Personnel function and to infuse concern 
for employee commitment into the fabric of daily work. The associated innova-
tions included ability testing for selecting employees, individual performance 
records, employee satisfaction surveys, coaching in supervisory skills, and the 
non-union employee representation plans. (Adler, 2001, p.13)
Instead of opposing each other, the proponents of Human Relations and of Sci-
entifi c Management often joined forces in the design of formalized personnel-
management systems. Gilbreth, among others, tried to construct a synthesis of 
Taylorism and Human Relations, with a focus on ”active worker involvement” in 
scientifi cally grounded quality-improvement efforts. 
Systems rationalization appeared at the beginning of the upswing of the ”motor-
ization age”. It encompassed efforts to rationalize relatively non-routine activities 
through the introduction of formalized R&D budgeting and project-management 
approaches and the use of matrix structures. It combined operations research, 
management science, and strategic business units as a common corporate struc-
ture. It further refi ned business planning and built control systems on the basis of 
the Scientifi c Management legacy. 
The beginning of the downswing of the ”motorization wave”, from 1973 on, 
witnessed a resurgence of interest in commitment in the form of Employee In-
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volvement (EI), as expressed in the themes of quality, culture, and empowerment. 
This wave has often been positioned in opposition to the tradition of Scientifi c 
Management. 
Socio-Technical Systems theory (STS), a common reference point, popular-
ized the idea that the human costs of excessively standardized and fragmented 
work would eventually lead to losses in productivity and quality – and that this 
would occur not only in non-routine tasks, but even in routine work. Propo-
nents advocated the adoption of forms of organization that would give work 
groups and individuals far greater autonomy in determining work methods 
and far less specialization in their job assignments (Adler 2001, p.14)
The general idea of Process Mapping, a tool used in both scientifi c management 
and STS was brought into non-routine operations in forms such as IDEF, CMM, 
ISO 9000, and clinical guidelines in medicine.
According to Adler, the emerging new Kondratiev upswing connected to the 
”computerization of the entire economy”, which started in 1990, has seen the re-
surgence of control-oriented innovations, primarily under the banner of Business 
Process Reengineering, outsourcing, and networks. 
The focus here was on radically rationalizing the scope and processes of work: 
downsize so as to focus on core competencies, and outsource the rest. A fi rst 
phase of this cycle seemed deliberately scornful of the human dimension. Lay-
offs and downsizing cuts were trumpeted as signs of reinvigorated manage-
ment recommitment to shareholder value. (Adler, 2001, p.15)
Adler notes that BPR champions embraced STS ideas on how to confi gure jobs in 
the reengineered organization. In his view, Business Process Reengineering could 
be seen as a control-oriented doctrine. It consists of process analysis, the purpose 
of which is to eliminate parts of the production line (Hammer & Champy, 1993; 
Khoong, 1999). Knowledge Management is the latest management doctrine (Non-
aka & Takeuchi, 1995; Brown & Duguid, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1995). It focuses 
on the collective competences needed in knowledge-intensive production. The lit-
erature on knowledge management also comprises both Systems Rationalizing, 
which focuses on IT infrastructure, and a commitment focus on ”Communities 
of Practice.” It is clear that the new management doctrines also actively use new 
theories of organizational learning. 
Following in the footsteps of Barley and Kunda (1992), Adler characterizes 
commitment-oriented doctrines as normative, and control-oriented doctrines as 
rational. He suggests that hidden behind the zig-zag movement is the trend towards 
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increased collaborative interdependence. The sequences of normative approaches 
have implied a shift from traditional blind trust to a more modern refl ective form 
of trust. One specifi c consequence of this development is that control-oriented in-
novations have become increasingly hospitable to commitment-oriented variants. 
Proponents of the Business Process Reengineering approaches learned to soften 
their rhetoric’s over a few years, a process that took scientifi c management nearly 
two decades. 
The management doctrines that highlighted worker commitment, or soft man-
agement, seemed to emerge and spread during the down-swing periods, while the 
”hard” and control-oriented doctrines gained ground during the upswings. This 
notion contradicts fairly common interpretations according to which soft mana-
gerial methods become common during favorable economic periods because 
employers have more resources to invest in their personnel and its development 
(Julkunen, 1987). One possible explanation is that the control-oriented new doc-
trines were created to meet the new challenges and needs posed by the expansion 
of work activities during the upswing, while managers had to concentrate on mak-
ing the best of the existing organization during the down-swing periods.
Adler makes another important observation. Management doctrines are not 
purely control-centered or commitment-centered, but have elements of both. The 
more recent a control doctrine is, the more quickly it has been complemented 
with the commitment doctrine. The emergence and spreading of new manage-
ment doctrines do not necessarily directly change the practices of production, but 
they do reveal the contradictions managers have to deal with. 
From the perspective of learning in and for production, Adler’s analysis is im-
portant in that it shows that, regardless of whether the management doctrines 
of the last century were integrated or diametrically opposed, they nevertheless 
refl ected new needs in the management of production. Management systems and 
types of shop-fl oor production are mutually interdependent. Managers and work-
ers both contribute to the development of forms of learning in and for production. 
Doctrines emphasizing control ascribe the principal agency of learning to man-
agers and designers, while those emphasizing commitment also ascribe agency 
to workers. New management doctrines such as Business Process Reengineering, 
Knowledge Management and Communities of Practice all emphasize the utiliza-
tion of information and knowledge as prerequisites of collective learning.
Adler’s analysis provides particular insights into the changes in management 
doctrines that took place during the motorization wave. A comparison of the evo-
lution of these doctrines and the structural changes identifi ed by Freeman and 
Louçã (Table 3.3) reveals a two-to-three-year cultural lag in the former.
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Table 3.3 A comparison of the evolution of management doctrines as reported by 
Adler and by Freeman and Louçã18
Constellation 
of technical & 
organizational
innovations
Management 
doctrines
(Adler)
Managerial & 
organizational 
changes (Feeman 
and Louçã )
Kondratiev 
wave
1. Water-powered 
mechanization of 
industry 
Factory systems
Entrepreneurs
Partnerships
1780–1815
Upswing
*
1815–1848
Downswing
2. Steam-powered 
mechanization of 
industry and transport 1872–1894 Welfare 
work.
Joint stock companies
Subcontracting to 
responsible craft 
workers
1848–1873 
Upswing
*
1873–1895 
Downswing
3. Electrifi cation of 
industry, transport, 
and the home
1895–1920 scientifi c 
management
1921–1944 human 
relations
Specialized 
professional 
management systems
”Taylorism”
Giant fi rms
1895–1918 
Upswing
*
1918–1940 
Downswing
4. Motorization 
of transport, civil 
economy and war
System rationalization 
1944–1977 
77– Employee 
involvement
Mass production and 
consumption
Fordism, Hierarchies
Lean production; TQM
1941–1973b 
Upswing
*
1973–1990 
Downswing
5. Computerization of 
the entire economy
1990 Business-
process reengineering, 
Outsourcing, 
Networks, Knowledge 
Management
Communities of 
practices
Internal, local, and 
global Networks
1990– 
Upswing
18
 The beginning and end of the periods deviate by two years from those used by Freeman and 
Louçã. I use Freeman and Louçã’s periodization in the following.
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Craft
Mass 
production
Process
enhancement
Mass 
customization
Co-
configuration
Renewal
Development
Linking
Modularization
Networking
3.4 Victor and Boynton’s developmental model of work types 
Bart Victor and Anderew Boynton claim that, in order for a company to maximize 
internal growth and profi tability, it has to learn to develop its production along 
”the right path”. The right path is a general sequence of historical types of work 
from craft to mass customization. In order to provide the kind of value the chang-
ing markets demand, companies have to completely transform their production 
from time to time. They have to learn new work organizations, new processes, 
new types of knowledge, new kinds of manager worker-relations, and new kinds 
of information systems. These elements are qualitatively different in each work 
type: craftwork, mass production, process-enhancement work, and mass custom-
ization. The following describes Victor and Boynton’s model of work types and the 
necessary transformations.
Figure 3.2 The right path transformations (Victor & Boynton, 1998, p. 233)
Thus, each type of work has its own strength in creating a special kind of market 
value. 
Craft is strong in inventing and creating high-priced novel products that make 
strong, unique impressions on customers.   Mass production is strong in disci-
pline and in achieving value through predictable, standard, ”no-surprise,” low-
price com modities. Process enhancement is strong in thinking and doing prod-
ucts that customers perceive as having superior quality. Mass customization is 
strong in modular confi guration and can dominate a market with precision, 
providing made-to-order; af fordable, tailored products and services. (Victor & 
Boynton, 1998, p. 7)
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Eeach historically evolved type of work is also related to the preceding and the fol-
lowing types in a specifi c and predetermined way.
Mass production cannot be reached but through some form of craftwork; 
process enhancement is impossible without the company’s fi rst having made 
some effort at learning from mass production; Mass customization is unfea-
sible without the learning from process enhancement. We think of the four 
work capabilities as four destinations on a map, because there is a single path of 
learning between them; that is why we call it the right path. (ibid., 1998, p.7)
A specifi c kind of knowledge is required in managing each of the four types of 
work. Learning is needed for managing the type of work, and also in the transfor-
mation from one type to another. The ”additional learning” that is not used in any 
particular form of work produces part of the knowledge that is the foundation of 
the next type. 
One type of knowledge is the foundation of each of the four types of work. 
This foundation knowledge has to be managed for a fi rm to excel, be it craft-
work, mass production, process enhancement or mass customisation. Under 
each type of work, learning occurs and a by-product of work is generated: ad-
ditional learning and knowledge, the key ingredients for fi rms taking the right 
path. (ibid., 1998, p. 9)
Craftwork consists of independent work performance that is decentralized to spe-
cialized groups or individuals. The craft organization that focuses on product nov-
elty is fl uid, adaptable, loosely coupled, and organic. Its highly informal nature is 
also refl ected in the relationships between managers and workers. Managers also 
work and workers also have managerial tasks. The roles of workers and managers 
are undefi ned and often ambiguous.
Craftwork is based on tacit knowledge that is transferred to the other workers 
through on-the-job-apprenticeship. The learning and experience that the workers 
acquire also allow them to describe the details of how they do the work. This type 
of description covers the steps or processes of how the products are made or the 
services are delivered. The resulting articulated knowledge can be used to insti-
gate the mass production of the former craft products or services. With the help 
of engineers’ know-how, managers can then identify and codify the articulated 
knowledge gained in the craft into machines or standard procedures, and rapidly 
transfer it to all work ers to be used repeatedly. Victor and Boynton call the activi-
ties underlying the codifi cation of articulated knowledge development.
Using tools such as time and motion studies, process engineering, and automa-
tion, development captures the best approaches discovered in craft and applies 
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them across the company. Development instills discipline through processes, 
procedures, or automation so that work can be replicated anywhere, at any 
time, in any amount. Repeatable tasks, hierarchical control systems, functional 
structures, standardized routines and processes automa tion, and division of 
labor characterize mass production. (ibid., 1998, p. 126)
The process of manufacturing standard commodities in mass production is lin-
ear and centrally controlled. The worker’s task is to do the specialized job that is 
planned by the management. The organization is bureaucratic, hierarchical and 
based on functional specialization. While knowledge is located ”in the heads” of 
the workers in craftwork, articulated knowledge is located in the ”fi rm’s head”, in 
documents and standard procedures.
When following the standards the workers also learn about the work through 
observation, sensing, and feeling. They learn where the standards are effective and 
where they are not. This learning leads to practical knowledge,
 
which accumulates 
from doing a job over and over again. Linking lev erages practical knowledge and 
creates a new type of work that Victor and Boynton call ”process enhancement 
work”, also called ”lean production”. It involves eliminating the gaps that remain 
after a company has developed its work processes under mass production.
Linking creates a system of overlapping processes that managers can continu-
ously improve. The tools used in linking include process documentation and 
mapping, team building, customer satisfaction measurement systems, process 
improvement tools, and techniques such as quality function deployment and 
brainstorming. (ibid., pp. 126–127)
Process-enhancement work is based on a horizontal team organization. The work-
ers are task-oriented and managers come down to the shop fl oor as their coaches. 
Together they are creative team players who make sure that every process contrib-
utes to satisfying the customer by achieving consistently higher quality. The workers 
are equipped with the tools and techniques to apply their practical knowledge in 
improving the tasks and processes. They conduct experiments, analyze the causes 
and effects of process changes, and evaluate the value added by a change in proce-
dures. They can continuously use and modify their practical knowledge, which is 
located in a dynamic network of workers – no longer in the head of the fi rm. 
Practical knowledge allows the organization to identify weaknesses and fi x 
them, to respond to slight changes in product requirements quickly, and to iden-
tify new sources of customers. Although the work is highly specifi ed and routine, 
workers defi ne the routines themselves. Victor and Boynton found in their study 
that employees had to use the new skill of role switching in order to use their prac-
tical knowledge for process enhancement.
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In switching, employees go back and forth between standardized production 
and creative process enhancement. At one moment, the employee focuses on 
doing the work, such as assembling a car door or responding to a customer ser-
vice call, and then switches to thinking about how to do the work better. This 
switching occurs over and over, and the information cues, incentive and reward 
systems, and structure encourage workers to do, then think, do, then think – to 
achieve effi ciency and create ideas on improving the work itself. (ibid., p.79)
As process enhancers modify, adjust, add, and subtract activities, technology, and 
inputs, employees learn what happens in the process. The additional learning that 
results comprises a deep understanding of the complex interactions and inter-
dependences of the production processes. Victor and Boynton (p. 88) call this 
knowledge architectural knowledge. It enables transformation to the next type of 
work, mass customization. 
Mass customization is based on product modularization. It transforms work 
by creating a network of modular processes that can respond to market demands, 
enabling a company to customize a product or service to meet ever-shifting mar-
ket needs. It thus creates a dynamic network of robust units.
With modularization, a fi rm separates the overlapping work capabilities de-
veloped under process enhancement and forms them into a dynamic network 
of modular units. The fi rm can then confi gure and reconfi gure the units to 
respond quickly to market change. This can be done only after architectural 
knowledge is developed under process enhancement. Modularization captures 
that learning as part of the transformation path to mass customization. (ibid., 
1998, p. 127)
Mass customization is based on market demand when customers seek products 
or services that not only offer quality, but also meet precisely their specifi c needs 
at little or no additional cost. Victor and Boynton call this precision demand. The 
fi rm has to be effi cient and fast and its products low-priced and customized, all at 
the same time.  Firms employing a precision strategy compete in meeting unique 
customer or market-niche requirements. 
The mass-customization fi rm has to understand not only how its processes 
work in sequence, but also how to combine, recombine and reconfi gure and reor-
der them to create new processes for making customized, personalized products. 
It cannot succeed without a highly responsive dynamic network organization that 
can modularize linkages integrated for customers. The managers are traffi c cops 
and the workers engage in hubs of a complex web of activities. These organiza-
tions use architectural knowledge for continuously rearranging the networks.
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Mass customization demands that the product and process are well known 
inside-out. Without a deep understanding of the product, the fi rm cannot know 
which variations create value for the customer and which are simply a source of 
expense and diffi culty. Firms that fail to develop new capabilities that better ad-
dress customer requirements will run into trouble. If they reach this point they 
may choose to follow a process that Victor and Boynton call renewal, which offers a 
way back to innovation and creativity. It brings new insights in terms of the fi rm’s 
capability and limits, using them to direct the process of invention. New capabili-
ties develop from new ideas generated in the ongoing work that involves meeting 
changing market expectations.
According to Victor and Boynton (ibid., p. 93), mass customization is a new 
developing kind of work: ”The twenty-fi rst century may be the mass customiza-
tion century, but it is only at the beginning”.
The authors suggest that, through additional learning mass customization 
generates still another type of knowledge that can lead beyond it. The challenges 
involved promote truly systemic understanding of the dynamic interactions be-
tween the product, the customer, and the fi rm. They call this knowledge confi gura-
tion knowledge, and it is needed to produce a product that continuously adjusts to 
what the customer wants. Co-confi guration creates customer-intelligent products 
that adapt to the customer’s needs continuously over time.  As customer needs 
change, so does the product. 
In developing customer intelligence a company will have to continuously con-
fi gure its products and services in interaction with the customer. It will not make a 
product only once, but will constantly remake it as both the company and the cus-
tomer learn. It seems that co-confi guration work never ends: it is like a continuous 
human chain between customer, product and company. The relations within this 
triangle are at the same time long-lasting and unpredictable (ibid., 1998, p. 204). 
Victor and Boynton call the leveraging of the necessary and historically emerg-
ing confi gurative knowledge integration, by which they mean series of activities 
that form a nexus of the fi rm’s knowledge of a product or a service and of a cus-
tomer. They cite Microsoft as a pioneering company on the path to integration. 
Microsoft’s organization is rather like a complex of adaptive systems or a city of 
forest ecosystems, the immune system, and the Internet than an organization in 
the traditional sense of the term. 
Further they predict that customer intelligence will be the new competitive ad-
vantage of the twenty-fi rst century. They also highlight the promise in technologi-
cal innovations such as the Internet, neural networks, and artifi cial intelligence in 
terms of enabling the development of co-confi gurative work. They maintain that 
the key prerequisite of integration is the preceding phase on the ”right path”. Their 
description of this emerging type of work and integration necessarily remains on 
a general level given the novelty of the phenomenon and the lack of data.
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Table 3.4 A condensed summary of the right-path theory; the elements of the four 
types of work
Type of work/ 
features
Craft Mass 
production
Process 
enhancement
Mass 
customisation
Specifi c kind of 
value produced
Novelty Commodity Quality Precision
Organization Fluid, adaptable, 
loosely-coupled, 
organic. Highly 
informal.
Bureaucratic, 
functionally 
defi ned, 
hierarchical 
vertical 
integration, 
mechanistic. 
Top-down. 
Team-based, 
horizontal. 
Value-chain 
integration; 
knowledge 
overlap; 
Bottom-up 
communication
Dynamic 
Network, 
renewable, 
virtual 
integration, 
cohesive. Highly 
responsive
Managers Not purely 
managers
Thinkers Coaches ”Traffi c cops”
Workers Not purely 
workers
Doers Task-oriented Hubs in a 
complex web  
of activities 
Manager-
Worker 
relations
Dual roles Specialized,
trained on the 
job
Creative team 
players
Independent 
team working
Process fl ow Independent 
work, 
decentralized 
to specialized 
groups and 
individuals.
Serial, linear; 
executed 
to plan; 
centralized 
control, 
information- 
specialized
Intensive and 
reciprocal 
within teams
Modularized, 
linkages 
integrated 
into customer/ 
product-unique 
value chains
Knowledge Tacit knowledge 
transfer through 
on-the-job 
training. 
Articulated 
knowledge, 
which resides 
with the fi rm, 
transferred 
through 
training 
Practical 
knowledge 
fl ows constantly 
from employee 
to fi rm
Architectural 
knowledge 
for arranging 
dynamic 
networks, 
and fl exible 
combinations.
Information 
technology
Development 
and distribution 
of customized 
systems
Automation of 
manual process 
to achieve 
cost-justifi ed 
effi ciency 
enhancement; 
vertical 
information 
control
Design of 
cross-functional 
information and 
communica-
tions systems 
that support 
micro 
transforma-
tions. 
Integration 
of constantly 
changing 
network 
information- 
processing and 
communicating 
requirements; 
networking 
effi ciency
The process of 
creating the 
form of work
Transferring 
tradition (but 
also renewal)
Development Linking Modularization
Victor and Boynton’s model depicts the qualitative differences in structural ele-
ments of production such as organization, manager roles, worker roles, informa-
tion technology, knowledge, and process fl ow in various types of work. They also 
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give managers and developers guidelines for carrying out the transformation from 
one work type to another. They show how to analyze the organization’s develop-
mental phase and how to respond to new market demands. Development, linking, 
modularisation, renewal, and integration are key sets of actions by which compa-
nies learn to master qualitatively different types of work.
The theory gives further insight into the historical transformation of learn-
ing in and for production, which is deemed to consist of a) learning to master a 
specifi c type of work b) ”additional learning” that creates the knowledge necessary 
in the next type of work, and c) the learning that is necessary in the process of 
transforming the work from one type to another. The theory also shows that the 
challenges of learning as well as its forms differ qualitatively in the different types 
of work, as does the kind of knowledge needed and produced in them. It does not, 
however, create concepts for analyzing or facilitating these learning processes.
3.5 Observations on the three historically oriented theories
My conclusion in Chapter two was that theories of organizational learning do 
not provide concepts for understanding the historical changes in work- related 
learning. It could be maintained, however, that the connection between history 
and such theories works the other way: historical changes explain their emergence 
and content.
The three historically oriented theories presented in this chapter conceptualize 
current changes in work and learning from different points of view.  Freeman and 
Louçã’s theory of long waves concerns macro changes in the world economy and 
techno-economic paradigms Adler’s theory of ”the zig-zag movement of manage-
ment doctrines’ relates the transformations of management doctrines to long waves 
of economic growth, and Victor and Boynton’s theory bridges these two perspec-
tives by providing concepts for describing qualitative changes in production logic.
Discussion of organizational learning started at the time when the long up-
swing of the motorization cycle turned downwards. It has, nevertheless, been 
dominated by theories that emphasize commitment rather than control, and they 
all clearly resonate the specifi c managerial problems of their time. Argyris and 
Schön’s theory contributes in addressing problems of commitment, as does Lave 
and Wenger’s theory in seeking the solution in craft work. The theory developed 
by March and Olsen is applicable in the bureaucratic context of mass production, 
while Nonaka and Tackeuchi address the specifi c challenges inherent in the con-
tinuous innovation of the techno-economic paradigm of the ICT- based network 
economy. In what follows I will summarize the ways in which historically oriented 
theories conceptualize and elaborate on the understanding they promote in terms 
of learning in and for production. 
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According to Freeman and Louçã, the principles and concrete manifestations 
of the new budding paradigm are based on corporate competition in global mar-
kets, in which fi nancial markets have gained in importance. The entire production 
process is based more and more on the continuous development of innovations 
(Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 302), and their new role in business is reshaping prod-
ucts and production methods. Higher development costs are forcing companies to 
specialize. On the other hand, the use of information networks facilitates collabo-
ration between these specialized bodies. End products are manufactured by fl ex-
ibly combining the know-how and products of several organizations in so-called 
virtual companies (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Vikström et al., 1994; Ollus, 1998).  
Information technology makes the mass customization of products and ser-
vices possible. Mass products and standard services remain, but they are increas-
ingly only components in a more comprehensive service, which may also include 
co-confi guration between producer and customer. Innovations may lead not 
only to changes in the production process but also to the renewal of entire busi-
ness concepts (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988). We have good reason to assume that 
co-confi guration and mass customization are forms of work that are genuinely 
based on the information-technological network economy. Mass customization 
could be interpreted as a transitional form of work between the techno-economic 
paradigm of mass production and the ICT-type of network economy comprising 
both motorization and computerization. It is still based on the idea of the cheap 
mass product, but product variation is carried to the extreme. Victor and Boynton 
claim, however, that this is possible only with the help of computers and computer 
programs. 
The dominating forms of work during the motorization period were mass pro-
duction and the fl exible production that is based on the continuous improvement 
of processes. Both are relatively well-established historical types of production that 
have already reached their mature period of development. Flexible production be-
gan to spread signifi cantly after the oil crisis and, the fact that Japanese plants 
had the highest productivity numbers in the world during the down-swing of the 
motorization wave was challenged the mass-production paradigm. The emerging 
new forms of work that are gaining ground in the upswing that started in 1990 are 
mass customization and co-confi guration.
As Adler shows, the mass-production model was already being questioned in 
the early 1920s by the human-relations school. One consequence of this move-
ment was Socio-Technical Systems Design (STSD), which spread worldwide with 
the beginning of the down-swing in the motorization wave produced by the oil 
crises at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s (van Einjatten, 1993; Julkunen, 1987; 
Kelly, 1982). The concrete innovations that STSD brought included semi-autono-
mous work groups and experiments in automobile plants to remove the assembly 
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The complexity of 
production organizations
Electrification            Motorization                         Computerization
1900               1930                         1973            1990
Craft
Mass 
production
Continuous
improvement,
STSD
Mass 
customization
Co-
configuration
line entirely and replace it with parallel work stations. It has spread as a develop-
mental method rather than as an actual type of production.  
Figure 3.3 The historical background and the current transformation from motorization to 
computerization
The research carried out within the International Motor Vehicle Project (Womack, 
Jones & Roos, 1990, p. 92) on global automobile production defi ned mass produc-
tion, lean production, and socio-technical production as the main alternatives in 
organizing automibile manufacture. One could say that mass production, fl exible 
production and socio-technical production have been the main forms of produc-
tion mastery during the motorization wave of economic development (Alasoini, 
et al., 1994; Berggren, 1990; Naschold et al., 1993, Adler & Cole, 1994; Cole, 1989). 
They are based on different methods of securing mastery and also rely on different 
forms of learning in and for production: they thus provide the historical basis for the 
emerging new forms.
According to Freeman and Louçã, processes of learning are pivotal in the eco-
nomic-growth interplay between the development of social, technical and eco-
nomic innovations that produce new techno-economic paradigms. Adler’s analy-
sis shows that the contradictory needs of commitment and control, and ways of 
meeting them, affect forms of learning in and for production. Victor and Boyn-
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ton point out that specifi c forms of learning are necessary for mastering different 
types of work (foundation learning), and that the preconditions for the necessary 
learning for the next type of work develop within the previous type (additional 
learning).  They characterized the different processes of learning necessary in each 
transformation of one specifi c type of work. According to their theory, learning in 
and for production is a cumulative process of building on and further developing 
existing knowledge, capabilities and structures. Individual organizations recapitu-
late in a condensed form the developmental phases of production logic that have 
marked the general historical development of forms of production.
Theories of organizational learning provide general, ahistorical explanations 
that, in terms of historical theories, appear to stem partly from historical phases. 
These generalizations seem not to be general from a historical perspective. On the 
other hand, historically oriented theories assume that learning changes in differ-
ent phases, but do not explicate any common or general typical form of learning 
in and for production. This raises the methodological question of how to research 
the phenomenon, which I will seek to answer in the following chapter.
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4 Toward historical-genetic method 
for studying learning in and for 
production 
4.1  The general as a principle of development
I/we Assume that the forms and dynamics of learning remain the same through 
historical changes, as theories of organizational learning implicitly do, owe could 
concentrate on testing empirically the validity of proposed theories. However given 
that forms of learning in and for production develop and change qualitatively over 
the course of history, as seems plausible on the basis of the historically oriented 
theories discussed above this method does not apply because the object of study 
is changing. The methodological challenge of analyzing the historical transforma-
tion of learning in and for production is to provide conceptual tools for analyzing 
the logic of its development.
Freeman and Louçã lean on similar the Kuhnian idea of paradigm change in 
science. According to Kuhn (1962), paradigms are scientifi c achievements, which 
are universally accepted and create, over a period of time, typical scientifi c prob-
lems and their solutions. Paradigms gain their status in scientifi c activities because 
they are more successful than their rivals in solving problems that the scientifi c 
community has recognized as important. An emerging new paradigm not only 
challenges the established science, it also creates new kinds of experiments and 
experimental procedures. ”Only as experiment and tentative theory are together 
articulated to a match does the discovery emerge and the theory become a para-
digm” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 61). 
Established ”normal science” does not search for new facts or theories, although 
newunexpected phenomena are repeatedly uncovered by scientifi c research. A new 
discovery begins from new observations that contradict the prevailing theory. 
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Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the recogni-
tion that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that 
govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended explora-
tion of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has 
been adjusted so that the anomalous have become the expected. (Kuhn, 1962, 
pp. 52–53)
Kuhn’s study deals with the history of physics, while Freeman and Louca com-
bined the theory of paradigm change with the theory of Kondratiev waves. New 
constellations of technological and social innovations emerge as separate unique 
types of techno-economic paradigm during the downswing periods of the long 
wave. These periods produce two kinds of ”production anomalies”. First, the es-
tablished ”business recipes” no longer produce profi table results, and secondly, 
the utilization of new technologies cannot be managed by applying established 
management doctrines. Freeman and Louçã do not focus on the nature of these 
occurrences, which are nevertheless important because the general downswing of 
techno-economic development cannot fully explain the rise and generalization 
of a new paradigm. Technical innovations do not directly produce new forms of 
production. Processes of learning in and for production mediate between techno-
logical innovations and production practices.
The philosopher Ewald Ilyenkov (1977) also points out that throughout hu-
man history really new phenomena have always arisen as anomalies and excep-
tions. For example, production for the market was by no means always the general 
form of production. Before it became established, it was a particular relation oc-
curring from time to time between people and things, and only capitalism made 
it the accepted form of interrelation between its components. These kinds of tran-
sitions from the particular to the general are not rare, but are rather the rule in 
history (ibid., 1977, p. 368).
According to Ilyenkov (ibid., p. 344) the concept ”general” relates not only to 
the common features of the phenomenon under study, but also to a common an-
cestor, which, as a rule, continues to live alongside its offspring as an individual 
case among other individual cases. The task of the study of a whole consists in dis-
covering from among the existing separate individual cases the one that emerged 
fi rst and therefore gave birth to all the rest. 
Seeing ”general” in terms of a common ancestor means that the general func-
tions as the law or principle of connection between the components in the struc-
ture of the whole. The components are related not by virtue of their possessing 
one and the same identical attribute, but by virtue of their having one and the 
same ancestor, by virtue of their arising as diverse modifi cations of one and the 
same substance of a material character (ibid., pp. 350–354). 
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General phenomena do not posses anything like a family resemblance as the 
sole grounds for being counted as one class, and the general in them may be out-
wardly expressed in the form of differences, even opposites. On the other hand, the 
general manifests itself precisely in the individual characteristics of all the com-
ponents of the whole without exception. A father often lives a very long time side 
by side with his sons. And if he is not present, he was once, of course, i.e. must be 
defi nitely thought of in the category of ”being there” (ibid., p. 354).
What does this mean in the context of studying learning in and for produc-
tion? According to Ilyenkov, the task of scientifi c concept formation is to discover 
the developmental germ cell, the initial genetic abstraction, of the totality under 
investigation and to develop it into its full concrete diversity. This is the way to 
comprehend a phenomenon. 
To comprehend a phenomenon means to establish its place and role in the con-
crete system of interacting phenomena in which it is necessarily realized, and to 
fi nd out precisely those traits, which make it possible for the phenomenon to 
play this role in the whole. To comprehend a phenomenon means to discover 
the mode of its origin, the rule according to which the phenomenon emerges 
with necessity rooted in the concrete totality of conditions, it means to analyze 
the very conditions of the origin of phenomena. That is the general formula for 
the formation of a concept. (Ilyenkov, 1982, p. 177)
Thus, this kind of concept formation consists of two processes: reducing the sen-
sual-concrete or the concrete totality under investigation to crystallized initial 
abstraction, and deriving from this abstraction the various manifestations of the 
phenomenon, thus ascending from the initial abstraction to a concrete multitude 
of its forms and manifestations. The initial abstraction could be characterized as a 
common, simple constantly repeating relation of the object. According to Davydov 
(1990, pp. 281–282), it should fi rstly indicate the direction of the system formation, 
which means that its content should correspond in reality to the beginning of the 
emergence of the concrete whole. It should comprise the very contradictions that 
have been resolved through its division into different features that emerge from 
a broken-down integral system. Secondly, the qualitative content of this abstrac-
tion should correspond to the nature of this entire system, and it should be a very 
simple, undetailed type of relationship within the whole and a distinctive feature 
of it. In its simple form it does not depend on other more developed relationships 
in the whole. Thirdly, as a general, genetic basis of the whole, this abstraction ex-
presses its essential foundation or essence, which provides for the universal break-
down into different, relatively independent components. These properties of the 
initial abstraction could be expressed briefl y as follows: it is the historically initial, 
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contradictory, simple and essential relationship of the concrete phenomenon that 
is being reproduced (Davydov, 1990, pp. 281–282). 
According to this idea, to comprehend learning in and for production means to 
fi nd its initial abstraction and to show how the multitude of manifestations have de-
rived from this initial form. In the following, I will elaborate the idea that its initial 
abstraction is the production of practice-relevant generalizations. I will present 
and apply theoretical concepts and ideas on generalization created within the tra-
dition of Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT).
4.2 Learning as the cultural process of adopting, applying and 
producing generalizations
Cultural artifacts as carriers of generalized human operations 
According to activity theory the specifi cally human form of learning is based on 
cultural artifacts, and its origin is in man’s productive activity. According to Ily-
enkov (1977, p. 265), thinking, or ”ideal”,  is an aspect of man’s labor activity and 
exists whenever an object of nature is transformed into an object of labor activity 
and then into a product of labor. In this process the external thing involved in the 
labor process is fi rst sublated in the subjective form of the activity and represented 
by a word. This is followed by the reverse sequence in which the verbally expressed 
idea is transformed into a deed, and through action into the form of an external, 
sensuously perceived thing an object. Thinking emerges in this cyclic movement 
along the route thing-deed-word-deed-thing. Man’s productive interaction with 
external bodies and their transformation fi rst into objects of activity and then into 
artifacts is itself mediated through cultural artifacts, signs and tools. 
According to Vygotsky, human individuals do not react to the environment or 
to other people directly (or merely instinctively) but through forms of behavior 
that are mediated through cultural artifacts that carry culturally developed gen-
eralizations. Human consciousness thus  lies not inside individuals’ heads as a 
product of biological development, but in the interaction between the individual 
and the cultural artifacts created by the labor of mankind. Culturally developed 
artifacts link individual and cultural learning. Higher psychological functions de-
velop fi rst in practical social activities and only later become internalized as inner 
psychological processes of individuals (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Vygotsky conceptualizes the meaning of signs, such as words as generalized 
refl ections of reality, in short generalizations that people use in their life activities. 
Tools could also be understood as culturally developed generalizations. 
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The ordinary tool is a societal operation fi xed in an object, the way in which it is 
used. The tool is necessarily linked to an object under specifi c conditions (and 
not against the ”back ground” of indifferent things). It generalizes and abstracts 
the characteristics of the object. It is the material, sensibly perceivable form 
of the fi rst real human generalization and its carrier – not indifferent to that 
which it car ries, yet directly not coincident with it. (Leontyev, 1933, p. V)
The development of human cognition and activity could thus be investigated as the 
development of forms of cultural mediation and mediating generalizations (Le-
ontyev, 1933, p. III). The generalizations reifi ed in tools or representations do not 
carry the generalization from one context or person to another in themselves, but 
they mediate a generalized operation. ”To appropriate a tool or a meaning means to 
appropriate an operation” (ibid., 1933, p. V), in other words, to learn to use a tool 
is to learn to carry out the operation the tool has been created to mediate.
While tools are directed at material objects of nature, words and other signs 
are directed toward other people as mediators of social cooperation. They entail 
generalizations concerning recurrent aspects of situations in human practices to 
which human beings need to direct other peoples’ attention. Once developed in 
social praxis, however, signs may later also become tools for the self-regulation of 
an individual’s behavior, and make creative refl ection and self-consciousness pos-
sible. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 54–55)
The tools and signs are in human activity connected to each other. There is a 
functional similarity between tools and concepts, that is, generalizations attached 
to and mediated through words and other signs. These two types of generaliza-
tions are complementary and there is no sharp distinction between them. The 
co-operative use of physical tools is often not possible without a corresponding 
set of concepts carried by words and other signs. (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII)
On the one hand, communication between people presupposes generalizations: 
without them it would be impossible. On the other hand, generalizations develop 
in communication: they are thus products of societal practices and can develop 
only within them (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII).
The dialectical connection between representation and the process of 
generalizing 
According to Leont’ev, an adequate characterization of the structure of a general-
ization is reached by showing the process that leads to it. The difference between 
general izations is understood as the differences in the contents being generalized 
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and in the process of generalizing. Different factual contents require different pro-
cesses, and one and the same content can be understood, generalized, and refl ected 
in dif ferent ways (Leontyev, 1933, p. VII).
Representations, whether internal or external, and the process of generaliza-
tion form a dialectical unity. 
The representation and its corresponding process [of generalizing, JP] do not 
exist apart from each other. But it cannot be concluded that they are one and 
the same, just appearing differently, now as moment now as process. They are 
different and opposed things. (Leontyev, 1933, p. IV)
The relationship between a generalized representation and the pro cess of general-
ization is dynamic. Their ”coincidence” merely appears as a moment; they can fi nd 
themselves in open contradiction with one another. The existing representation 
detaches itself from the process and becomes inert, resisting change. The process 
in which a generalized refl ection develops is unthinkable without the generalized 
refl ection on which it is based, however.
(…) every refl ection of reality in the human con sciousness (and every refl ec-
tion is generalized refl ection and cannot be otherwise) and the pro cess in which 
it develops and presents itself form a dialectical unity (that is, one is unthink-
able without the other), they form an opposition, are identical processes – pass 
into one an other. Fundamental in this unity is the process that always links 
generalization with the general ized reality (and the subject with reality). (ibid., 
1933, p. IV)
Vygotsky and his colleagues defi ned the object of research on knowledge and 
learning in a radically new way. Their studies showed that the opposition between 
process and generalization was more important than the Cartesian opposition 
between internal and external processes that had traditionally been regarded as 
fundamental.
The actual opposition is the opposition between re presentation and process, 
whether internal or ex ternal, and defi nitely not the opposition between con-
sciousness (as internal) and object world (as external). (…) The opposition be-
tween material-external and ideal-internal began to reveal itself as histori cal, as 
a secondary formation, and thus as an opposition that could not serve as a point 
of depar ture. It must be understood and exposed as just an historical formation, 
that is, as not absolute. (ibid., 1933, pp. IV–V)
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Considering the opposition between process and representation to be primary 
does not deny the existence of a difference between the material-external or ideal-
internal processes of generalizing and generalization: it rather postulates their co-
existence and interaction.
The process of generalizing presupposes variation in the material about which a 
generalization is made. Marton (2000) pointed out that variation, not repetition, is 
the ”mother of learning”. Only variation makes it possible for the subject to discern 
what is essential and what is irrelevant from the point of view of reaching an objec-
tive. There is, however, a dialectical relationship between repetition and variation. 
If something varies, that something must be repeated. At the same time, that 
which is repeated can never be exactly the same if seen from the learner’s point 
of view. Another way of looking at the relationship between variation and rep-
etition (in the sense of the exact same event taking place again and again) is 
seeing the latter as the limiting special case of the former. There is an unlimited 
number of ways in which repetitions of the same text (or whatever) may differ 
from each other. One, and only one, of these is the case when they do not differ 
at all. And this case in fact does not occur in the context of learning. (Marton, 
2000, pp.14–15 )
Marton maintains that to be able to do something is to be able to see or experience 
something.  In order to do that, a person has to discern certain critical aspects of 
the object. We can see or experience specifi c features in the object only when there 
is contrast and variety within sameness. Variation within sameness is the basis of 
all generalization.  Following Marton’s idea, we could say that there are four basic 
elements in the process of generalizing: 1) an existing generalization that defi nes 
what is being repeated, in other words what the unit is within which it becomes 
possible to observe and analyze variation; 2) there is variation within this unit of 
attention; 3) there is a method of processing the variation in order to reach further 
generalizations, and further, 4) there is a way of remembering or preserving the 
reached generalization. According to Leont’ev, all these four elements can exist 
both as internal mental structures and as objectifi ed in artifacts. 
The tripartite structure and logic of mediated action provides a quasi-experi-
mental setting of variation in sameness, as some of the elements may vary while 
others remain the same. When the same person uses the same tool and there is 
variation in the object, he/she learns about the properties of the objects. When 
the same person uses different tools on the same object he/she can learn about the 
properties of the tools. When the same person repeats actions using the same tool 
for modifying the same object, but varies his or her attention and method of using 
the tool, he or she may learn to reach the goal more effectively with the tool.
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According to Leont’ev, tools and signs do not mediate actions: they only medi-
ate the operations needed to carry them out. Operations are the means of goal-
oriented actions. Thus the culturally developed generalizations fi xed in artifacts do 
not completely determine individuals’ actions, but rather facilitate certain kinds of 
actions and restrict the scope of possible goals. Individuals use generalized types 
of operations in various combinations to carry out actions. 
Furthermore, operations can be formed consciously from actions, or they can 
develop unconsciously as responses to the requirements set by the specifi c condi-
tions of performing an action. The operations that stem from conscious actions 
are the results of a process of psychological automatization, and it is just in this 
automated form that they become included in actions as readily available mod-
ules. Leont’ev (1978, p. 66) illustrates the nature of the transformation of action 
into operation using the example of driving a car. 
Initially every operation, such as shifting gears, is formed as an action subor-
dinated specifi cally to this goal and has its own conscious ”orientation basis”. 
Subsequently this action is included in another action, for example, changing the 
speed of the car. Now shifting gears becomes one of the methods for attaining the 
goal, the operation that effects the change in speed, and shifting gears now ceases 
to be accomplished as a specifi c goal-oriented process: Its goal is not isolated. 
For the consciousness of the driver, shifting gears in normal circumstances is as 
if it did not exist. He does something else: He moves the car from a place, climbs 
steep grades, drives the car fast, stops at a given place, etc. Actually this opera-
tion of shifting gears may, as is known, be removed entirely from the activity of 
the driver and be carried out automatically. Generally, the fate of the operation 
sooner or later becomes the function of the machine. (Leont’ev, 1978, p. 66)
Operations that develop spontaneously as ways of adapting an action to the objec-
tive conditions in a situation, or through simple imitation are largely unconscious. 
The individual cannot control them or the conditions to which they respond con-
sciously without special effort. These operations may be brought into conscious 
control only if they become objects of special actions and are specially recognized. 
A child does not need grammatical knowledge in order to learn his/her native 
language. In order to control the practically adapted knowledge consciously, how-
ever, he or she has to make the forms of grammar into the object of goal-directed 
actions of inquiry (ibid., p. 165).
On the other hand, operations that are formed as results of conscious actions 
are easier for the actor to change and more fl exible than those that evolve spon-
taneously and unconsciously. The latter are inadequately controlled, rigid and in-
fl exible while the former can be transformed from automated operations to con-
scious actions and back (ibid., p. 166).
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Every action, even the ”reaching of point N,” is always accomplished in a cer-
tain objective situation. Thus actions are determined not only by their goals, but 
also by the conditions of achieving the goal. The conditions ”formulate” the spe-
cifi c and particular operations (how, by what means) through which the action 
is accomplished. (ibid., p. 64). Because objectives and conditions vary somewhat 
independently of the available signs and tools the generalizations objectifi ed in 
them do not always coincide with them. The tensions between the changing objec-
tives and conditions and the available signs and tools create needs to change and 
develop existing artifacts and the generalizations embedded in them.
Two origins of generalizing
Davydov maintains that generalizing processes emerged in human history from 
two different sources and orientations. On the one hand, peoples’ elementary ra-
tional orientation toward objects and means of labor brought the conceptions that 
established the immediate properties of objects. These were translated through lan-
guage into abstract generalities, no longer closely connected to the objects and 
means of production. 
This was an orientation toward the settled and canonized methods of produc-
tion with relatively stable tools requiring ”training”, the acquisition of ”skills”. 
This type of orientation towards the presently external being became the basis 
for the empirical thinking of the mass of the toiling performers of social and 
labor operations. (Davydov, 1990, p. 244)
On the other hand, human beings developed an ability to plan production, and 
to create designs for new tools and the techniques for making and using them. 
Another kind of practical action emerged that was taken in order to delineate the 
universal properties of things. These generalizing processes apparently developed 
through a different route. 
It can be presumed that the sensory-practical action retained its external, ob-
ject related form, but for cognitive purposes in the role of ”fi tting”, ”testing” 
or ”trying out”. This engendered specifi c sensory-object actions of a compre-
hending nature, which reproduced a certain form of the movement of things. 
For example, operations (…) can solve problems in evaluating the suitability 
of raw material or of a by-product by a preliminary testing, a practical ”try-
ing out” of it. Operations of this kind, which are subordinate to the cognitive 
purpose, whose result is the knowledge obtained through them, are genuine 
thought in its external, practical form. (ibid., pp. 263–264)
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The nature of recurrent methods of production activity was idealized in the kind 
of thinking that prevailed out in the external form of trying out and testing. Davy-
dov called this form of generalizing sensory-object experimentation. It was a men-
tal activity that was gradually converted into ”internal activity”, into work done by 
man ”for himself”. 
Humans’ rational orientation toward the objects and tools of production, and 
habituation in the form of practice on the one hand and the ability to plan pro-
duction and to experiment on the other were the essential early processes that pro-
duced the fi rst generalizations, the fi rst forms of human thinking in history. They 
made it possible for people to sustain, change, and develop their labor activity. 
We might presume that the operations used in this different kind of thinking 
were objectifi ed in different types of artifacts, which further made possible differ-
ent types of practical and intellectual actions and also different forms and levels of 
learning. Marx Wartofsky (1979, p. 201) characterizes the artifacts directly used in 
production, e.g., tools, models of social organization, and bodily skills in the use 
of tools, as primary. The symbolic communication of such skills in the production, 
reproduction and use of artifacts is a characteristic mode of human activity. This 
ability to represent an action by symbolic means generates a distinctive class of 
secondary artifacts, representation of practices in textbooks, designs, directives and 
prescriptions. Representations of practices make it possible for the practitioners 
to take an overall view of the activity, to refl ect on it and to collect and save their 
experiences as material for the further development of the work. While primary 
artifacts mediate the operations needed in directly productive actions, representa-
tions mediate those needed in planning these actions, coordinating and teaching 
them as well as refl ecting on them. 
According to Wartofsky, there are also tertiary artifacts that do not have a direct 
representational function, but serve the free construction in the imagination of 
tools, rules and operations that are different from those adopted for the praxis. 
Such ”possible worlds” may refl ect the limits of the actual praxis and help to create 
alternatives for conceivable changes in the model itself. Tertiary artifacts serve as 
tools for refl ecting on, evaluating and developing the secondary artifacts.
Yrjö Engeström (1987) connected Gregory Bateson’s theory of the three levels 
of learning with Wartofsky’s different types of artifacts. On Bateson’s fi rst level of 
learning the learner learns a behavior within a situation in which the goal and the 
means for reaching it are given and the appropriate reaction is learned through 
habituation. On the second level the goal is given and the learner learns by trial 
and error or experimentation to select an appropriate tool. In other words, he or 
she learns the context and rules of the fi rst level. This may take place largely as tacit 
socialization, or more in the form of conscious strategizing. A worker learns by 
trial and error, or by experimenting, to select appropriate work instruments, to use 
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certain kinds of problem-solving methods as a team member and to understand 
his/her own position as a worker in a factory. Representations of the practice are 
important tools for the more advanced forms of second-level learning involving 
problem solving and experimentation. 
If the underlying logic of action reveals continuously unstable or contradic-
tory action, the third level of learning is needed, according to Bateson. In this case, 
the uncertainty and instability become so pressing that people engage in a major 
effort to make sense of it all. The essence of this level of learning is thus in identi-
fying the right problems to solve. The learner learns not only to solve problems of 
a certain kind, but also to transform the context so that the problems appear and 
become manageable in a radically new light. This historically new level of learning 
emerges when individuals are repeatedly exposed to double-bind situations in the 
social context, when all efforts to resolve crises seem to lead to deeper crises, but 
not to a new solution. The only solution is to change the context profoundly. We 
could say that Wartofsky’s third level of artifacts supports the intellectual opera-
tions needed on that level of learning. 
The interaction between different processes of generalizing: scientifi c and 
everyday generalizations 
Vygotsky studied the development of children’s thinking as the development of 
concepts, inother words, generalizations. His experiments showed that in the fi rst 
phases of development the child creates generalizations from its experiences by 
combining subjectively in its mind individual objects in groups. Later on words 
begin to function as a means for it to guide attention to the specifi c features and 
to abstract them from the totality (Leont’ev, 1997, p. 27). From that phase on, the 
child’s individual experience and the cultural generalizations carried by words in-
teract in the development of its thinking.
The role of words in conceptual development changes when the child goes to 
school. Vygotsky assumed that some of its concepts are acquired in its daily life 
outside school, and others inside school. He called these different types of con-
cepts everyday19 and scientifi c. Everyday concepts arise in the context of daily life 
as a result of the child’s interaction with adults and the non-social environment. 
They are not explicitly introduced, they do not form a coherent, hierarchically 
19 Vygotsky used ”everyday concept” and ”spontaneous concepts” interchangeably. In this text I 
use only ”everyday concept” in order to distinguish it from Piaget’s term.
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ordered whole, and they are not used in a conscious deliberate way (van der Veer, 
1998, p. 90). The highest level of generalization is, in this case, the abstraction 
of some visual characteristics. The resulting concepts are general ideas, which go 
from the concrete to the abstract: they are ”generalizations of things” (Leontyev, 
1997, p. 28). This process of generalizing is largely inductive.
The relationship between the scientifi c concept and the object, on the other 
hand is, mediated from the very beginning by other concepts comprising the hi-
erarchical system, within which scientifi c concepts have a place. The rudiments of 
this systematization fi rst enter the child’s mind by way of its contact with scientifi c 
concepts, and are then transferred to everyday concepts, changing their psycho-
logical structure from the top down (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 93). Ideally, scientifi c con-
cepts refl ect what is seen to be the essence of a certain aspect of reality (van der 
Veer, 1998, p. 92). 
The formation path runs from the abstract to the concrete, and the child is more 
conscious of the concept than of the object from the very beginning (Leont’ev, 
1997, p. 28).
Scientifi c concepts presuppose everyday concepts as their foundation, but 
they are also able to transform them.  Both develop as intertwined, but in reverse 
directions (Vygotsky, 1962, 108). Scientifi c concepts go down through everyday 
concepts and everyday concepts grow upward through scientifi c concepts. Scien-
tifi c concepts are brought into the child’s consciousness in the course of instruc-
tion, and stimulate a step of cognitive development through which it has not yet 
passed. 
The development of everyday concepts must have reached a certain level for 
the child to be able to absorb a related scientifi c concept (ibid., p. 108). The degree 
of mastery of everyday concepts indicates the level of the child’s actual develop-
ment while the degree of mastery of scientifi c concepts indicates its zone of proxi-
mal development. The instruction ”calls into life a whole number of functions, 
which are in a stage of maturation lying in the zone of proximal development” 
(Vygotsky, 1962, p. 220). The zone of proximal development characterizes the dif-
ference between what the child is capable of itself and what it can become capable 
of with the help of a teacher. 
Using the experimental method of double stimulation, Vygotsky (1962, p. 56) 
was able to demonstrate how these two processes of generalizing can interact with 
each other. The experimenter presented to the subject two sets of stimuli, one as 
objects of his or her activity and the other, ”neutral stimuli” as signs that may serve 
to organize that activity. In the course of these experiments it turned out that the 
neutral stimuli assumed a specifi c instrumental meaning for the subject who was 
accomplishing the task. 
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Thus, the child actively incorporates these neutral objects into the task of prob-
lem solving. We might say that when diffi culties arise, neutral stimuli take on 
the function of a sign and from that point on the operation’s structure assumes 
an essentially different character. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 74–75)
In this case, the child creates a hypothesis concerning the instrumental meaning 
of the artifact in the situation and any possible operation that could be carried 
out with it. The reasoning here follows neither inductive nor deductive but rather 
abductive logic, which is the process of inference to the best explanation. Through 
this abductive inference the artifact becomes an instrument for the subject, who 
uses it in an action. In a problematic situation the subject associates one object 
with another in a goal-oriented action through the idea of an operation being 
realizable by using the other object as a tool.
Although Vygotsky studied concept formation and generalization in child de-
velopment, his studies are also relevant in terms of understanding the processes 
of generalizing that take place in production. Generalizations are not created only 
or primarily in local practice, but develop as an interplay between local processes 
of generalizing ”from below” and through abductive reasoning that uses culturally 
existing means to reach specifi c goals. 
4.3 Transforming generalizations that are fi xed in the human activity 
system
According to Leont’ev, societal practices have the character of collaborative activ-
ity. Human activities are the context in which new generalizations develop, but at 
the same time they are systems of existing generalizations. They are systemic for-
mations in which the psychological processes of individual persons who partici-
pate in an activity and in its societal system are inherently connected to each other. 
Individuals’ actions cannot be considered in isolation from the life of society and 
the societal systems of activity (Leont’ev, 1978, pp. 62–63). 
A constituting characteristic of a system of human activity is its object-orient-
edness. The concept of the object is implicit in the very concept of activity. The 
object of an activity has to be seen in two ways: fi rst in its independent existence as 
subordinating to itself and transforming the activity of the subject, and second as 
an image, a generalized representation. The changes that are realized in the object 
of an activity depend crucially on the adequacy and validity of the generalized rep-
resentations that the subject uses to orient him/herself to it. Activity is a process 
of interaction between subject and object, mediated by physical instruments and 
representations of the object as well as the social relationships of collaboration ex-
change and the division of labor. While the subject moulds an output of the object 
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that corresponds more or less to the idea of it the same interaction transforms the 
subject and his/her thoughts, actions and instruments (ibid., pp. 62–64). Hence 
the thing-deed-work-deed-thing interaction Ilyenkov speaks about takes place in 
man’s collaborative activities.
Activities differ from each other in their social motive and object:
The main thing that distinguishes one activity from another, however, is the 
difference of their objects. It is exactly the object of an activity that gives it a de-
termined direction. According to the terminology I have proposed, the object 
of an activity is its true motive. It is understood that the motive may be either 
material or ideal, either present in perception or exclusively in the imagination 
or in thought. The main thing is that behind activity there should always be a 
need, that it should always answer one need or another. Thus, the concept of 
activity is necessarily connected with the concept of motive. Activity does not 
exist without a motive; ”non-motivated” activity is not activity without a mo-
tive but activity with a subjectively and objectively hidden motive. (Leont’ev, 
1978, pp. 62)
According to Leont’ev, activity systems are hierarchical formations. Activity refers 
to institutionalized systems of collaborative activity that evolve over a lengthy pe-
riod of time in interaction with an object. Actions, on the other hand, are relatively 
short-lived units of activity. They have a temporally clear-cut beginning and end. 
Activities are always oriented to historically evolved objects, whereas actions are 
oriented to goals. 
In his famous hunting example, Leont’ev shows how the object of the hunting 
activity of a tribe in prehistoric times was the game. One group of hunters engaged 
in frightening a herd of animals and sending them toward other hunters who were 
hiding in ambush to catch them (Leont’ev, 1981, p. 210). The immediate goal of 
frightening the game was directly opposed to that of the hunting activity, which 
was to get food and fur. It can only be understood on the basis of the division of 
labor between the hunters. The actions of the individuals taking part in an activ-
ity are launched by the motive of the joint activity that is being realized. The goal 
regulates the way in which the action is carried out.
The relationship between the goal of an action and the object of an activity de-
pends on the nature of the activity. Actions are typically taken by individuals, but 
they can also be taken collaboratively by several people. Hunters take actions in 
order to get fl esh and fur, but the way in which they act is directed by the goals of 
frightening the animals to run to the catchers, and of catching them. In Leont’ev’s 
example frightening the game was an action taken by many hunters. The more 
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people there are carrying out the same action, the more necessary it is for each in-
dividual to know the goal. It has to be transferred from one individual to another, 
and understood by the individuals engaged in it. The goals may also be more or 
less conscious to the subject, but what is important is that the object of the activity 
determines the horizon of possible goals and actions (Leont’ev, 1978, p. 65). 
An activity may lose the motive that elicited it, whereupon it is converted into 
an action that may realize an entirely different relation to the world, a different 
activity. Conversely, an action may turn into an independent stimulating force and 
may become a separate activity.
Engeström (1987; 1995; 2001) further developed activity theory by modelling 
the multiple relationships of mediation of an activity system. The interaction be-
tween the subject, the object, and those engaged in the same activity is mediated 
by tools and signs. The community comprises multiple individuals, sub-groups or 
networks of people who share the same object of the activity and take actions to 
produce the outcome. The division of labor refers to both the horizontal division 
of tasks between the individuals or groups in the community and to the vertical 
division of power and status. Rules refer to the explicit and implicit norms that 
control individual action and exchange in interactions between members of the 
community.
All the elements of the activity system have the character of a generalization. 
The concept of the object of the activity is a generalization that sets limits on what 
is and what is not dealt with in it. The tools and instruments, the division of la-
bor and the rules comprise generalizations concerning aspects of the activity. The 
subjects develop an identity, a generalization of the kind of persons they are. The 
generalizations embedded in the various mediators have to be aligned in order 
for the activity to run effectively.  The way in which the variation in the activity is 
controlled i.e. the principle and the logic on which the coherence of the elements 
of activity systems are based could be called the concept of the activity (Virkkunen, 
2004 p. 13).
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Figure 4.1 The structure of human activity (Engeström 1987, p. 78)
The artifacts that mediate the activity are, to a great extent outputs of other ac-
tivity systems that produce instruments (research, science, technology), subjects 
(education and schooling) and rules (administration, legislation and collective 
bargaining). Thus processes of producing practice-relevant generalizations are 
distributed between networks of activities. 
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Figure 4.2 The network of activity systems
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Because the generalizations inherent in the various artifacts that mediate an activ-
ity are functionally interdependent, a remarkable change in one of these leads to 
a chain of developing new generalizations and of remediation in the system. This 
kind of chain process of change may be expansive or it may lead to progressive de-
terioration in the activity. According to Engeström (1987), a cycle of expansive de-
velopment of an activity typically comprises fi ve phases. It is accomplished when 
the object of the activity is re-conceptualized to embrace a radically wider horizon 
of possibilities than in the previous mode of the activity and when the structure of the 
activity is changed accordingly (Engeström, 1999). 
Engeström calls the fi rst phase of expansive transformation the need state. A 
diffuse need for change emerges as the primary contradiction between the use 
value and the exchange value of the elements of the activity. The outcome of a pro-
ductive activity system has its use value for a customer, but it also has an exchange 
value in the markets. As conditions change, the quasi-stationary balance between 
the different logics of these interconnected aspects of the elements of an activity 
can be shaken. 
Accumulating changes in the object of the activity system, such as setting new 
rules govering occupational health, may aggravate the fi rst-order contradictions 
to produce secondary contradictions, which arise when actors face in their daily 
actions disturbances that seem impossible to resolve. The aggravation may divide 
work community or the management into diverging camps causing confl icts that 
often produce crises or the double-bind situations individual actors experience in 
such a situation: according to Engeström’s theory, these are caused by contradic-
tions between the elements of the activity system.
The aggravation of secondary contradictions leads actors to search for a new 
object/motive for the activity and a new model and principle. The new model is the 
germ cell of the new concept of the activity: it captures in a simplifi ed form the ba-
sic internal relations and tensions that make the participants understand their his-
tory and strive for possible expansive change in their activity system (Engeström, 
2004, p. 12). Implementation of the model will meet diffi culties because the pre-
vious activity system does not disappear by itself. The old system rebels against 
the growing new one. The confl icts or disturbances of the implementation phase 
refl ect the tertiary contradiction between the qualitatively new activity system and 
the traditional one. When the new system fi nally begins to establish and consoli-
date itself, it meets diffi culties and disturbances again. The activity systems that are 
in interaction with the central renewed system will face quaternary contradictions 
between it and the traditional neighboring activities. Expansive learning thus pro-
ceeds in cycles, through multiple phases and over lengthy periods of time. 
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Engeström’s theory of activity systems and learning by expansion facilitate analysis 
of the transformation of local activities, including work places, and the different 
processes of generating new generalizations for them. The theory does not pro-
vide any conceptualization of the historical development of the generalizations, 
however. In the following section I consider classical studies of cultural-historical 
activity theory in terms of historical changes in generalization. 
4.4 Historical types of generalizations
Perceptual-functional generalizations
The aim of A Luria (1976) in his famous study on the cultural history of cognitive 
development was to demonstrate the socio-historical roots of all basic cognitive 
processes. His hypothesis was that the structure of the dominant types of activity 
in a culture affects its way of generalizing. Thus practical or situational-concrete 
thinking would predominate in societies that are characterized by practical ma-
nipulations of objects, and the more ”abstract” forms of ”theoretical” activity in 
technologically advanced societies would lead to more abstract thinking. (Luria, 
1976, pp. xiv-xv) This distinction corresponds to the difference between a society 
in which production is predominantly based on craft work and one based on a 
more elaborated division of labor and money-mediated exchange.
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Figure 4.3 The ideal-type cycle of expansive learning and the development of the activity 
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The subjects in a society predominated by the practical manipulation of things 
did not interpret words as symbols of abstract categories that were usable for clas-
sifying ideas. What mattered to them were strictly concrete ideas about practical 
schemes in which appropriate objects could be incorporated. Consequently, their 
thinking was wholly unlike that of subjects trained to perform theoretical opera-
tions (ibid., 1976, p. 54).
Among uneducated, illiterate subjects the controlling factor was the tendency 
to reproduce operations used in practical life. Rakmat, one of the interviewees in 
this thorough study, was an illiterate, thirty-nine-year-old peasant from an outly-
ing district. The researcher asked him to group certain objects showing him draw-
ings of a hammer, a saw, a log, and a hatchet. 
They are all alike. I think all of them have to be here. See if you’re going to saw, 
you need a saw, and if you have to split something you need hatchet. So they are 
all needed here. (Luria, 1976, p. 55)
Luria’s interpretation was that Rakmat employed in his answer the principle of the 
practical grouping of objects. He was asked more questions in an effort to make 
him categorize or use abstract thinking, but he always assigned objects functions 
in a practical way and reverted to situational thinking. Luria also returned to  the 
saw-log-hatchet example in an attempt to provoke an empirical generalization. 
(Luria’s interpretations are in italics)
Which of these things could you call by one word?
”How’s that? If you call all three of them a ’hammer’ that won’t be right either”
Rejects use of general term.
But one fellow picked three things – the hammer, saw, and hatchet – and said 
they were alike.
”A saw, a hammer, and a hatchet all have to work together. But the log has to 
be here too!”
Reverts to situational thinking.
Why do you think he picked these three things and not the log?
”Probably he’s got a lot of fi rewood, but if we’ll be left without fi rewood, we 
wont be able to do anything”
Explains selection in strictly practical terms.
True, but a hammer, a saw, and a hatchet are all tools.
”Yes, but even if we have tools, we still need wood, otherwise, we can’t build 
anything.” 
Persists in situational thinking.
(Luria, 1976, p. 56)
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At the point in the last question at which the researcher consciously used the cate-
gorical, classifying term, the subject persisted in situational thinking. Using similar 
interviews and clinical methodology, Luria showed that the limitation of percep-
tual-functional generalization was that it could not be used for other purposes.
Our subjects used concrete situational thinking to compile groups that were 
extremely resistant to change. When we tried to suggest another group (based 
on abstract principles) they generally rejected it, insisting that such an arrange-
ment did not refl ect the intrinsic relationship among the objects, and that the 
person who adopted it was ”stupid”, or ”did not understand anything”. (Luria, 
1976, p. 54) 
The subjects who gravitated towards this type of classifi cation did not sort objects 
into formal categories, but incorporated them into perceptual-functional situa-
tions drawn from life and reproduced from memory (Luria, 1976, p. 49). 
This generalizing process could be interpreted as Bateson’s fi rst-level learn-
ing, when an actor fi ts his/her behavior into a situation in which the goal and the 
means of reaching it are given and the appropriate reaction is learned through ha-
bituation. The representations used in this perceptual-functional process consist 
of primary artifacts such as tools, modes of social organization, bodily skills and 
technical skills in the use of tools. According Wartofsky (1979, p. 202) the modes 
may be gestural, oral, or visual, but obviously such that they may be communi-
cated in one or more sense-modalities: such, in short, that they may be perceived.
Abstract-empirical generalizations
According to Luria, the setting of things in formal categories was typical in indus-
trial societies. It is also the central form of generalization in schools. V. V. Davy-
dov studied types of generalization in school curricula and learning, following an 
initial observation that the teaching of ”generalizations” and concepts was one of 
the principal purposes of school instruction. He found out that the material in the 
textbooks of various disciplines was arranged, as a rule, so that the pupils’ work 
with it could lead them to appropriate formal empirical generalizations. 
Davydov and his collaborators showed in their theoretically and experimen-
tally oriented studies lasting over thirty years that empirical generalizations were 
based on observation and comparison of the external properties of objects. Chil-
dren moved from describing of the properties of a particular object to fi nding and 
singling them out in a whole class of similar objects, and learned to fi nd and single 
out certain stable, recurring properties of that class of objects. The textbooks pre-
sented as general the qualities that were similar in all objects of the same type or 
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class. What occurred during the process of generalization was, on the one hand, 
the search for a certain invariant in an assortment of objects and their properties, 
and the designation of that invariant by a word, and on the other hand, the use of 
the invariant that had been singled out to identify objects in a given assortment 
(Davydov, 1990, p.10). 
E. Iljyenkov and V.V. Davydov elaborated on the distinction between formal-
empirical and theoretical-genetic generalizations and concepts. Abstract relation-
ships are conventionally objects of formal logic and mathematical science, which 
examine these connections using formal classifi cations of numbers and groups. 
Formal logic describes certain important features of concept formation and think-
ing that are necessary in everyday life. Formal generalizing entails comparing sev-
eral objects, identifying some similarities between them, abstracting the similar 
features from each other, and crystallizing the contribution of the features into a 
verbal defi nition. The defi nition that is based on the common features of a class 
of objects or the common feature as such is the content of an empirical concept. 
It enables the classifi cation, systematization, and connection of phenomena or be-
ings. It also enables the connection of successive or parallel courses of events, and 
the description of cause-and-effect relationships using a similar method.
The process of empirical generalization follows the chain: observation - image 
linguistic abstraction. ”Concrete” is understood to describe an individual, sensu-
ally perceivable object, while ”abstract” is a separate feature that is common to sev-
eral objects. Formal logic follows the pattern of inductive generalization. It starts 
from a particular case and ends up in the ”logically abstract”, and conversely, it 
makes defi nitions and sorts singular objects into classes.
The laws of formal logic, such as ”the law of forbidden contradiction” and  ”the 
law of double negation”, do not describe the way people think. They are rather 
necessary conditions that thinking should follow to be ”formally right”, and are 
prerequisites in the formulation and operation of empirical concepts.
Abstarct-empirical generalizations such as Warofsky’s secondary artifacts make 
it possible for practitioners to produce generalizations of an overall view of the ac-
tivity, to refl ect on it, and to collect and save the experiences as material for further 
development of the work. Processes of generalizing are also equivalent to Bateson’s 
second level of learning, when the learner learns the underlying logic of his/her 
actions in the given context.
Such generalizations are not signifi cant in relatively isolated rural societies in 
which the economy is based on craft production, however. They can only develop 
in activity that looks on the object and product of work from the outside in terms 
of quantities, which is typical of the work of tradesmen and administrators. One 
might thus presume that this type of generalization originally developed to medi-
ate these activities. We might also presume that it increases in signifi cance as the 
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economy transforms from nature-based to money-mediated exchange and wage 
labor. 
Theoretical-genetic generalizations
The limitation of perceptual-functional generalization is its immediate and situ-
ational nature that inhibits the creation of abstractions and empirical general-
ization. Formal logic, on the other hand, operates with abstractions, wherein the 
empirically derived concepts lose their concrete content. Formal logic does not 
provide tools for developing understanding of the emergence and development of 
the object. Theoretical-genetic thinking produces generalizations that differ from 
both perceptual-functional and abstract-empirical generalizations, and which are 
based on an act of objective transformation and analysis carried out in order to 
establish the essential relationships that characterize the object and its genetically 
original form. 
Theoretical thinking is a process of generalization that singles out the general 
principle of the emergence of the production of a phenomenon. Spinoza’s famous 
example of the good defi nition of a circle shows the difference between that and 
abstract thinking. A circle can be defi ned in an abstract-empirical way as a regular 
round fi gure, and identifi ed from a class of fi gures of various forms. According to 
Spinoza, a better defi nition would be that a circle forms at the end of a line when 
the other end is fi xed and the line is turned around. This defi nition is general in 
the sense that any size or kind of circle can be produced by applying it, and it is 
theoretical in the sense that no prior empirical acquaintance of circles is needed. 
It gives the origin of any circle by describing the contradictory relationships that 
produce it: free movement contra the fi xed end of the line. (Kozulin, 1998, pp. 
63–64)
Davydov’s (1990, pp. 301–302) analysis of the differences between abstract-
empirical and theoretical-genetic generalization is presented in a concise form in 
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 A comparison of empirical and theoretical generalizations
Abstract-empirical generalization Theoretical-genetic generalization
– is produced by comparing objects and their 
representations 
– is produced by an analysis of a certain 
relations inside a structured system
– discerns the formally general property, of 
particular objects to be attributed to a certain 
formal class regardless of whether these objects 
are connected with one another
– identifi es the real and specifi c essential 
relationship of things, which is the genetic 
foundation of all other manifestations of the 
system 
– is based on observation, refl ects the 
external properties of objects and relies com-
pletely on visual conceptions
– is based on the transformation of objects, 
and refl ects their internal relationships and 
connections 
– separates the formally common trait from 
the particular features of the objects
– fi xates  the connections between 
an essential relationship and its various 
manifestations
– fi xates empirical knowledge in the word, the 
term
– is primarily expressed in the methods and 
models of intellectual activity and subsequently 
in various systems of signs and symbols in 
artifi cial and natural languages 
According to dialectical logic, individual, particular things and phenomena in the 
world are products of the development of a certain concrete whole or system. The 
basis of the objective process of development is a specifi c real relationship between 
objects in the world that one can perceive as sensorial. This relationship is the germ 
cell of the concrete whole, or of the system that has evolved from it. Although the 
germ cell exists as a particular form of the relationship, it has at the same time 
the property of being the universal abstract form, determining the emergence and 
development of other particular, special and individual phenomena based on that 
relationship within the whole or in the system in question (Davydov, 1990, p. 285).
The commonly understood concepts of abstract and concrete are redefi ned in 
dialectical logic. The concrete is not seen as sensually palpable or the abstract as 
something mentally constructed. The research both begins from the concrete and 
ends up with it. 
For dialectical logic, the concrete is an interconnected systemic whole. But the 
interconnections are not of any arbitrary kind. At the core of the interconnec-
tions there are internal contradictions. (Ilyenkov, 1982, p. 272)
In promoting understanding of the nature of any particular component of the 
concrete whole, the task of investigation is to grasp its role within the concrete 
whole and the history of its origin. This logic cannot be stored in the form of 
ready-made formulas to be imposed upon the object. On the contrary, ”the con-
crete history of a concrete object should be considered in each particular case 
rather than history in general” (llyenkov, 1982, p. 215). 
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By ”abstract”, Ilyenkov means anything that is ”picked out, isolated, existing‚ 
on its own in relative independence from everything else, any side, aspect or part 
of a whole, any determinate fragment of reality or its refl ection in consciousness.” 
(Bakhurst, 1991, p. 141)
The process of theoretical generalization ascends from the abstract to the con-
crete. Ilyenkov saw this as a reasonable method for investigating historically-devel-
oping phenomena. The aim is to understand the development of the object-phe-
nomenon as it evolves from its original contradictory relationship or germ cell, or 
initially single and isolated, and in that sense abstract, relationship into its present 
mature and complex form. The study starts with the concrete chaotic whole from 
which it descends to the abstraction of the basic determining categories. Thirdly, it 
rises again – using the abstraction – to the concrete whole, this time as a rich total-
ity of determinations and relations (Miettinen, 2000, pp. 111–112).
Particular abstract defi nitions, the synthesis of which yields the concrete 
thought, are formed in the process of ascending from the abstract to the concrete. 
Moreover, the concept ”expresses a reality which, while being quite a particular 
phenomenon among other particular phenomena, is at the same time a genuinely 
universal element, a cell in all the other particular phenomena” (Ilyenkov, 1982, 
p. 79). The task of genuine concept formation is thus to fi nd out the developmen-
tal germ cell, the initial genetic abstraction, of the totality under investigation, and 
to develop it into its full concrete diversity. 
The theoretical process that leads to the attainment of concrete knowledge is 
always a whole in each of its individual links, and at the same time a process of 
reducing the concrete to the abstract (Ilyenkov, 1982, pp. 114–115). Although both 
processes (reduction and ascending) occur in unison, the leading one is ascending, 
which expresses the nature of theoretical thought (Davydov, 1990, p. 281).
General notions are formal abstractions since they separate arbitrary features 
of objects from their interconnections. Genuine concepts are concrete abstractions 
since they refl ect and reconstruct the systemic and interconnected nature of the 
objects.  This systemic nature is not of the static classifi catory ”genus-species” type 
but is rather genetic and dynamic. A whale is, in empirical terms, a fi sh because of 
its external features but theoretically, in relation to its genesis, it is a mammal.
In dialectical logic, the concrete is an interconnected systemic whole. The core 
of the interconnections lies in the internal contradictions that produce the phe-
nomena in the system.
Concreteness is in general identity of opposites, whereas the abstract general is 
obtained according to the principle of bare identity, identity without contra-
diction. (Ilyenkov 1982, p. 272)
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Contradictions become signifi cant if we are to handle movement, development 
and change conceptually.
Any utterance expressing the very moment, the very act of transition (and 
not the result of this transition only) inevitably contains an explicit or im-
plicit contradiction, and a contradiction ”at one and the same time” (that 
is, during transition, at the moment of transition) and ”in one and the same 
relation”(precisely with regard to the transition of the opposites into each oth-
er). (Ilyenkov, 1982, p. 251)
The struggle and mutual dependency of opposite forces or elements is the devel-
opmental driving force within objective systems. To create a genuine concept is 
to grasp and fi xate this inner contradiction of the object system and to derive its 
subsequent developmental manifestations from that initial contradiction. 
The dialectical materialist method of resolution of contradictions in theoretical 
defi nitions thus consists in tracing the process by which the movement of real-
ity itself resolves them in a new form of expression. Expressed objectively, the 
goal lies in tracing, through analysis of new empirical materials, the emergence 
of reality in which an earlier established contradiction fi nds its relative resolu-
tion in a new objective form of its realisation. (Ilyenkov, 1982, pp. 262–263)
According to Davydov, the term knowledge should be used to refer to both the 
result of thought and the process whereby that result is achieved. 
Every scientifi c concept is both a construction of thought and a refl ection of 
being. From this point of view, a concept is both a refl ection of being and an 
instrumentality of the mental operation. (Davydov, 1988, p. 21)
We might also presume that theoretical-genetic generalizations represent Bates-
on’s third level of learning, when the learner transforms and continuously expands 
the context of problems. This is a typical area of scientifi c activity. We might also 
assume that, in this kind of process of generalizing Wartofsky’s (1979, p. 208) ter-
tiary artifacts constitute ”possible worlds” and may refl ect the limits of the actual 
praxis, thereby helping to create alternatives for conceivable change in the very 
model of praxis. Wartofsky points out that primary and secondary artifacts are 
created in production, on-line, whereas tertiary  ”off-line” worlds are outside of 
production.
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The artifacts of the imaginative construction of ”off-line” worlds I take to be 
derivative, and abstractive. But there may well be a structural component in all 
this, which derives from other (though no less social) needs, which transcend 
the more immediate necessities of productive praxis. (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 209)
Davydov emphasizes that empirical actions correspond to empirical concepts/
generalizations, while theoretical actions correspond to theoretical concepts /gen-
eralizations. Nevertheless, schoolchildren do not create these kinds of concepts. 
They are created in scientifi c work. Children appropriate them as part of learning 
activity, which he claims consists of mental actions commensurate with actions, 
whereby these products of spiritual culture have been historically elicited. In or-
der to appropriate a theoretical concept, learners have to reproduce the process 
whereby people have created concepts, images, values, and norms.
Davydov (1988, p. 24) identifi ed the following constituent learning actions 
as necessary for producing theoretical generalization within learning activity: 1) 
transforming the situation to fi nd out the general relation of the system under 
consideration; 2) modelling the relation in question in a material, graphic and 
symbolic form; 3) transforming the model of the relation for studying its prop-
erties in their original form; 4) deducing and constructing a series of particular 
concrete practical problems having a general method of solution; 5) controlling 
the preceding operations; 6) evaluating  the mastering of the general method.
4.5 The results of the analysis thus far 
My study started from the observation that a historical change in learning in and 
for production is currently taking place. In analyzing theories of organizational 
learning I recognized that they do not provide concepts for understanding histori-
cal change in forms of learning. I then turned to three theories concerning the his-
torical development of forms of production, one approaching it from the point of 
view of general economic development, one from the historical ideal types of pro-
duction and one from the perspective of management doctrines. It was through 
these theories that, I was able to locate the current change in learning in and for 
production in the transition from the period of industrial mass production to 
ICT-based network economy. Although these theories support the idea of histori-
cal change, they do not specifi cally elaborate on it. 
I then took on the task of fi nding a method that would allow me to study his-
torical change in learning in and for production. I chose a genetic method that 
involves fi nding the initial abstraction of the phenomenon. On the basis of cul-
tural historical activity theory I came to hypothesize that the initial abstraction of 
learning in and for was the process of creating practice-relevant generalizations. 
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The changes and the research questions could then be analyzed as changes in the 
processes of producing generalizations, and more specifi cally as producing gen-
eralized cognitive and/or practical operations that are objectifi ed in artifacts used 
as mediators in carrying out these operations. Leaning on Marton’s observations 
I came to the conclusion that processes of generalizing require unity of sameness 
and variation. The sameness becomes defi ned by an initial generalization that de-
fi nes the object of attention within which variation is analyzed. Reaching a gener-
alization requires specifi c processing of the relevant variation. According to classic 
activity-theoretical studies, the processes and the generalizations inherent in them 
differ historically from each other. It was possible to identify three rough types of 
generalization: perceptual-functional, abstract-empirical and theoretical-genetic.
The development of the industrial form of production marginalized the pre-
viously dominant craft forms of work and also the form of learning in and for 
production typical of craft work. Mechanization-based industry reached its ma-
ture phase in the mass-production era of the last century. Three main models of 
work organization and forms of developing production were created during that 
period: the Taylorist Rationalization of work, Socio-Technical Systems Design and 
Continuous Process Improvement20.
In order to further understanding of the nature of generalizing in the models, 
I will, in the following chapters 5–8, analyze the experiments and development 
processes that produced the ”ancestors” of the later variants of these three forms 
of production and production-related learning with a view to tracing the essential 
general relationships of these systems in their initial, most simple form. I will fol-
low Ilyenkov’s methodological idea of revealing the nature of generalization by 
studying the process of its creation. I will analyze how Taylor (1911) in his experi-
mental work created the Scientifi c Management model of generalizing how Trist 
and Bamforth came up with the idea of Socio-Technical System Design in their 
study of a coalmine, and how Taichi Ohno of the Toyota Motor Company created 
a fl exible manufacturing system through sustained experimentation. 
The experimenters themselves have written about their experimental activities. 
I will use their reports as my primary sources, and other studies on these experi-
ments and the development of the production types as my secondary sources.
20 see Figure 3.3, page 64

95
5 Taylor’s experiments as the origin of 
generalizing in mass production
5.1 Taylor’s works and experiments
The up-swing of the fourth Kondratiev wave was based mainly on the automobile 
and oil industries. At that time, cars were built of both interchangeable standard 
parts and hand-crafted parts.  Henry Ford, who gradually eliminated all hand-
crafted components in the manufacture of the Model T car, was the fi rst truly to 
apply mass-production techniques. The assembly line came into being through 
his introduction of machines and presses that could cut, shape, and stamp out 
each one of the components of the car in exact measure (Womack et al., 1990). 
The mass -production paradigm, also called Fordism, dominated management 
philosophy for more than half a century. 
The prerequisites of Fordism were created in the third Kondratiev wave of 
1895–1940. Despite the fact that many of the original inventions for the internal 
combustion engine were made in Europe before the end of the nineteenth century, 
it was in the US automobile industry that mass production took off before the 
First World War. By the 1920s, the United States totally dominated the industry. 
A crucial prerequisite of Fordism was so-called Scientifi c Management devel-
oped by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915). Taylor began working at the Mid-
vale Steel Company in 1878 as a machinist. He became foreman of the steel-plant 
department and applied work study in the measurement of industrial productiv-
ity. He developed detailed systems for gaining maximum effi ciency that relied on 
time-and-motion studies, the purpose of which was to determine the best meth-
ods for performing a task in the least amount of time. Taylor’s best-known works 
are: ”Notes on Belting”, 1893; ”A Piece-Rate System”, 1895; ”Shop Management”, 
1903; ”On the Art of Cutting Metals”, 1906; and ”The Principles of Scientifi c Man-
agement”, 1911.
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In his main work, ”The Principles of Scientifi c Management”, Taylor argued 
strongly for the new management method he had developed. According to him, 
the main problem in production was ”the ineffi ciency and waste of human work-
force and material things”. It was the problem that pervaded the whole country. 
He aimed to show that ”the great loss, which the whole country was suffering” was 
caused by ”the ineffi ciency in almost all of our daily acts.” (Taylor, 1911, p.7)
Taylor worked within large productional units. Although the experiments he 
illustrated in his ”Scientifi c Management” were from the industrial context, he 
hoped 
(…) that the same principles could be applied with equal force to all social 
activities: To the management of our homes; the management of our farms; 
the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of our 
churches, our philanthropic institutions our universities and our governmental 
departments. (Taylor, 1911, p. 8)
”The Principles of Scientifi c Management” consists of two chapters. The fi rst one, 
”Fundamentals of Scientifi c Management”, concentrates on the general problem 
of ineffi ciency and on the need for a new management style, and the second in-
troduces the principles of scientifi c management, illustrated by his experiments, 
which are explained in detail. At the end of the book Taylor presents a condensed 
vision of a standardized production system.
In this chapter I will show how Frederick Winslow Taylor’s (1856–1915) exper-
iments, during the period of the third Kondratiev wave provided the foundations 
of the generalizing process that become prevalent in the era of mass production. I 
will fi rst elaborate the contradictions in production that inspired his experimen-
tal work. I will then explore the nature of generalizing processes and representa-
tions in his famous experiment in handling pig iron, the principles of Scientifi c 
Management, and his vision of the planning offi ce: my conclusion is that Taylor 
created a system of work-related generalizing, that was typical of mass production. 
Finally,  I will explore the spreading of this system, and the limitations that drove 
the search for alternatives.
5.2. The sources of Taylor-type generalizing
The electrifi cation industry was the carrier branch of the third Kondratiev wave. 
The core inputs consisted of steel and copper. Electricity and chemistry were also 
the two areas in which scientifi c research fi rst began to be intimately related to in-
dustrial development. As a new fl exible source of energy electricity affected factory 
design and layout in almost all sectors of manufacture as old steam-based power 
machinery was replaced (Freeman and Louçã, 2001, pp. 226–230).
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The manufacturers generally understood that the indirect benefi ts of using unit 
electric drives were far greater than the direct energy-saving benefi ts (Freeman 
and Louçã, 2000, p. 230). The machines in factories using water or steam power 
had to be arranged along the main axis of the power supply. Electric motors made 
it possible for the fi rst time to lay out the machines according to the manufactur-
ing phases of the product (Hirschhorn, 1984, p. 10), and the new factory layouts in 
factories made possible big capital savings in terms of fl oor space. Factories could 
be made cleaner and lighter, and production capacity could be improved more 
easily. Machine tools were re-designed, handling and other production equipment 
was moved, and many plants and industries relocated-taking advantage of the new 
freedom conferred by electric power transmission and local generating capacity 
(Freeman and Louçã, 2000, pp. 230–231).
These changes involved two signifi cant features: the emergence of giant fi rms 
and the introduction of professional management. The concentration was stron-
gest in the electrical equipment industry (ibid., 2000, p. 244). The growth in com-
pany size meant that large plants could be established in which the management 
had to control the work of several hundred workers. The changes called for new 
ways of organizing and controlling the workforce.
Technological innovations placed enormous strains on the decentralized man-
agement system. In some heat-using industries a shift from large batch to genu-
ine fl ow production produced demands for better scheduling and coordination 
and inevitably, for a larger managerial staff. The growing size of the plant had a 
similar effect. No matter how the manufacturer sought to insulate himself from 
day-to-day affairs, his role in the factory, particularly in labour-management 
relations, inevitably increased. The obvious response was to recruit a corps of 
specialists. (Nelson 1980, 10)
The increased interdependence between managers and workers, the profession-
alization of management and the enormous growth in the number of workers 
caused serious problems in managing the production. Moreover, securing a fl u-
ent fl ow of production became increasingly important because it was the way to 
increase productivity and to offset the fi xed costs associated with the rising capital 
intensity. Sustaining or improving profi tability by using physical capacity more 
fully and controlling the fl ow of materials and components became a major man-
agement concern (Freeman & Louca, 2001, p. 246). Success was based more and 
more on product quantity and the rapidity of production fl ow. Taylor understood 
this logic of emerging mass production. He was not the only person to emphasize 
effi ciency, however: it was in the minds of all of the managers who had invested in 
electric machines. 
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Reading Taylor in this light gives an insight into why his method was so in-
fl uential. Although he was a practising engineer rather than a historian, his texts 
tell us about his opinions and about the historical transformation of production 
that was taking place at the time, because he was substantiating his arguments by 
revealing the problems and opportunities he saw in the industry of his day. 
Electricity and mechanization opened managers’ eyes to the possibility of 
speeding up production. This idea permeates Taylor’s texts as he addresses the 
question of how to perform all industrial tasks as quickly and as effi ciently as pos-
sible. On the other hand, he complained that managers and workers in general 
were not interested in effi ciency.  
Mechanization and electrifi cation did not extend to all tasks in the factory, how-
ever.  This fact was manifested in a particular way in Taylor’s experiments, which 
focused mainly on tasks that required hard manual work. He worked in a steel com-
pany and the studies he reported in ”Scientifi c Management” covered tasks such as 
loading heavy pig iron, shovelling large areas with spades and laying bricks.  These 
were not the tasks involved in operating electrifi ed mechanical machines but the 
remaining manual tasks that were carried out by great masses of men using simple 
hand tools. The purpose of Taylor’s experiments was to speed up production and 
in many cases the manual tasks were bottlenecks21 in increasing the overall pace of 
production fl ow. Experimenting with different methods of heat treatment, Taylor 
and his colleagues found that a metal-cutting tool operated at maximum effi ciency 
when run at the highest possible speed without melting the steel. Machines could 
thus be run in machine shops two to four times faster than before. By reducing 
machine times drastically this invention focused attention on the proportionately 
greater importance of handling times. Efforts to reduce handling time through job 
analysis and time study therefore were increased (Aitken, 1960, pp. 32–33). The pace 
of the remaining manual tasks became the threshold question in terms of electrifi -
cation: it determined the overall effi ciency and pace of production, which explains 
why they became the critical object of management’s developmental activity.
Electrifi cation brought changes into the production process: 
1. The use of electric machines facilitated more fl uent layouts in plants.
2. There was transition from the large batch production of many products to 
work-fl ow production of a few products. 
21 Only one experiment dealt with ‘dedicated’ machine work involving cutting metal using dif-
ferent metal-cutting machines, especially the lathe. The experiments, which were eventually suc-
cessful, lasted for 25 years.
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3. The speed of the work fl ow became the critical factor in competition be-
tween companies.
4. The remaining manual work tasks became the major bottleneck that pre-
vented the speeding up of the fl ow of production.
5. The number of workmen in factories increased enormously (giant fi rms).
6. Worker specialization and the number of industrial trades increased.
7. Management became a specialized profession.
My interpretation is that the fi rst three changes supported the speeding up of work 
at the same time as the second three changes had an the opposite effect: the num-
ber of workers and worker specialization increased enormously, thus making the 
management of production more diffi cult and preventing its speeding up.
The traditional management tool for controlling work was the ”incentive-ini-
tiative” management system, which Taylor considered to be the best way of manag-
ing at the time. It was a method whereby managers induced individual workmen 
to work hard and use their best initiative, skills, ingenuity and goodwill by giving 
them promises. The inducements were based on the hope of rapid promotion or 
advancement, better working conditions, and higher wages in the form of gener-
ous piecework rates or bonus payments for good and rapid work. Taylor claimed, 
however, that this management method was inadequate for speeding up work. He 
quoted one foreman:
Well, I can keep them from sitting down, but the devil can’t make them get a 
move on while they are at work. (Taylor, 1911, p. 20)
The main obstacle in trying to speed up the pace of work was the application of 
traditional rule-of thumb methods: workers used their experience-based ways to 
determine the capacities and features of machines, the properties of raw materials, 
and the necessary work operations.
In an industrial establishment, which employs say from 500 to 1000 workmen, 
there will be found in many cases at least twenty to thirty different trades. The 
workmen in each of these trades have had their knowledge handed down to 
them by word of mouth, through the many years in which their trade has been 
developed from the primitive condition, in which our far-distant ancestors 
each one practiced the rudiments of many different trades, to the present state 
of great and growing subdivision of labor, in which each man specializes upon 
some comparatively small class of work. (ibid. 1911, p. 31)
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The use of rule-of-thumb methods, which were transferred from generation to 
generation of workers by observation, led to very different work habits and so 
the workers performed the same tasks in different ways. The mechanization that 
straightened the layout of production and the fact that more and more tasks were 
done in successive order made this internal variation in individual performance 
increasingly a problem. The rule-of-thumb method helped to sustain the variation 
in the ways in which work tasks were performed, however: managers could not 
tighten up the work fl ow because they did not have access to the knowledge that 
had been handed down.
This mass of rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the 
principal asset or possession of every tradesman. Now, in the best of the ordi-
nary types of management, the managers recognize frankly the fact that the 500 
or 1000 workmen, included in the twenty to thirty trades, who are under them, 
possess this mass of traditional knowledge, a large part of which is not in the 
possession of the management. (Taylor, 1911, p. 32)
The managers understood that their own knowledge and personal skills ”fall far 
short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the workmen under them.” 
”Incentives and initiatives management” left the responsibility of determining 
how to do the work to the workers.
The most experienced managers therefore frankly place before their workmen 
the problem of doing the work in the best and most economical way. (ibid., 
p. 32)
Factory workers operated in comparatively large groups that Taylor called ”gangs”. 
The size of the gangs, each under a single foreman, tended to remain fairly con-
stant regardless of the amount of work. It was almost impossible for managers and 
foremen to fi nd out how quickly the worker really could do the work. The gangs 
worked slowly because they thought that working more quickly would cause un-
employment.
The fallacy, which has from time immemorial been almost universal among 
workmen, that a material increase in the output of each man or each machine 
in the trade would result in the end in throwing a large number of men out of 
work. (ibid., p. 15)
Taylor asserted ”without fear of contradiction” that this combination of thinking 
and doing constituted ”the greatest evil” with which working people were affl icted. 
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(…) because they are ignorant of the history of their own trade even, they still 
fi rmly believe, as their fathers did before them, that it is against their best inter-
ests for each man to turn out each day as much work as possible. (ibid., p. 17)
Taylor called this phenomenon under working and soldiering. The workmen were 
”deliberately working slowly to avoid doing a full day’s work”. 
So universal is soldiering for this purpose that hardly a competent workman 
can be found in a large establishment, whether he works by the day or on piece 
work, contract work, or under any of the ordinary systems, who does not de-
vote a considerable part of his time to studying just how slow he can work and 
still convince his employer that he is going at a good pace. (ibid., p. 21)
Taylor also maintained that under-working was in the control of the workmen 
themselves. If a newcomer tried to earn money the old-timers prevented it. Under 
the ”initiative and incentive” management system the pace of work was almost 
entirely ”up to the workmen” (ibid., p. 38). 
The initiative-incentive managers’ attempts to speed up the pace of work using 
different payment methods also seemed to lead to results that were the opposite 
of what was intended. Payment methods in those times were based on contracts, 
which were drawn up according to the number of pieces per day, or piecework. If 
the workers were paid ”the standard rate of pay per day” for similar work, the pace 
was slow because the single worker did not get any benefi t from working hard. 
Why should I work hard when the lazy fellow gets the same pay that I do and 
does only half as much work. (ibid., p. 20)
The payment method itself caused soldiering and changed the workmen’s atti-
tudes to their employers.
It is, however, under piece work that the art of systematic soldiering is thor-
oughly developed; after a workman has had the price per piece of the work he 
is doing lowered two or three times as a result of his having worked harder and 
increased his output, he is likely entirely to lose sight of his employer’s side of 
the case and become imbued with a grim determination to have no more cuts 
if soldiering can prevent it. Unfortunately, for the character of the workman, 
soldiering involves a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive his employer, 
and thus upright and straightforward workmen are compelled to become more 
or less hypocritical. The employer is soon looked upon as an antagonist, if not 
an enemy, and the mutual confi dence which should exist between a leader and 
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his men, the enthusiasm, the feeling that they are all working for the same end 
and will share in the results is entirely lacking. (ibid., p. 23)
Taylor was concerned about the relationships between managers and workmen, 
and disapproved of the opposition between them. He maintained that it was im-
possible to control the work with the prevailing management methods, which, 
on the contrary, even caused soldiering.  The work methods were based on rules 
of thumb, which inhibited control. The only solution to this contradiction was 
to ”change from rule-of-thumb management to Scientifi c Management” (ibid., 
p. 100). 
Taylor conducted and recorded in all 30,000–50,000 experiments as he tried 
to introduce to and convince managers of the superiority of his system. Accord-
ing to Callahan (1962, p. 40), he was an outstanding scientist and creative thinker. 
When administrators attempted to bring his system into schools, for example, 
they showed no real interest in or ability to carry out such painstaking research. 
Taylor’s exceptional stamina in research manifests itself in his most famous experi-
ment, the rationalization of pig-iron handling. I will show in the following how 
the new way of producing generalizations concerning work methods took shape 
in this experiment. 
5.3 Experimental change in the way of handling pig iron
Before the Spanish War, the price of pig iron was so low that the Bethlehem Steel 
Company could not sell it at a profi t. The produced iron was therefore transported 
to a storehouse until the climate improved. Taylor took the situation as a chal-
lenge to show the workers, managers and owners the advantages of his method. 
This, probably the best-known of Taylor’s experiments, is a good example of how 
he dealt with the work tasks that had remained outside of mechanization. The 
workers were used to handling the products that were made in the company blast 
furnaces using only their physical strength: a group of 75 pig-iron handlers did 
the work. 
They were good, average pig-iron handlers, who were under an excellent fore-
man who himself had been a pig-iron handler, and the work was done, on the 
whole, about as fast and as cheaply as it was anywhere else at that time. (…) A 
railroad switch was run out into the fi eld, right along the edge of the piles of 
pig iron. An inclined plank was placed against the side of a car, and each man 
picked up from his pile a pig of iron weighing about 92 pounds walked up the 
inclined plank and dropped it on the end of the car. (Taylor, 1911, p.  42)
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According to Taylor’s calculations, the men were loading on, average, about 12.5 
long tons per man per day. After further study, he and his assistants came to the 
conclusion that a fi rst-class pig-iron handler ought to handle 47 - 48 tons per 
day.  These calculations preceded Taylor’s period of experimentation that lasted 
for many years.  By studying separate work movements, he endeavored to establish 
a law concerning the tiring effect of heavy laboring on a workman.
The law is confi ned to that class of work in which the limit of a man’s capacity 
is reached because he is tired out. It is the law of heavy laboring, cor responding 
to the work of the carthorse, rather than that of the trotter. (ibid., p.57)
Taylor defi ned this type of work as moving a heavy thing from one place to an-
other using the force of the worker.
Practically all such work consists of a heavy pull or a push on the man’s arms, 
that is, the man’s strength is exerted by either lifting or pushing something, 
which he grasps in his hands. (ibid., p. 57)
Taylor’s aim was to fi nd a law that would ”enable a foreman to know in advance, 
how much of any kind of heavy laboring work a man who was well suited to his 
job ought to do in a day; that is, to fi nd a standard for the work performance and 
to study the tiring effect of heavy labor upon a fi rst-class man” (Taylor, 1911, pp. 
53–54). He pointed out that he was not ”trying to fi nd the maxi mum work that a 
man could do on a short spurt”, but to study what really constituted a ”full day’s 
work for a fi rst-class man; the best day’s work that a man could properly do, year 
in and year out, and still thrive under” (ibid., p. 54).
Taylor selected two strong men for the experiment and set three conditions: 
double payment, the promise from them to do the work as best they could, and 
a lay–off condition. A young college man conducted these experiments using re-
cordings and a stopwatch, and gave the men different tasks22.
(…) a young college man (…) who at the same time noted with a stop-watch 
the proper time for all of the motions that were made by the men. Every ele-
ment in any way connected with the work which we believed could have a bear-
ing on the result was carefully studied and recorded. (ibid., p. 55) 
22 Taylor did not specify the kind of tasks.
104
Taylor’s purpose was then to determine what fraction of one horsepower a man 
was able to produce, in other words how many foot-pounds of work he could 
do in a day. Applying contemporary laws of mechanics (these laws are no longer 
deemed valid in modern physics), he and his assistants tried to work out the law 
of the tiring effect of heavy labor. Finally, after two failed attempts, they succeeded 
after enlisting the help of a mathematician in analyzing the data using graphical 
plotting curves.
We decided to investigate the problem in a new way, by graphically represent-
ing each element of the work through plotting curves, which should give us, as 
it were, a bird’s-eye view of every element.  In a comparatively short time, Mr. 
Barth had discovered the law governing the tiring effect of heavy labor on a 
fi rst-class man. (ibid., p. 57)
The law enabled Taylor to determine the percentage of work hours in a working 
day that was needed for loading and for rest.  For example, in the case of pig iron 
”a fi rst-class workman” could be under load only 43 percent of the day and should 
be entirely free from load 57 percent of the time. The new law made it possible 
to calculate the quantity of work a fi rst-class man could do a day if the load were 
lighter. If he were handling half pig iron, work under load should constitute 58 
percent and the rest 42 percent of the day. Another law had to be determined for 
much lighter work.
As the weight grows lighter the man can remain under load during a larger and 
larger percentage of the day, until fi nally a load is reached which he can carry 
in his hands all day long without being tired out. When that point has been 
arrived at this law ceases to be useful as a guide to a laborer’s endurance, and 
some other law must be found which indicates the man’s capacity for work.” 
(ibid., p. 58)
This law made it possible to measure and determine standard performance, that 
is the output that could reasonably be expected from a workman using the right 
working method. 
It was our duty to see that the 80,000 tons of pig iron was loaded on to the cars 
at the rate of 47 tons per man per day, in place of 12.5 tons, at which rate the 
work was then being done. And it was further our duty to see that this work 
was done without bringing on a strike among the men, without any quarrel 
with the men, and to see that the men were happier and better contented when 
loading at the new rate of 47 tons than they were when loading at the old rate 
of 12.5 tons. (ibid., pp.  42–43)
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In order to test the law he had developed, Taylor and his assistants sought out 
four physically and culturally appropriate individuals from the 75 men working in 
the department. The researchers checked the men’s history and made ”thorough 
inquiries” into their characters, habits and ambitions (ibid., p. 54). Finally, they 
selected a man for the test whom they started to call Schmidt.
He was a little Pennsyl vania Dutchman who had been observed to trot back 
home for a mile or after his work in the evening; about as fresh as he was when 
he came trotting down to work in the morning. We found that upon wages of 
1.15 a day he had succeeded in buying a plot of ground
 
and that he was en-
gaged in putting up the walls of a little house for himself in the morning before 
starting to work and at night after leaving. He also had the reputation of being 
exceedingly ”close,” that is, of placing a very high value on a dollar. As one of 
whom we talked to about him said, ”A penny looks about the size of a car wheel 
to him.” This man we will call Schmidt. (ibid., p. 45)
The recorded notes on the men involved in this ”scientifi c selection of workmen” 
contained an evaluation of how well each man was suited to the experimental pur-
pose. The worker’s habits and values concerning their activities outside of work 
were also recorded.
Taylor had planned how to persuade Schmidt to agree to the experiment. He 
told him that if he agreed to be tested as a ”fi rst-class workman” he would be paid 
1.85 dollars instead of his present 1.15 dollars if he followed the experimenter’s 
orders. He consciously neglected to explicate the quantity of work to be done in 
the experiment, as he supposed the ”incentive and initiative” manager would do 
that, but directed Schmidt’s attention to the higher wage instead of the work per-
formance. Obedience to the experimenter’s orders and the cover-up of the higher 
work goals with talk of higher wages were mentioned as rules of the experiment.
Taylor characterized the person whose work he was trying to speed up in a 
rather inhuman way. He assumed that for simple work there were simple work-
men, and that those who did simple work were simple. He compared the require-
ments of a worker to the qualities of an ox or gorilla. 
The man who is mentally alert and intelligent is for this very reason entirely 
unsuited to what would for him be the grinding monotony of work of this 
character. Therefore, the workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is 
unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work. (ibid., p. 59)
As is made clear later this inhuman attitude to workers was connected to Taylor’s 
purpose of making a clear distinction between workers and researchers. The work-
ers had to obey the experimenter’s orders.
106
When he tells you to pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and walk, and when 
he tells you to sit down and rest, you sit down. You do that straight through the 
day. And what’s more, no back talk. Now a high-priced man does just what he’s 
told to do, and no back talk. (ibid. p. 46)
The experiment succeeded. Schmidt worked when he was told to work and rested 
when he was told to rest. He loaded 47.5 tons in the fi rst day and on the fol-
lowing days. He worked for three years in the same way and received the same 
higher payment all the time. One man after another was picked out and trained to 
handle pig iron at the rate of 47.5 tons with the same wages. One man in eight was 
physically capable of handling this amount per day. The men who did not succeed 
were transferred to other work in the same plant. For Taylor, this was part of the 
”scientifi c selection” of the men. The purpose was not to fi nd an extraordinary 
individual, but merely to pick out from ordinary men the ones who were especially 
suited to the type of work under investigation.23
Three features in the way in which Taylor presented the object of his research 
stand out. First, he separated the performance of the individual worker from the 
performance of ”gangs” in his experiment because ”each workman had his own 
special abilities and limita tions, and since we are not dealing with men in masses, 
but are trying to develop each individual man to his highest state of effi ciency 
and prosperity.” Second, he defi ned work as ”push and pull” operations carried by 
individuals  (Taylor, 1895, pp. 172–176). He claimed that work as push and pull 
permeated all industrial work, but because it had a specifi c character in each trade 
it had to be researched separately. Third, the experiment brought to the work situ-
ation a new social subject, the experimenter, who used special tools for collecting 
and analyzing data on push-and-pull work. The experimenter also gave rules to 
the workmen and expected them to obey them in the smallest detail. The workers’ 
knowledge of the work was not used. The experimenter’s task was to objectify the 
work as movements that were either necessary or unnecessary, to be eliminated or 
used, to load or to rest. In this sense, the experimental method itself was already an 
important part of the new structure of management and type of generalizing that 
Taylor developed. Taylor’s experimental method detached work-related generalizing 
from the context of direct work in separate steps, to goal-directed actions of general-
izing in which the tasks of the experimenter and the subjects differed.
23 Taylor’s contemporaries criticized his experiments and ideas strongly. The language that he 
used in describing the pig-iron handler as ‘mentally sluggish’ led to fear and anxiety among the 
laborers. Labor leaders and humanitarians were fi rst shocked and then indignant at the way in 
which Schmidt had been treated. Some of the proponents of scientifi c management refrained 
from using Taylor’s name. Labor leaders also had suspicions that Schmidt had died because of 
Taylor’s experiments. The man was located, and Taylor had him examined by a physician who 
declared him to be healthy and thriving. (Callahan 1962, p. 39) 
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The pig-iron handling experiment consisted of eight steps in which the initiator 
was always the experimenter:
1. defi ning the work task to be studied;
2. recording and conducting experiments with the optimal pace of work per-
formance using a stop watch;
3. analyzing the data with the help of mathematical curves and physical laws;
4. fi nding ”the law of heavy laboring” using plotting curves, simple mathemat-
ics and physical laws;
5. creating the standard for a specifi c task applying the law as the experiment-
er’s verbal orders to the worker;
6. selecting a worker who could take part in the test using particular criteria;
7. testing the standard on an individual;
8. using the tested standard as a tool for permanently controlling the worker’s 
performance and extending it to other workers.
These steps fall into fi ve types of actions of generalizing. The fi rst type concerns 
identifying the work task to be studied. The second type (step 2) incorporates 
experimental variation in the method and recording performance speed in the 
given work. The third type (steps 3–4) involves determining the law of the task 
type and the fourth type (step 5) concerns analyzing the data in order to construct 
the standard.  The fi fth type (6–8) is to do with testing the standard and conveying 
the resulting instructions to other workers doing similar work. In the following, I 
will elaborate on how these types of actions of generalizing tally with the general 
principles of scientifi c management. 
5.4 The written standard as a carrier of generalization 
Taylor (1911, p. 151) described his Scientifi c Management in terms of four prin-
ciples:
1. the development of a true science;
2. the education and development of the workmen;
3. the scientifi c selection of workmen and
4. friendly cooperation between the management and the men.
He maintained that single ”elements”, such as time study, could not be implement-
ed if the principles were not understood and study had to follow them. In order 
to present a broader picture of Taylor’s doctrine, I will now briefl y describe each 
principle.
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The principle of the development of true science was connected to Taylor’s 
claim that management had to be based on scientifi c laws of work. The prerequi-
site here was the time-and-motion study, which he defi ned in fi ve general steps. 
First. Find, say, 10 or 15 different men (preferably in as many separate establish-
ments and different parts of the country) who are especially skilful in doing the 
particular work to be analyzed.
Second. Study the exact series of elementary operations or motions which each 
of these men uses in doing the work which is being investigated, as well as the 
implements each man uses.
Third. Study with a stop-watch the time required to make each of these elemen-
tary movements and then select the quickest way of doing each element of the 
work.
Fourth. Eliminate all false movements, slow movements, and useless move-
ments.
Fifth. After doing away with all unnecessary movements, collect into one series 
the quickest and best movements as well as the best implements. (ibid., pp. 
117–118)
The procedure describes the construction of standards. It corresponds to the chain 
of actions in generalizing described in the previous section, although teaching and 
permanent control of performance are missing, as is ”the general law of heavy 
working”. In the procedure set out above, defi ning the standard is the more practi-
cal process of eliminating false movements from the work method. Taylor’s ex-
periments mainly focused on these practical processes while the processes needed 
in creating a ”law” that would be applicable to many work tasks were exceptions
He also considered work implements important objects of standardization.
Scientifi c management requires, fi rst, a careful investigation of each of the 
many modifi cations of the same implement, developed under rule of thumb; 
and second, after a time study has been made of the speed attainable with each 
of these implements, that the good points of several of them shall be united in 
a single standard implement, which will enable the workman to work faster and 
with greater ease than he could before. This one implement, then, is adopted 
as standard in place of the many different kinds before in use, and it remains 
standard for all workmen to use until superseded by an implement which has 
been shown, through motion and time study, to be still better. (ibid., p. 118)
Here, Taylor was emphasizing the use of existing variation in methods and imple-
ments as the basis of developing optimal solutions. The purpose of the time-and-
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motion study is to develop the standard that defi nes the optimal solution of per-
forming a given work task. The standard could then be transferred from researcher 
to worker, from one workplace to another, and from one person to another. 
The second principle of scientifi c management concerns the teaching of stan-
dards to the workers.
This one new method, involving that series of motions, which can be made 
quickest and best, is then substituted in place of the ten or fi fteen inferior series 
which were formerly in use.  This best method becomes standard, and remains 
standard, to be taught fi rst to the teachers (or functional foremen) and by them 
to every workman in the establishment until it is superseded by a quicker and 
better series of movements. (ibid., pp. 118–119)
Taylor emphasized the ”task idea” in his instructions to the workers. He explained 
the standard and the wage system that gave additional reward, a bonus in addition 
to their ordinary wage, paid for working according to the standard. In the case of 
handling pig iron, the standard was set according to the experimenter’s orders. It 
was normally in the form of an instruction card on which were the written in-
structions: the details of the workman’s task, ”not only what is to be done but how 
it is to be done and the exact time allowed for doing it”.
The third principle, the scientifi c selection of workers, referred fi rst to how the 
workers were chosen to participate in the experiments and in the testing of the 
standards, and later to carry out the specifi c task. Instead ”of allowing the work-
men to select themselves”, the management had to select the best men according 
to their suitability for regular everyday tasks.
The fourth principle, friendly co-operation between individual workers and 
management, was based on Taylor’s idea that standardization could not succeed 
without co-operation, trust, and ”harmony” between workmen and planners. The 
responsibility for this co-operation rested with the management. If this was not 
reached, however, in an extreme case the task of the management, was to enforce 
cooperation. 
Nor has any one workman the authority to make other men cooperate with 
him to do faster work. It is only through enforced standardization of methods, 
enforced adoption of the best implements and work ing conditions, and enforced 
cooperation that this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforc ing the 
adoption of standards and of enforcing this cooperation rests with the manage-
ment alone. (ibid., p. 83)
It is not diffi cult to see the crucial role of standards in these principles: all four 
principles refer to constructing or using standards. They made the management 
”scientifi c”. 
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5.5 The vision of the planning-offi ce system 
In order to systematically master and control work performance Taylor presented 
a model in which the foreman’s previous actions were taken care of by a special 
planning department. 
The shop, and indeed the whole works, should be managed, not by the manag-
er, superintendent, or foreman, but by the planning department. (Taylor, 1914, 
p. 110)
The planning offi cials, who Taylor also called functional foremen or teachers, had 
to work in the planning offi ce, separate from the workers.  They specialized in cer-
tain aspects of work according to a functional division of labor. The duties previ-
ously carried out by a single foreman were now split up among several offi cials.
For with the installation of functional foremen, a planning department au-
tomatically comes into existence, and the separation of the planning of the 
methods of doing the work from the doing of the work itself is immediately 
accomplished. (Taylor, 1911, p. 95)
Each of these planning offi cials was a specialist in the particular line to which he 
was assigned, and he was trained to the highest level of effi ciency in discharging 
the particular duties of that line.
Under functional management, the old-fashioned single foreman is supersed-
ed by eight different men, each one of whom has his own special duties, and 
these men, acting as the agents for the planning department (…) are the expert 
teachers, who are at all times in the shop, helping and directing the workmen. 
Being each one chosen for his knowledge and personal skill in his specialty, they 
are able not only to tell the workman what he should do, but in case of necessity 
they do the work themselves in the presence of the workman, so as to show him 
not only the best but also the quickest methods. (ibid., pp. 123–124)
Taylor gave three types of justifi cation for dividing workers’ and planners’ tasks. 
The fi rst was the one he used in the pig-iron case: the workmen must have been 
”stupid or sluggish” because they had chosen that kind of work. The other two 
were more interesting. Even if the workmen did have the opportunity to study 
their own work themselves, the nature of the study required cooperation between 
two men, the one who performed the work and the one who measured it. Taylor 
also believed that the personal interests of the workmen would inhibit them from 
objectively articulating the outcomes of the studies. (Taylor, 1911, pp. 103–104)
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Taylor imagined that the planners would be experts who would stay in the 
shop all the time helping and directing the workmen. Their task was to show the 
workmen the best and quickest working methods. The inspector helped them to 
follow the instructions, the gang boss taught them the best and quickest way to do 
the work, the speed boss saw that the machine was run at the optimum speed and 
that the proper tool was used so as to enable the machine to fi nish its product in the 
shortest possible time. The workmen also received orders from specialists such as 
the ”repair boss”, ”the time clerk”, the ”route clerk” and the ”disciplinarian”. 24 It was 
their duty to control how the workers followed the standards, because ”workmen, if 
left to themselves, would pay but little attention to their written instructions.”
The task idea affected single workmen in another way, too. The time studies 
made it possible to break down the tasks that had evolved during the history of the 
plant. Thus they also had an impact on the structure of the trade and on produc-
tion fl ow. 
The man in the planning room, whose specialty under scientifi c management 
is planning ahead, invariably fi nds that the work can be done better and more 
economically by a subdivision of the labor; each act of each mechanic, for ex-
ample, should be preceded by various preparatory acts done by other men. 
(ibid., p. 38)
As Taylor noted repeatedly, his main interest was neither in the experimenting nor 
in the production of knowledge as such, but in the permanent practical use of the 
standards for achieving the great ideal of effi ciency and maximum output.  The 
initiative and the responsibility for performing the necessary actions rested with 
the planners. 
5.6 The actions of generalizing in Taylor’s system
The three fi rst industrial revolutions described by Freeman and Louçã (2001) 
brought a change in the tools of production from individual hand-used imple-
ments to collectively used machines. The increasing use of machines in industry 
did not destroy the craft tradition, however. The workers who used mechanical 
tools were skilled and highly respected machine operators. Although the industrial 
revolutions essentially changed the primary artifacts of production, the secondary 
artifacts, rules-of-thumb, still represented craft-type work. 
24 Taylor (1911; 1914) refers in most cases to eight functional task performers: order-of-work-
route man, instruction-card man, time-and-cost clerk, disciplinarian, gang boss, speed boss, 
repair boss and inspector. 
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Taylor developed four new kinds of actions of generalizing: 1) identifying and 
determining a task in industrial work as the object of time-and-motion study, 2) 
recording the variations in the ways in which the workers performed the task, 3a) 
comparing the variants and connecting the best variants into a standard method 
or 3b) in special cases determining the law that was applicable to similar kinds of 
tasks, and 4) testing and teaching the standard.
The fi rst actions involved choosing ”a particular work task to be analyzed”. 
Taylor advised the planners to identify a task or a class of tasks within the indus-
trial activity.  In order to do that they had to search for similarities between tasks 
and to classify them. They started by identifying a class of tasks that were similar 
enough among the variations of industrial work to be treated as ”a task” and then 
they made comparisons in order to identify the major similarities and differences 
of the work in the factory.
Subject
Work
researcher
Object
Work in the factory
Tools
The concept of
task, comparison
Outcome
A group of
similar tasks as 
a research object
Figure 5.1 The action of identifying a ”task” to be investigated
The second group of actions of generalizing involved recording the variation of 
form and time in the motions used by a set of individuals in performing the task, 
with a view to fi nding a basis for selecting the best movements. This requires from 
the researcher the competence to identify different movements involved in the 
performance. In setting up time and motion studies, the variation in the time 
needed to perform the motions and the ”elementary operations” could be ar-
tifi cially speeded up, as in the pig-iron example, but it could also be studied in 
the normal work setting in the way Taylor described as the general procedure for 
time-and-motion studies.  The other tools used by the work researchers in these 
actions were inherited from traditional mechanical research: a stopwatch, other 
measuring instruments, and notebooks. Taylor also described how, in the plan-
ning-offi ce system, the ”scientifi c” experimentation itself became an important 
set-up that mediated the relationships between workers and planners. It was the 
work researcher who took these actions. The workers’ role was to adapt to the set-
up as on object of research. 
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Figure 5.2 The action of measuring and documenting the variation in movements 
The third type of actions of generalizing were aimed at constructing the standard. 
They involved methods for comparing the documented variation in the quality 
and duration of work movements and usually took only a short time (3a). The 
comparisons between different ways of doing the task could be made in a very 
simple way by eliminating false, slow, or useless movements. In special cases (3b) 
these actions involved determining the ”law” of tasks required for defi ning the 
standard. These were cases in which the methods were based on the natural sci-
ences; mechanics, mathematics, and physics. In Taylor’s practice the simple way 
(3a) had a prior claim, and here actions 3a and 3b were taken by the researchers 
outside of the actual work situation in the planner’s offi ce. The workers had noth-
ing to do with them.
Subject
Work
researcher
Object
The performance
of the task by a set of
individual workers 
Tools of time-and-motion study, 
stopwatch recording form
Outcome
Data about the variety of 
motions and the time 
needed to perform them
Figure 5.3 The action of constructing the standard 
The fourth kind of action of generalizing consisted of testing and implementing 
the standard in the production process. The planner, now in the role of teacher, 
used it as a tool when instructing a selected worker to do the task in the best way. 
In the planning-offi ce model, instruction and control becomes the everyday prac-
tice of the planners. The standard serves fi rst as a tool of instruction and is then 
adopted permanently as the basis of determining the pay of the worker and the 
possible bonus he gets when exceeding it. 
Subject
Work
researcher
Object
The documented variation
in the quality and duration
of work movements  
Tools of comparison and 
principles of mechanical science
Outcome
The standard
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Figure 5.4 The action of testing and teaching the standard with regard to a predetermined 
class of individual tasks
Subject
Work
researcher 
as teacher
Object
The task and 
the workers who 
perform the task  
Tools 
Standard, work instructions
Outcome
Optimized performance of 
the task by the workers, 
knowledge of the applicability 
of the standard
All these four kinds of actions were carried out by the planners who were, in Tay-
lor’s model, experts responsible for creating generalizations concerning optimal 
ways of performing work tasks. The workers had to adopt and follow the standard. 
The method of extending the standard was to instruct workers individually one 
after another.
Taylor acknowledged the fact that, in certain cases the workmen were allowed 
to suggest improvements, and could also use standards as yardsticks of ”their own 
progress”. All of the improvement initiative had to be analyzed by management, 
however.
Every encouragement, however, should be given him  (the worker) to suggest 
improvements, both in methods and in implements. And whenever a work-
man proposes an improvement, it should be the policy of the management to 
make a careful analysis of the new method, and if necessary conduct a series of 
experiments to determine accurately the relative merit of the new suggestion 
and of the old standard. And whenever the new method is found to be mark-
edly superior to the old, it should be adopted as the standard for the whole 
establishment. (Taylor 1911,83)
5.7 Standardizing work methods as a distributed system of 
generalizing
Work-related generalization before Taylor
In traditional craft production there was always some variation in work that made 
it possible for the craft worker to compare the relative effi ciency of the tools and 
methods as well as the requirements set by different materials. On the basis of such 
observations they made incremental changes in the tools and methods of work. 
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Possible outcomes included improvements in the instrument, in knowledge of the 
raw material, in the design of the end product, and in the knowledge of the work-
ers performing the operation. This knowledge was preserved in the rule-of-thumb 
method used in planning the work and in the forms of equipment.
The skills needed in the craft were transferred to the next generation within 
the ”set-up” of guilds, in master – apprentice relationships. The rules of thumb 
could only be transferred in the immediate context of the work practice because 
the details of the process were explicated only vaguely. The gradual development 
of new generalizations was partly a by-product of the production, and partly a 
result of the actions of designing and testing tools. Those fi xed in tools or rules of 
thumb were largely results of incremental improvements and only exceptionally 
of specifi c conscious actions of generalizing, although conscious experimenting was 
not completely alien to craft work (Thurnbull, 2000). Although the craft workers’ 
tools were simple, the necessary skills and knowledge were mastered in general ap-
prenticeship, which lasted for many years.
The form of perceptual functional generalizing described above also continued 
in the late craftera. The work to be done was defi ned by contract, and the rules of 
thumb had an important role in the negotiations between employers and employees, 
and in the use of machines. The immediate employer of many workers was not the 
entrepreneur but an intermediary, a contractor who had a contractual relationship 
with the entrepreneur and the laborers. The contractor hired, supervised and fi red 
the workers against the lump sum of money he received from the manufacturer as 
the work was completed and in turn made a contract with the representatives of the 
worker groups (Littler 1982, p. 65). In the manufacturing industry, the contracts 
were in the form of general piece-work agreements covering the work and division 
of labor of dozens of workers.  These agreements were based on estimations about 
the amount of work needed that were based on rules of thumb. 
This tradition-based pattern of work-related generalizing in industrial pro-
duction prevailed during the three fi rst Kondratiev waves when the major chang-
es were based on mechanization. Machines took the place of hand tools as the 
primary artifacts of production. Workers adopted the use of machines as they 
had previously adopted the hand tools of their craft. However, improvements no 
longer depended on the skills of the individual workers, but rested with the skills 
of the engineers and technicians who designed and maintained the machines. 
The operations of individual workers in electrifi ed factories were more closely 
linked than in production driven by steam or waterpower machines. Work opera-
tions were increasingly arranged in successive order according to the production 
process. As the individual operations carried out by workers in different positions 
on the production line thus became interdependent of each other, the broad varia-
tion in individual performance began to hinder the process. 
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As the integration of the production process proceeded, the form of tradition-
based perceptual-functional generalizing described above became increasingly 
problematic. Taylor was the experimenter and ideologist who became the leading 
fi gure in constructing a new form of work-related generalizing. He replaced rules 
of thumb with standards, and thus introduced a new type of secondary artifact to 
production. 
The Distributed system of empirical generalizing
The process of generalizing that Taylor developed to create work standards was 
based on two forms of empirical generalization. He was able to do this only after 
creating a new unit of analysis and development, the work task, which consisted 
of the various push and pull movements needed to accomplish an objective in 
production. First, he searched for similarities in and differences between tasks in 
order to classify them. He saw a work task as a class of actual tasks performed by 
different individuals at different times that were similar enough to be subsumed 
under the same category and treated as one. Second, he recorded and compared 
the variation in the elements of the task, and created the best method by combin-
ing the best elements with the production process. The standard fi xed the general-
ization concerning the best method of carrying out the specifi c task in question.
When men, whose education has given them the habit of generalizing and 
everywhere looking for laws, fi nd themselves confronted with a multitude of 
problems, such as exist in every trade and which have a general similarity one 
to another, it is inevitable that they should try to gather these problems into 
certain logical groups, and then search for some general laws or rules to guide 
them in their solution. (Taylor, 1911, p. 103)
Taylor assumed that the standard was generally applicable to all of the individual 
manifestations of the task. He was also convinced that general laws concerning hu-
man beings would emerge if only the research was carried out in a valid way. 
It is true that the laws which result from experiments of this class, owing to the 
fact that the very complex organism – the human being is being experimented 
with, are subject to a larger number of exceptions than is the case with laws 
relating to material things. Yet laws of this kind, which apply to a large majority 
of men, unquestionably exist, and when clearly defi ned are of great value as a 
guide in dealing with men. In developing these laws, accurate, carefully planned 
and executed experiments, extending through a term of years, have been made, 
similar in a general way to the experiments upon various other elements which 
have been referred to in this paper. (ibid.,)
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Taylor’s system replaced the perceptual-functional generalizing of the late craft 
period with four phases of empirical generalizing, which started from defi ning the 
task. The separate tasks comprising all work in industrial production became ob-
jects of time-and-motion study. The task was an abstraction: the production was 
considered to consist of tasks. Those that were identifi ed were then divided by the 
planners into the smallest units, movements, the variation in which was studied 
and recorded with the help of a stopwatch, and notebooks in the experimental 
set-up.  Studies of the variation in ways of performing a task could be carried out 
with quite simple tools, but they also called for the application of the procedures 
and principles of mechanics. 
Figure 5.5 The pattern of empirical generalization in creating a standard for a work task
These phases of empirical generalizing are referred to repeatedly in mass produc-
tion as some parts of process are changed or renewed. The actions of generalizing 
and the way they are distributed among different actors together form the distrib-
uted system of producing work-related generalizations in industrial production. This 
would not have been possible without the innovation of describing the task in the 
written form, with the standard that started to function as a secondary artifact. 
The system also provided the mode of learning, which Bateson called second-level 
learning.  All of the actions of generalizing were taken by the experts, while the 
workers had the role of experimental subjects.  The horizontal line in Figure 5.6 
shows the bifurcation of learning in and for production.
Participants Actions
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Workers
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Defining 
the task
Carrying out
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2. 
Measuring 
the variation 
in movements
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-
4.
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Figure 5.6 Features of the distributed system of generalizing
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The spreading of the distributed system of generalizing 
According to Taylor (1911, p. 28), at least 50,000 workmen in the United States 
were employed under his system, which was complemented and renewed through 
the inventions created in the Ford automobile factory in Highland Park.
Ford’s vision was to produce a car for the masses. For this he had to plan ev-
ery task of the assembly line and determine and plan the passage of each part of 
the car on it. The assembly line changed shop-fl oor operations dramatically. The 
work that had been done earlier by two to fi ve mechanists was divided between 
84 of them. This restricted the workers’ actions to mechanical operations. While 
a typical series of repeated operations of an individual worker took an average 
514 minutes in traditional work, in the new standardized system it took only 1.19 
minutes (Womack, 1990, pp. 27–28). 
Although carrying out these operations required some instruction, the work-
ers adopted the movements very quickly. This made it possible for Ford to em-
ploy cheap labor. The majority, 71 percent, of the workforce in his factory in 1914 
consisted of migrant workers from 22 countries (Meyer 1981, p.77). The labor 
turnover in his manufacturing plant rose to 1,370 percent, and absenteeism to 10 
percent (ibid 1981, pp. 53–56). By way of response, Ford drastically increased the 
number of foremen: in 1914 there was one foreman per 53 workers, but three years 
later one foreman was responsible for 15 workers. The foremen’s main task was to 
control the standards and keep the assembly line continuously moving. 
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The mass production that started with the automobile production in the USA 
spread from the US to Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and the 
rest of the world. It also spread to other branches of production and entirely 
changed production activities within a short space of time. (Freeman and Louçã 
2001; Callahan 1962; Julkunen, 1987). 
The spreading of mass production increased the signifi cance of the kind of 
actions of generalizing that Taylor developed.  Rationalizing and standardizing 
the production process enabled management to continuously cut unit costs, 
which was the essential challenge (Yelle, 1979). It was also a prerequisite to de-
termine in advance the progress of the components on the assembly line and 
to plan the standards for the work tasks. Taylor’s method of generalizing was 
needed for this. 
The limitations of Taylor-type generalizing 
The standards that are empirical generalizations represent an average that neces-
sarily leaves out of consideration some relevant variation in the task. The more 
variation there is in the conditions of the task, the more important it is that the 
Figure 5.7 The Planning Department at the Midvale Steel Company. (Hughes, 1989)
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actor identifi es the essential elements and varies his or her performance accord-
ingly. 
Taylor studied work tasks in which the object of the work remained constant 
such as the loading of pig iron, the stacking of bricks, and the shovelling of sand. 
The empirical generalization that was objectifi ed in the work standard was rooted 
in the tools, the rules, the division of labor and the community in a form that cor-
responded to average conditions. The benefi t of this kind of system was in manag-
ing predictable industrial tasks, but the limitations became apparent if there was 
much variation in the object of the work and the conditions. 
The application of mass-production principles did not stop workers from 
learning and making generalizations, although they made them unoffi cially and 
even against regulations. The planning of operations in advance prompted the 
workers to take actions that either strengthened or weakened the plan. Hughes 
(1989, p. 197) reported that workmen created standards themselves because they 
felt that the planners could not, as outsiders, understand the demands of the work 
processes, and that they set unrealistic standards. 
Shaiken (1986) described how the machinists on the shop fl oor could use their 
own notebooks in order to help them overcome problem situations. The informa-
tion in these books complemented the planners’ actions.
The process planner has the key role of determining how a part is made, select-
ing the processes the tools, the machines and the sequence of operations. There 
is of necessity a close relation between the planner and the machinist. When a 
new job comes in, for example, the planner might go down to the shop fl oor 
and chat with the machinist about how a similar job was routed a few weeks 
ago. Any self-respecting senior machinist has a legendary ”black book” that re-
cords the problems encountered and shortcuts discovered on previous jobs, 
usually in some indecipherable shorthand. That carefully constructed knowl-
edge, however, is the property of the machinist, enriched over time, and very 
much part of the worker’s control over production. (Shaiken, 1986, p. 54–55)
Adler (1993, pp. 143–144) documented a third type of worker action in which 
the original idea of the participant’s role in standardizing was reversed, according 
to one union representative’s description. We could call these actions ”actions of 
pretending” or ”actions of mutual cheating”.
In most plants, management assumes the ”divine right” to design jobs as they 
see it. And in the U.S. auto industry, workers have historically agreed to that in 
exchange for high wages. Management was willing to pay a ton of money to 
the workers to preserve its prerogative. But in practice, the old way of setting 
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standards was just ridiculous.25 An industrial engineer (IE) would shut himself 
away in an isolated offi ce and consider how long it took for somebody to twist 
their wrist and move their arm in such and such a way, and calculate times from 
some manual and try that way to come up with a task design. The IE would take 
this ”properly” designed job to the foreman.  The foreman would nod his head, 
but then said ”screw you” to the IE’s back and redesigned the task to his own 
liking. Then he would take this task design to the worker and say ”Do it this 
way or you’re out”. The worker would nod but would pull the same trick on the 
foreman. In the end, the job got done however the worker could. When the boss 
walked by, the worker might pretend to do the job the way the foreman had told 
him. Everybody involved knew this was going on but no one cared enough to 
do anything about it. 
Multiply that game by the number of shifts and the number of different people 
involved and you’ve got a process you can’t control. You can’t build a quality car 
like that. You can’t even go back and improve the process because the IE lives 
in a dream world, does not have a clue how the job is actually done and doesn’t 
have any impact. The foreman’s impact is also zip. Nobody talks to the worker 
even though he is the one guy who can do something about the problem. No-
body wants to listen to him. That’s basically how most of the auto industry 
operates even today. So you can see why standardized work is so revolutionary. 
And why most IEs are uncomfortable with it!
Paul Adler and Kim B. Clark analyzed the interaction between engineers’ and 
workers’ learning processes in Taylorist production in a fi rm producing elec-
tronic equipment.  According to them, workers’ direct labor represents fi rst-order 
learning that is based on repetition and on the incremental development of skills. 
Second-order learning, which is based on indirect labor, takes place as engineers 
transform the production by changing the technology and the production pro-
cesses. This second-order learning may be based on information gained from pro-
duction or on knowledge acquired from other sources (Adler & Clark, 1991, pp. 
267–270).
Adler and Clark (ibid, pp. 278–279) found that engineers’ and workers’ learn-
ing processes could be both mutually supportive and disruptive. In order to solve 
problems in production, engineers take actions that may have temporarily sizable, 
25 The interview was conducted after the union representative had experienced different stan-
dardization procedures in fl exible production. The ‘old way’ of setting standards refers to the 
time before the standardization method was used in ‘lean’ production. 
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negative effects on performance and make the workers’ learning obsolete. On the 
other hand, the problems that emerge in fi rst-order learning can cause problems 
to second-order learning because the workers do not get feedback on the adequacy 
of the solutions they have created. Adler and Clark’s study demonstrates the new, 
complex relationship between direct and indirect work and fi rst- and second-or-
der learning. 
5.8 Assessing change in generalizing
In my view, Taylorism represented an intermediate phase between late-craft work 
and Fordism. During the late-craft period the raw material was handled successively 
using manual tools, and the workers knowledge still determined the details of the 
tasks. The workers had to have a conscious idea of the result of the part of the work 
they were carrying out. This detailed knowledge also dominated their communica-
tion. The type of generalizing involved was still based on the kind of organization in 
which the labor consisted of both specialized bodies and trained minds, and rested 
on the technical knowledge and skill possessed by the workers themselves.
It is also possible to characterize the qualitative change from production-relat-
ed generalizing fi xed in craft-based production to Taylor-type distributed systems 
of generalizing as expansive transition (Engeström, 1987). Taylor questioned the 
late craft-based system in his criticism of the ”incentive-initiative” management 
system of 1880–1915. He analyzed the reasons behind the inherent problems, fo-
cusing on the pace of production fl ow and on how the managers could increase it. 
He modelled the new system of management in his experiments and texts, which 
was further developed in the light of Ford’s inventions and mass-product vision. 
The worldwide implementation of the new system of generalizing took place with 
the spreading of mass production during the upswing of the fourth Kondratiev 
wave in 1945–1960. 
The saturation of the markets for standard products and the oil crisis led to 
changes in the original model of mass production in many areas, and to the de-
velopment of two alternative forms of production in the 1970s that challenged the 
original model.
These new forms of mass production were spreading all over the world: Flex-
ible Production with its focus on continuous improvement, and Socio-Technical 
Systems Design that used semi-autonomous teams. In the following chapters I will 
show how these methods of organizing work production provided an alternative 
to the Taylorist system of generalizing.
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6 Trist and Bamforth’s study as the 
origin of the socio-technical form of 
generalizing
6.1 Socio-Technical Systems Design as an umbrella framework for 
developing production
The oil crisis in the 1970s provoked a lively discussion about alternatives to Taylorist 
work organization, and by the end of the twentieth century two rival and in many 
ways opposing potential production models emerged: socio-technical and lean pro-
duction. In this chapter I will analyze the origin and form of generalizing in Socio-
Technical Systemss Design with a view to identifying the germ cell that typifi es socio-
technical production. I will fi rst give an overview of STSD, and then I will chart the 
progress of Trist and Bamforth’s ground-braking study on the transformation from 
craft-based coal mining to the mass production of coal. I will analyze how the prob-
lems that the implementation of mass-production principles created in the mine 
were handled, and further consider Trist and Bamforth’s solutions from the perspec-
tive of work-related generalizing. In this I will follow the line of theoretical discus-
sion that led to the idea of the joint optimization of social and technical systems and 
to the fi rst socio-technical design method of work organization to be widely used in 
practice. Finally, I will show how the use of socio-technical work design and semiau-
tonomous teams has spread, and summarize the results of the analyses.
STSD is usually introduced by presenting its main principles. However, its 
proponents defi ne the principles in different ways. Van Einjatten (1993, p. 3) in 
his comprehensive analysis, describes it as a paradigm shift from autocratic to 
democratic work organization. He is referring here not to democracy in terms 
of indirect representation, as ”choosing by voting from amongst people who of-
fer themselves as candidates to be our representatives”, but rather to more direct 
participation aimed at ”locating responsibility for coordination clearly and fi rmly 
with those whose efforts require coordination”.
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Wobbe (1991, p. 5) identifi ed the following as the central principles of so-
cio-technically designed production: unity in the design and execution of work, 
decentralized decision-making, fl at hierarchies, collaboration between engineers 
and workers, skill-enhancing work design, and interaction between design and 
production.
Van Einjatten (1993, pp.17–18) divides the development of socio-technical de-
sign into pioneering, classical and modern periods. In the pioneering phase of 
1949–1959, researchers conducting fi eld studies in coal mines in the UK observed 
composite work groups being used as an alternative to Taylorist work design, and 
this sowed the seeds of the socio-technical system. Hundreds of socio-technical 
projects were carried out during 1959–1971. The developmental wave spread from 
the European Continent (England, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia) 
to Australia, Canada and the USA, mostly in the form of job rotation and semi 
autonomous groups.  The theory of the organization as an open system was devel-
oped during this phase.  
According to van Einjatten, the modern phase of Socio-Technical Systems 
Design that began after 1971 developed along four separate tracks: Participative 
Design, Integral Organizational Design, Democratic Dialogue and North Ameri-
can Consultancy. Participative Design refers to in-house design without the help of 
experts or consultants – a ”do-it-yourself approach” based on a minimum of theo-
retical concepts. Integral Organizational Design offers detailed structural principles 
in terms of design content, while at the same time specifying a theory of change 
by means of worker participation after training. It was a Dutch development, with 
some roots in German sociology. Democratic Dialogue goes beyond the enterprise 
level. It places the emphasis on the formation of networks and the development of 
”local theories”. Engelstadt and Gustavsen defi ne networks in terms of relationships 
between organizations, which are based on voluntary collaboration and comple-
mentarity rather than on formal ownership. Democratic Dialogue focuses primarily 
on open communication and not design. North American Consultancy is basically a 
continuation of the American classical approach. American scholars still rely on the 
Tavistock STSD experience, which was imported into the US by Davis and Trist in 
the late 1960s. These classical concepts are still used in expert-driven projects. An es-
sential element of contemporary American STSD is the notion of ”empowerment”, 
which means passing on authority and responsibility to the workers. It happens 
when power is delegated to employees, who then experience a sense of ownership 
and control over their jobs (van Einjatten, 1993, pp. 45–80).
As socio-technical design methods are multidimensional and diverse, their rep-
resentatives have developed separate theoretical foundations. This has decreased 
the need for theoretical discussion within the paradigm, and highlights its practi-
cal orientation. STSD is an umbrella term for a variety of programmatic projects.
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6.2 The content and position of Trist and Bamforth’s study
The pioneer role of the study in the STS approach
According to Van Einjatten (1993, p.150), STSD developed from the rediscovery 
of a fl exible form of work organization in a British coalmine that was a potential 
alternative to Taylorism. 
STSD means a radical departure from the common practice of Scientifi c Man-
agement, and is clearly ushering in a new era of organization design that is 
based on participative democracy. (Van Einjatten, 1993, p. 128)
The fi eld study conducted by Trist and Bamforth, which initiated the development 
of STSD, was reported in ”Human Relations” 4/1951 in England under the title: 
”Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Long-wall Method of Coal 
Getting”. Van Beinum (Van Einjatten, 1993, xxii), like many other representatives 
of the socio-technical school, describes the study as ground-breaking.
When in 1949 Eric Trist of the Tavistock Institute and Ken Bamforth, a former 
miner and at the time a postgraduate fellow at the institute, discovered in the 
South Yorkshire coalfi eld the existence of the semiautonomous group, they had 
their fi rst glimpse of the new organizational paradigm.
Their fi nd was a radical one, it signifi ed the relationship between participative 
democracy and organizational design; it was a powerful demonstration of the 
reality of the organizational choice. At the conceptual level, the researchers had 
begun to realize that the production process had the characteristics of the so-
cio-technical system. (van Eijnatten, 1993, xxi)
Trist and Bamforth’s study has been the subject of numerous elucidations and dis-
cussions by many authors (ibid., pp. 23–24). Trist wrote forty-two years later that 
the fi ndings inspired researchers because there fi nally seemed to be an alternative 
to scientifi c management and bureaucratic organization.
For several decades, the prevailing direction had been to increase bureaucracy 
with each increase in scale and level of mechanization. The original model that 
fused Weber’s description of bureaucracy with Frederic Taylor’s concept of sci-
entifi c management had become pervasive. The Highmoor innovation showed 
that there was an alternative. (Trist, 1993a, p. 38)
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The overall picture of the study 
Coal was the chief source of power in England after the Second World War. In 
those times industrial reconstruction depended on coal production. Many coal 
mines were nationalized because of economic problems in the industry. The ex-
pectation was widespread that management-worker relations would improve and 
that productivity would increase through the change of ownership. The national-
ized mining industry began to use the so-called long-wall method, which was very 
different from the previous ”hand got” method. It was a mechanical form of min-
ing that applied the principles of Taylorist organization.
Although the implementation of the long-wall method improved the equip-
ments and increased productivity, wages, and amenities, the problem was that it 
also increased the levels of sickness and absenteeism. Employees had also begun to 
drift from the pits. Some researchers maintained that the social balance achieved 
in the previous ”hand-got” methods, were lost during the implementation of the 
long-wall method although the reasons remained obscure (Trist & Bamforth, 
1951, p. 4).
In researching the causes of the lack of social balance, Trist and Bamforth 
challenged the methods of both Taylorism and the Human Relations School. 
They suggested that the change to the long-wall method could be analyzed from 
the perspective of interaction between two interdependent entities, the techni-
cal system and the social structures. The technical system comprised machines, 
mass-production layout, and the mechanical work design of the mass-produc-
tion engineers, while the social structures took the form of occupational roles, 
understood as institutional forms required by the technical system. In the context 
of Kurt Lewin’s concepts, Trist and Bamforth maintained that the technical and 
social patterns existed as ”forces” that had psychological effects in the ”life-space” 
of coal miners. According to this early form of socio-technical theory, the forces 
and their effects constituted the psychosocial whole, which the researchers defi ned 
as the object of their study.
In order to analyze the cause-effect relationships of the ”psychosocial whole”, 
Trist and Bamforth made observations based on interviews with miners, their 
deputies and other informants in the Highmore mine. The collection of this quali-
tative data continued intensively for two years. The researchers recorded their ob-
servations after the discussions, because it was not always possible to use a tape re-
corder in the pit. They maintained relatively continuous contact with some twenty 
key informants representing the various coalface occupations over a period of two 
years, and had similar discussions and interviews with the management and rep-
resentatives of all other grades of personnel. They also interviewed three psychia-
trists who had wide experience of local miners’ problems (ibid., p. 5).
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In interpreting their qualitative data Trist and Bamforth compared how the 
imbalance was constructed between different social formations in pre-mecha-
nized and long-wall coalmining. They found that it was possible with the former 
to achieve a balance between the entire coal-mine group and the working pairs, 
whereas this was not possible in long-wall mining because the social organization 
was segmented and the tasks were differentiated. Their conclusion was that the 
scale of the task26 transcended the conditions under which those concerned could 
complete a job in one place at one time. The differentiated and sequenced social 
structures hindered progress in mastering the entire task. The integration diffi cul-
ties between the larger groups were transferred to internal group relations (ibid., 
p. 14). 
This led Trist and Bamforth to conduct a more detailed analysis of the prob-
lematic inter- and intra-group relations in long-wall production. As a tool for 
understanding these relations they used their knowledge of therapeutic rehabili-
tation and group dynamics and the early theory of socio-technical forces. They 
found that the problems manifested themselves as disturbances, as norms of low 
production in work groups, as the functional isolation of groups, and as group 
defences. These manifestations were the results of the mechanical work design that 
could not take into account the psychological aspects.
However, the researchers also found a team of rippers who, in their view, rep-
resented a new promising organizational innovation. They suggested that some 
group relations on the coalface should change immediately, and they also main-
tained that qualitative change in coalmining could be effected only by combining 
the design of technical and social aspects of the entire production process.
The nature of pre-mechanized coalmining
Pre-mechanized coalmining was in many respects similar to the late craft industry, 
except that the size of the piecework groups was smaller. The common practice in 
the mines was for the colliery management fi rst to make a contract with two col-
liers, a hewer and his mate. This pair worked on their own small coalface with the 
assistance of a boy ”trammer”. Trist and Bamforth describe how hard the work was 
in the hand-got system.
26 The term ”task” had a different meaning for Trist and Bamforth than for Taylor, who saw it as 
a particular job that had to be done. For Trist and Bamforth it denoted either the entity of coal 
mining or a specifi c operation performed in order to carry out this entire task.
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To tram tubs was ”horse-work”. Trammers were commonly identifi ed by scabs, 
called ”buttons”, on the bone joints of their backs, caused by catching the roof 
while pushing and holding tubs on and off  ”the gates”. (Trist & Bamforth, 
1951, pp. 7–8)
The pair unit could function in different mine layouts and it could extend its num-
ber to eight members, when three or four colliers and their attendant trammers 
would work together. Although contracts were made in the name of the hewer the 
group understood it as a joint undertaking. 
For each participant the task has total and dynamic closure.  Leadership and 
supervision were internal to the group, which had a quality of responsible au-
tonomy. The capacity of the groups for self-regulation was a function of the 
wholeness of their work task, this connection being represented in their con-
tractual status. A whole has power as an independent detachment, but a part 
requires external control. (ibid., p. 6)
Trist and Bamforth did not consider the features of the technical implements used 
in the ”hand got” method in detail, but they did emphasize the importance of 
having many coalface skills. A collier was an all-round workman who was usually 
able to substitute for his mate. There were no strict occupational borders in the 
hand-got system.
Though his equipment was simple, his tasks were multiple. The ”underground 
skill” on which their effi cient and safe execution depended, was almost entirely 
person carried. He had craft pride and artisan independence. These qualities 
obviated diffi culties and contributed to responsible autonomy. (ibid., p. 6)
With full awareness of the conditions underground and with long-standing knowl-
edge of each other, the men chose their workmates themselves. The relationships 
between workers reached beyond occupational borders, and the family relations 
and the contract system supported each other. 
In circumstances where a man was injured or killed, it was not uncommon for 
his mate to care for his family. These work relationships were often reinforced 
by kinship ties, the contract system and the small group autonomy allowing a 
close but spontaneous connection to be maintained between family and occu-
pation, which avoided tying the one to the other. (ibid., pp. 6–7)
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The authors concluded that in the contract system of hand-got mining, the whole-
ness of the work task, the multiplicity of the skills of the indi vidual, and the self-
selection of the group were congruent attributes of a pattern of responsible au-
tonomy that characterized the pair-based coalface teams. The small group structure 
of the coalmining organization was fl exible. Being able to work their own faces 
continuously, the groups could stop at whatever point may have been reached by 
the end of a shift. The fl exibility had many advantages in the underground situa-
tion. When bad conditions were encountered, the extraction process in one series 
of stalls might proceed unevenly in corres pondence with the uneven distribution 
of these bad conditions.
In the underground situation external dangers must be faced in darkness. 
Darkness also awakens internal dangers. The need to share with others anxiet-
ies aroused by this double threat may be taken as self-evident. In view of the 
restricted range of effective communication, these others have to be immedi-
ately present. (ibid., p. 7) 
The small-group organization facilitated good relations among the men. The spe-
cifi c underground activities were spread out in a large coalmining area and the 
groups therefore became isolated from each other even when they were working in 
the same series of stalls. The darkness increased the isolation. The small teams and 
the pairs were often also in competition and quarrels broke out. The inter-team 
confl icts provided a channel for aggression that preserved intact the loyalties on 
which the small group depended. 
The system as a whole contained its bad in a way that did not destroy its good. 
The balance persisted, albeit that work was of hardest, rewards often meager, 
and the social climate rough at times and even violent. (ibid., p. 9)
The long-wall method
Trist and Bamforth maintained that the introduction of coal cutters and mechani-
cal conveyors broke the social balance between the pairs and the entire coalmin-
ing group. The new tools enabled the men work on long faces instead of short 
ones, which made the production more effective. The working of short faces in 
pre-mechanized coalmining was costly because a large number of gates had to be 
opened up several feet above the height of the seam to create haulage and traveling 
facilities. There was a tendency to make full use of the possibility of working long 
rather than short faces (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, p. 9).
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The complexity and the large scale of the production unit thus created conditions 
that made the development of a technological system impossible without bring-
ing into existence a work-relationship structure that was radically different from 
the one associated with hand-got procedures. The new long-wall produc tion unit 
consisted of three shifts and shift ”deputies”, who were responsible to the pit man-
agement for the production of the shifts as a whole.
In the long-wall method, a direct advance is made into the coal on a con tinuous 
front; faces of 180–200 yards being typical, though longer faces are not uncom-
mon. The work is broken down into a standard series of component operations 
that follow each other in rigid succession over three shifts of seven and a half 
hours each, so that a total coal getting cycle may be completed once in each 
twenty-four hours of the working week. The shift spread of the 40 workmen 
needed on an average face is: 10 each to the fi rst (”cutting”) and second (rip-
ping) shifts; 20 to the third (fi lling) shift. The amount of coal scheduled for 
extraction varies under different conditions but is com monly in the neighbor-
hood of 200 tons per cycle. A medium-size pit with three seams would have 
12–15 long-wall faces in operation simultaneously. (ibid., p. 11)
This production method required an intermediate social organization that was 
more complex than that of a small factory department. The structure of this or-
ganization began to threaten the previous social balance between the pair-based 
work groups and the entire group of workers in the coal mine. 
This centering of the new system on a differentiated structure of intermedi-
ate social magnitude disturbed the simple balance that had existed between 
the very small and very large traditional groups, and impaired the quality of 
responsible autonomy. The psychological and sociological problems posed by 
the technological needs of the long-wall system were those with respect to which 
experience in the industry
 
was least, and towards which its traditions were an-
tithetical. (ibid., p. 10)
No new social balance emerged after the implementation of the long-wall method. 
The changes in the group structure of the work affected the morale of the coalmin-
ers and that had to be analyzed in social and psychological rather than engineering 
and accounting terms. 
Anyone who has listened to the talk of older miners who have experi enced 
in their own work-lives the changeover to the long-wall cannot fail to be im-
pressed by the confused mourning for the past that still goes on in them to-
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gether with a dismay over the present colored by despair and indignation. To 
the clinical worker the quality of these talks has at times a ring that is familiar. 
Those with rehabilitation experience will recognize it as similar to the quality 
of feeling expressed by rehabilitees when ventilating the aftermath in them-
selves of impairment accepted as irreversible. (ibid., p. 10)
Trist and Bamforth described the nature of the shift work in the mass-production 
layout as a spatio-temporal structure necessitated by the long-wall method. This 
structure, as  part of the technical system, caused specifi c problems in the work that 
required effective communication and good working relationships. 
The production engineer might write a simple equation: 200 tons equals 40 
men over 200 yds. over 24 hours. But there are no solutions of equivalent sim-
plicity to the psychological and social diffi culties raised. For psychological and 
social diffi culties of a new order appear when the scale of a task transcends the 
limits of simple spatio-temporal structure. By this is meant conditions under 
which those concerned can complete a job in one place at one time, i.e., the 
situation of the face-to-face, or singular group. Once a job is too big for a sin-
gular group, a multiple group comes into existence, composed of a number of 
sub-groups of the singular type. (ibid., p. 14)
The entire task of coalmining had fallen into four groups, concerned with (a) the 
preparation of the coalface for shot-fi ring, (b) shifting the conveyor, (c) ripping 
down and building up the main and side gates, and (d) moving the shot coal on to 
the conveyor. These tasks were strictly differentiated but also interdependent, form-
ing a social structure of occupational roles (borer, cutter, gummer, belt-breaker, 
belt-builder, ripper, and fi ller).
Occupational roles express the relationship between a production process and 
the social organization of the group. In one direction, they are related to tasks, 
which are related to each other; in the other, to people, who are also, related to 
each other. (ibid., p. 14) 
The face-preparation tasks were all performed on the fi rst shift. They included 
boring holes for the shot-fi rer, driving the coal-cutter, taking out the inches of 
coal, and placing supporting ”noggings” underneath it so that this weight did not 
cause it to sag down to the fl oor while the ”cut” was standing during the next shift 
(ibid., p.15). These tasks were performed in a given order. Two men were fully oc-
cupied boring the holes, two managing the coal cutter, and four in clearing out the 
undercut. The success of the shots fi red at the end of the second shift that made 
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the coal fi nally ready for the fi ller depended on the effi ciency with which each 
preparation task had been carried out.
In the long-wall system, the workers were trained for one occupational role. 
Trist and Bamforth saw this as an institutionalized form of segregating the work-
ers from each other. This segregation was intensifi ed by the different payment 
methods, by the exaggeration of status differences, and by the segregation of shifts. 
The workers on different shifts never met. Moreover, the two preparation groups 
alternated in the so-called ”back shifts”, while the fi llers alternated on ”days” and 
” afternoons”.
Trist and Bamforth studied four ”differentiated work groups”: interdependent 
pairs of borers, belt builders and belt-breakers, extended pairs of cutters and gum-
mers, the self-suffi cient group of eight rippers, and the aggregate of twenty fi llers 
spread out over the 200-yard face. They maintained that the uneven quality of the 
groups worked ”against the social integration of the cycle group as a whole”.
The unevenness and unpredictability of the coal load
Trist and Bamforth maintained that mechanized coalmining was different from 
factory production because the workers had to encounter a large variety of unfa-
vorable and changing environmental conditions, many of which were impossible 
to predict. Factory mass production required a kind of ”constant background to 
the task”, but the threat of some other ”untoward activity” was always present at 
the coalface (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, p. 20). 
Work at the coal mine comprised two distinct and ever-present elements. The 
fi rst task incorporated the normal daily occupational work that had to be done in 
the mine, while the second stemmed from the nature of the ground. The coalmin-
ers continuously encountered danger because the ground was in a state of contin-
uous motion. The problems involved in reconciling these two elements led to the 
adoption by the miners of norms of low productivity in the long-wall method.
The miners’ ability to cope with the dangers they encountered was based on 
the common fund of underground skills shared by all experienced face workers. 
The training period for the standard operations of the new production cycle was 
short, however. The most important skill, the ability to maintain a high level of 
performance when diffi culties arose, developed only as the result of several years 
of experience at the face, and was of a higher order than those that required simply 
carrying out standard operations.
A work system basically appropriate to the underground situation requires to 
have built into its organization the fi ndings of this experience. Unless this has 
been done, it will not only fail to engage the face-worker to the limit of his ca-
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pabilities, but will restrict him to a level of performance below his potentiality.” 
(ibid., p. 23)
Trist and Bamforth did not explain in detail their fi ndings concerning these skills. 
It is evident from their description, however, that the skills were related to the 
variations in quality and the structure of the coal loads that were the objects of 
the miners’ work. They maintained that the workers had adopted norms of low 
productivity because the long-wall method prevented them from building up this 
knowledge. 
They criticized the direct implementation of the rigidly sequenced and differ-
entiated work organization of mass production in the coal mine. Mass production 
created diffi cult problems in factories, but the diffi culties were even worse in a coal 
mine. Factory conditions were stable, and it was possible to control the production 
line, but control was much more diffi cult in the coal mine. The main problems 
arose from the ”bad conditions” that stemmed from the uneven nature of the coal 
load, and not from ”bad work”, a term that referred to human error. Bad conditions 
emerged even though the seams were well ventilated, cool, dry, and dust-free.
Rolls or faults may appear in the seam. Control may be lost over the roof for 
considerable periods. Especially in the middle of a long face, certain types of 
roof are apt to sag down. Changes may occur in the fl oor; the condition known 
as ”rising fl oor” being not uncommon. (ibid., p. 20)
The bad conditions meant additional dangers but also additional labor, ”bye-work”, 
which was work that was not included in the standards. Many of the bye-work tasks 
were badly remunerated. From the face worker’s point of view, ”bad conditions” 
meant not only more danger and harder work, but also less pay (ibid., p. 20).
Bad conditions also tended to instigate ”bad work”. The interaction between the 
two tended to lead to circular causal processes, the disruptive character of which 
was obvious. The bad work and the bad conditions were distributed unevenly be-
tween different faces and among different tasks within the same face.  The con-
sequence was unevenness in the level of functional effi ciency, and cycle stoppages 
threatened the entire system of successive shift work. Stoppages were rare, how-
ever. The researchers assumed that the coalminers were working quickly towards 
the end of their shifts in order to prevent the disruption (ibid., pp. 21–22). 
The main responsibility for keeping down the number of cycle stoppages fell 
on the deputy, whose job was to control the entire process of production in the 
face area. However, the darkness and the wide working area made supervision of 
the miners diffi cult, if not impossible. The management complained of a lack of 
support from the men, who focused only on their standard operations. The work-
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ers, on the other hand, criticized the deputies for being outsiders – intermittent 
visitors and ”stick” men, who interfered in their work without sharing its hard, 
physical conditions and in their in-group life at the face. This strained cycle con-
trol tended to produce a ”group culture” of angry and suspicious bargaining in 
which both management and men were in collusion.
Trist and Bamforth maintained that, at the time when the long-wall method 
was developed, there were no precedents for the underground application of ma-
chine technology. In the absence of relevant experience in the mining industry, it 
was almost inevitable that factory norms would be adopted. There was no psy-
chological or sociological knowledge, at that time that might have alleviated the 
problems (ibid., p. 23). 
According to Trist and Bamforth, the workers’ methods of coping with the 
problems were based mostly on defensive reactions. Interestingly, they also iden-
tifi ed a working method that helped groups of workers to minimize these reac-
tions.
Group defences as a way of dealing with the problem of functional isolation
Under the long-wall system, fi llers working alone in their ”stints” loaded coal on 
a mechanically driven conveyor. A stint was ”a period of time, which you should 
spend doing a particular job or activity or working in a particular place” (Trist, 
1963, p.7). It was a typical work standard. Trist and Bamforth characterized the re-
lationships between members of the fi lling shift as having ”an absence of functional 
interdependence.” Instead of being one of an independent pair, the fi ller became 
a member of an ”absent group”, like nineteen other fi llers in the shift. Because of 
the temporal distance between  the shifts, the fi llers and the preparation person-
nel formed a ”totally absent group”. The relationships between specialized workers 
were characterized by dependency rather than independency within a given cycle 
period and operated only in one direction. The fi llers were dependent on groups 
that were not present. This ”isolated dependence” meant that they were ”left alone 
with each other and at the mercy of the rest” (Trist and Bamforth 1951, pp. 25–26).
Trist and Bamforth gave a detailed analysis of some of the most common types 
of bad conditions and of the bad work that caused functional isolation. The local 
occurrence of certain types of bad conditions, such as temporary unevenness in 
the fl oor or roof of the face that reduced the working height, were impossible to 
anticipate, so that anxiety piled up. Bad work put the fi ller in a situation in which 
he would never know what he might fi nd, which provoked another kind of anxiety 
that produced chronic uncertainty and irritation. In situations of dependent isola-
tion, individuals inevitably erected protective defenses, which were elaborated and 
shared in the work group. 
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These defences are reactive rather than adaptive. Their effectiveness therefore is 
only partial. But without them life at the long-wall would be intolerable for all 
but those whose level of personal adjustment is rather better than that attained 
by most individuals in the course of their development. (Trist & Bamforth, 
1951, p. 30)
Functional isolation prompted the fi llers to develop, as their defense, an informal 
small-group organization in which the miners made private arrangements to help 
each other. Neighbors, in twos, threes or fours, formed these groups. The miners 
assumed that the small groups made ”things [were] more like the old times in 
the pit”. This kind of group sometimes appeared to be held together by a natural 
leader or to consist of individuals with generally good personalities. In practice 
they met the fi llers’ need for a secure role in a primary group only to a very limited 
extent. The second type of defence was the development of reactive individualism, 
in which a reserve of personal secrecy was maintained. The fi llers plotted with and 
against their shift mates to get the best places. The middle positions were avoided, 
because it was ”a long way to creep” from them.
The fi llers virtually never saw those who worked on the ”back shifts”. This lack 
of contact gave full rein to the mutual and irresponsible defense form of scape-
goating. When there was a fi lling crisis, one fi ller could be named by his mates as 
”a buck” and his name passed to the other shift. The ”buck” was frequently also 
passed to the deputy, who was blamed for not fi nding substitutes. Withdrawal was 
the fourth form of defense, which complemented mutual scapegoating. For ex-
ample, a fi ller returning from his week’s holiday might complain that the fi rst two 
shifts had ”knocked it all out of him”. The gummings had been left in. His coal 
was solid. He had had the air-pick on all day. ”I’ve tried cursing ‘em but it’s no use, 
and pleading with ‘em but it’s no use. I’ll take a day off for this.” According to Trist 
and Bamforth, absenteeism was a social technique within this type of defense. 
Although there were local differences, the four defense forms apparently played 
”dynamically interrelated parts in forming the culture of the work groups”.
In some cases, the informants also told the researchers about good cooperation, 
and suggested that fewer lapses occurred when that was the case. Some temporary 
payment arrangements reminiscent of the methods used in pre-mechanized con-
tracts had also been applied. These experiments had come up against ”long-wall 
separatism”, with no overall goal . ”No functionally defi ned responsibilities” exist-
ed for binding the responsibilities together. Thus ”the persistence or resuscitation 
of the old forms of contract were not in themselves enough to restore responsible 
autonomy” (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, p. 30–35).
Trist and Bamforth openly brought the pre-mechanized type of responsible au-
tonomy into their work ideal. The need for such autonomy was seen best in the pair 
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structures of borers, belt-builders, and belt-breakers who were only superfi cially 
an ”echo of those pre-mechanized days” and were restricted to work tasks of a sin-
gularly narrow component character. This was the reason why they could not feel 
the satisfaction of accepting responsibility for the conveyor system as a whole.
The ”all-in” method as a solution to the problems caused by implementing 
mass-production principles
Trist and Bamforth found a group of miners applying the long-wall method in a 
different way than others. A ”ripping team” in the same seam used an alternative 
working method the group called ”all in”. The discovery of this group was later 
referred to as the beginning of STSD.
The task of the rippers’ team was to ”rip” dirt out of the main and side gates 
to assigned heights, place cambers, build up the roof into a solid, safe and durable 
structure, and packup the sides. The team carried out all its tasks independently. 
The tasks required the ”highest degree of building skill”, but also entailed some 
very heavy labor. The team was a well-organized work group of seven or eight 
members with an identifi able overall task for which it carried complete respon-
sibility. 
Other miners frequently referred to the rippers as a ”good crowd” who sel-
dom ”went absent on each other”. Their pride in their craft was considerable. The 
group consisted of a main ripper and individuals with varying work experience, 
and it managed its internal relationships without status diffi culties. A measure of 
responsible autonomy persisted.  (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, p 36.)
The problem with this team, however, was that it focused only on its own tasks 
and the working method did not spread to the wider organization. It was an iso-
lated group and there was no transfer of its more stable morale to other groups in 
the system. Working in the main and side gates was felt to be the prerogative of a 
closed group very much apart from the interaction between the preparation and 
fi lling operations.
According to Trist and Bamforth (1951, pp. 36–37), the separation of the rip-
ping team represented in all essential respects ”a survival of the hand-got past in 
the mechanical present”. All relevant operations were carried out within the group, 
which completed them within the compass of one shift. 
Rippers have escaped from, rather than become part of, the long-wall system, 
retaining intact their total task, their multiple skills, their artisan independence, 
and their small group organization. (Trist & Bamforth, 1951, p. 37)
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Rippers’ teams worked in a gate, which was part of the production layout. Working 
in gates was not at all like working on the long-wall faces.
In the gates, the scale of the task remains small; the spatio-temporal structure 
is simple, and methods are un-mechanized. Changes consequent on the intro-
duction of power-driven tools, or of steel replacing wood, have been assimi-
lated without essential restructuring. (ibid., p. 37)
The difference between the work of the rippers’ teams in the gates and of the oth-
ers on the face was obvious. The introduction of machines on the face changed the 
scale of mass production and brought out the problems under study. 
As a potential resolution of the problems in the long-wall faces, Trist and Bam-
forth (ibid., pp. 37–38) suggested the need for a qualitative change in the pro-
duction design, which should be based on an analysis of the social as well as the 
technological forces of production. 
Their immediate suggestion was to develop a small-group organization to re-
solve the fi llers’ and cutting teams’ problems.  In order to do that it was necessary 
to restore the social pattern that, in the previous hand-got system, had supported 
the coalminers’ ability to be productive in dangerous situations.
But it is diffi cult to see how these problems could be resolved effectively with-
out restoring the responsible autonomy to primary groups throughout the sys-
tem and ensuring that each of these groups has a satisfying ”sub-whole” as its 
work task, and some scope for fl exibility in work pace. (ibid., p. 38)
6.3 Problems in the implementation of mass production as refl ections 
of contradictions in the activity system
Trist and Bamforth’s original purpose was to fi nd organizational innovations in 
the post- war reconstruction of industry. They found the rippers’ all-in method 
in a coal mine in which the implementation of mass-production principles had 
caused problems.  My claim in Chapter 5 was that mass production could not have 
become the dominant form of production in the motorization wave without its 
system of generalizing. 
Trist and Bamforth analyzed a specifi c case of the application of mass-produc-
tion principles to coalmining. They did not deny the enormous increase in pro-
duction that this method achieved nor did they advocate replacing mass produc-
tion with another production concept. Maintaining that there was a possibility to 
implement mass production in another way, they were not questioning the whole 
concept, only the way of designing the work connected to it. In so doing, they also 
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questioned the system of producing work-related generalizations of mass produc-
tion.
My interpretation in Chapter 5 was that the core unit of analysis and the core 
object of the system of generalizing in mass production was the variation of move-
ments within a given work task. The artifacts that were used in Taylor-type gener-
alizing stemmed from mechanical research. Trist and Bamforth focused on rela-
tions between different kinds of work groups rather than on internal relations in a 
work task. They analyzed these relations using the concepts used in therapeutic 
rehabilitation and psychodynamic group therapy. 
Figure 6.1 below depicts the transformation from pre-mechanized coalmining 
to long-wall mass production, which Trist and Bamforth analyzed using a general 
activity system model.
Tools
Optimally short face -> optimally long face
Hand-got tools -> conveyor, coal cutter
Subject
Artisan pair ->
individual 
tradesman
Rules
Contract -> standards
Responsible autonomy ->
norm of low productivity
Balance -> imbalance
Community
Groups -> shifts
Small -> large
Division of labor
Flexible -> 
functionally isolated
Unpredictably 
varying coal load 
as the object
Outcome
Small ->
great quantity 
of coal
Figure 6.1 The transformation from pre-mechanized to long-wall mining 
The diffi culties in the transformation were connected to the lower part of the 
activity system. The rules (the norm of low productivity and imbalance between 
the work groups) and division of labor (functional isolation) were the critical 
points. This model does not yet give an adequate picture of reason for the prob-
lems, however.
The object of the work activity and of the entire activity system were constant 
in the Taylor-type system of generalizing. The tools, rules, subject, community, 
and division of labor were fi xed at a formal optimum level. This kind of fi xed 
system made it possible to carry out industrial tasks because the object of the 
activity varied minimally. In contrast to the well-standardized mass production, 
the object of the coal-mining activity, the coal lode, varied in unpredictable ways. 
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This meant that the standardized task did not in fact remain the same all the time, 
as was assumed in the generalization that was fi xed in the standard. The standard 
embedded empirical generalization of the variation in the task. Instead of provid-
ing information about the essential variation in the object of the activity, the coal 
lode, this generalization provided only one way of coping with it. Consequently 
there were contradictions between the fi xed elements of the activity system and its 
varying object (Figure 6.2).
Tools
Fixed
Subject
Fixed
Rules 
Fixed
Community
Fixed 
Division of labor
Fixed 
Object
Continuous 
unpredictable
variation 
in the ground
Outcome
Large quantity
of coal
Figure 6.2 The contradiction between the fi xed activity system and its varying object
The problematic consequences that Trist and Bamforth describe could be seen as 
symptoms of aggravated contradictions between elements of the activity system 
and attempts to cope with it. The dangers and isolation aggravated the workers’ 
experience of these contradictions, but were not the main cause. Orr (1996) de-
scribed a very similar situation in the work of copy-machine repairers. The stan-
dard method of repair was based on the assumption that machines of a certain 
type were similar, but the problems the repair men met in the fi eld were caused by 
the interaction between the machines and their users. The different ways in which 
the machines were used caused variations in the kinds of faults that developed, 
which the standard operating instructions did not cover.
The contradiction described above was not caused by a lack of precision in the 
system of generalizing. Taylorist empirical generalization is a generalized repre-
sentation of average effective work operations that take the object of the work as 
given and constant. An alternative could be to devise generalized representations 
of the variation in the object of activity, and of the corresponding variation in 
work operations. 
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Did the work of the rippers’ team represent a historically new form of work-
related generalizing?
According to Trist and Bamforth (1951, p.37), the very existence of the ”all-in” 
method showed that the industry had ”the necessary resources and creativity to 
allow widespread constructive developments to take place”. In my view, the pro-
cesses and representations of generalizing in the rippers’ team did not differ from 
those of the late craft industries in that they were based on the incremental devel-
opment of knowledge that was fi xed in the tools and rules of thumb. They also ap-
parently complied with the traditional form of piecework agreement: wages were 
paid according to cubic measures of coal produced.27
Many authors (e.g. Vartiainen, 1994, p. 44) assume that the workers themselves 
created the system. In Trist’s view 27 years after the study, however, it was not only 
the workers who came up with the idea.
The method called the all-in method had been conceived by Reg Baker, the Area 
General Manager NO.3 Area, formerly manager at Elsecar (…). It was both 
moving and exciting to talk to the men about the value they placed on their 
experience in the newly formed autonomous groups. (Trist 1978, pp. 5–6)
Why did Reg Baker conceive of the rippers’ team? One explanation is that it was 
not possible to standardize the entire work of the coal mine as Henry Ford (1924) 
found with his factories. The rippers’ team seemed to be a typical group of craft 
workers performing residual tasks that could not be organized according to the 
principles of mass production. As I see it, Trist and Bamforth’s conclusion was that 
mass production could be more effective when complemented with the percep-
tual-functional form of generalizing typical of craft work. The pattern of general-
izing in the rippers’ team was based on the transformation of working methods 
as members of the group reacted spontaneously to the challenges imposed by the 
situation. The team did not need the low productivity norm because their general-
ized operations were adequate in terms of carrying out their work task.
A major disadvantage of this kind of generalization is that it is embedded in 
local forms of collaboration and is not transferable from one group to another. 
Assimilation had to follow the craft pattern of learning through apprenticeship. 
A newcomer learns – and possibly contributes to – these forms of collaboration 
only by following in the footsteps of the more experienced members of the group. 
This could also explain the isolation of the rippers’ team from the rest of the work 
27 Trist and Bamforth did not clarify out on what fi gures the cubic measures was based.
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community in the long-wall system28. In terms of producing work-related general-
izations, the all-in method was a return to the old.
On the other hand, what Trist and Bamforth found was that the rippers’ team, 
a group with responsible autonomy, which worked within the mass-production sys-
tem, could control its work better and was also more effective than the work units 
organized in the Taylorist  fashion in the same coal mine. A group, as a new unit of 
work design in mass production could also alleviate the problems that resulted in 
the use of social defense and the norm of low productivity. The discovery of the 
advantages of the new potential unit, the group, was historically signifi cant.
Trist and Bamforth’s identifi cation of the potentiality of the work group as a 
new unit of work design inspired further research that focused on the productive 
outputs of various group-based forms of work organization. Trist (1963) and his 
colleagues studied and found similar groups in other coal mines and compared 
”composite” coalmining with the ”conventional” type. Composite mining involved 
the miners working in a group with varying tasks, while conventional production 
entailed more segregated and permanently divided tasks and less variation. Ac-
cording to these studies, the composite working groups were more effective than 
the conventional groups.
The answer to the question whether the work of the rippers’ team represented a 
historically new form of work-related generalizing is thus both ”yes” and ”no”. On 
the one hand, it followed the pattern of perceptual-functional generalizing typical 
of craft work and on the other hand, the idea of the group as part of the social sys-
tem challenged the foundations of the Taylorist form of generalization, according 
to which task variation was the main priority. According to Trist and Bamforth the 
groups and the interrelations between them provided the variations in the social 
entity, which were dependent on the changes in the technical system. The coordi-
nation of the variation in these two systems – the social and the technical – gave 
rise to the main STSD concept.
The background of this development was, as I see it, that the variation of the 
object in coalmining contradicted the fi xed empirical generalizations. This prob-
lem was not unique – on the contrary, the need to manage this kind of variation 
became increasingly acute as mass production reached its peak in the 1970s and 
the need to introduce more variation arose.
Trist and Bamforth were not interested in how the new form of work carried 
out by the rippers’ team developed. Early studies on STSD focused more on the ex-
istence of groups than on their construction. The famous pioneer study conducted 
by Rice in Ahmedabad, India reported how the workers in a weaving mill created 
28 The rippers escaped the other shifts although the other miners appreciated them.
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semi-autonomous teams when Rice had only mentioned the possibility in a plan-
ning meeting (van Einjatten 1993, p. 24). Nevertheless, socio-technicians began to 
place more emphasis on how to construct groups in mass-production work, and 
this required some theoretical back-up. 
6.4 The conceptual development towards dualism 
The coalmining studies highlighted the need to analyze the requirements the tech-
nical system imposed upon the social system. This made it possible to organize 
production in a way that satisfi ed the technical requirements and made the best use 
of the social system itself (Emery & Hill, 1993, p. 279). The ”joint optimization”of 
the social and technical aspects of production became a major practical and theo-
retical goal in the socio-technical school.
According to Emery, the Taylorist approach was based on analyzing part prob-
lems. The initial motive behind socio-technical theory building was more effectively 
to identify what was relevant in order to resolve particular problems of work orga-
nization. Emery used the concept of the socio-technical system for the fi rst time in 
1959 as a frame of reference for ordering the facts in analyses of the interrelations of 
these two systems, and for revealing the way each of them contributed to the perfor-
mance of the enterprise (van Einjatten, 1993, p. 30; Emery 1993a, 157). 
Emery maintained that the concept ”social” referred to people and ”technical” 
to the physical support of their activities. The main dimensions of the technical 
system were the natural characteristics of the material being worked, the level of 
mechanization, the unit operations, the degree of centrality of the different pro-
duction operations, maintenance operations, supply operations, the spatio-tem-
poral dimensions of the production and the immediate physical work setting. Of 
these the most important was the level of mechanization. The social system con-
sisted of the structure of the occupational roles, methods of payment, the supervi-
sory relationships, and the work culture. The demands created by the technologi-
cal system were met fi rst by ”bringing into existence a work relationship structure” 
(Emery, 1993a, pp. 161–165).
Emery and Trist (1969) understood an enterprise as an open system. This idea 
was taken from Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems of physics and biology.29 The 
authors saw an analogy between the capacity of biological organisms to survive 
in their environment and an enterprise’s capacity to survive in the markets. The 
steady state of an enterprise was the state in which the commerce was going on. 
The conditions for keeping this steady state existed within and outside of it. 
29 Note that Taylor has based his scientifi c management on mechanics, mathematic and physics.
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The technical system converted the inputs into outputs, and thus played the 
major role in determining the self-regulating properties of the enterprise. It func-
tioned as ”one of the major boundary conditions” between the social system and 
the environment. It represented, as it were, an ”internal environment”. The varia-
tion in the output markets and in the inputs in commerce was seen as the most 
important factor infl uencing the enterprise’s ability to maintain a steady state in 
its social and technical systems (Emery & Trist, 1969, p. 283).
The concept of joint optimization referred to the objective of achieving the 
best match between technical instrumentation and social work organization. The 
socio-technical entity should be optimized. 
Any attempts to optimize for one without due regard to the other will lead to 
sub optimal overall performance, so even if an effort is made in an industrial 
situation to follow the traditional pattern, i.e., to optimize the technical system 
and hope the social system will somehow sort itself out, then sub-optimization 
is certain result. This is also the case when attempting to optimize each system 
but independently, ignoring the interaction effects. (Trist, 1993b, p. 587)
According to Emery (1993b), the principle of joint optimization could be applied 
only where the systems were independent but correlative. It did not apply when 
one system was, in fact, part of another such as when a sales section of a com-
pany was part of a social system that was governed by the same laws as the rest of 
the social system. Socio-technical systems were composed of two distinct systems, 
however, both of which, although correlative, were governed by different laws. Ac-
cording to Trist, the technical system followed the laws of natural sciences and the 
social system followed human laws.
Interaction between different systems could be conceived of only under the 
principle of contemporaneous causation, i.e. past events cannot be causes because 
they no longer exist, and future events cannot be causes because they do not yet 
exist. Only systems that exist together can interact. Independent systems cannot 
be conceived of as coupled together unless, at a certain time, there is movement 
of information at least from one system to another (Emery, 1993b, p. 563; van 
Einjatten, p. 86–89). Emery called the symmetric compatibility of the laws govern-
ing the social and the technical the Postulate of Dualism. Dualism that separates 
the enterprise from its turbulent environment that divides the internal activity of 
an enterprise into two logically different systems, and that develops methods for 
seeking out the best match between these systems, has been characteristic of So-
cio-Technical Systems Design. This type of dualistic logic was also evident in the 
STSD work-related generalizations. 
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6.5 The basic STSD model as abstract-empirical generalizing
The fi rst widely practiced method for undertaking socio-technical design and 
research was called the nine-step model, introduced by Emery in 1967 (Emery, 
1993b, pp. 569–579). The objective was to help designers and line managers with 
action groups, and to implement the concept of joint optimization in their own 
departments in order to improve the level of performance of the whole enterprise. 
Emery was apparently applying Ashby’s law of requisite variety according to which 
the system has to be able to create a greater amount of variation in its responses 
than the environment produces. In the following, I will describe this process in 
terms of four actions of generalizing. 
The fi rst action is to make an initial assessment of the variation needed in the 
task structure of the production system. This means describing the production 
reality and its environment, and identifying the main problems in the system for 
further study. 
The second action involves analyzing the transformation variance in techni-
cal and social systems, and comparing the different elements within each entity. 
The fi rst task of the action group analyzing the technical system is to examine the 
trajectory of raw material, in other words the phases in the series of operations 
that have to be carried out to convert materials at the input end of the system into 
products at the output end. At this point the focus is exclusively on the series of 
transformations through which the raw material passes, and the effects of ma-
chines and people are ignored. 
This makes it possible to analyze the ”key process variances” and the inter-
relationships between them. Variance is defi ned as deviation from some standard 
or specifi cation. The focus at this stage is on the key variances that signifi cantly 
affect the capability of the production system to meet its targets in one or more of 
its unit operations. First, all the variances in the system that, in the opinion of the 
action group, are worthy of note have to be identifi ed. The group then draws up 
a matrix of identifi ed variances 30 in the form of a table with specifi c disturbance 
sources as one input source and factual disturbance controls as the others
Key variance analysis makes it possible to examine the way in which the social 
system contributes to variance control and the attainment of production objec-
tives. Using different descriptions, mappings and analyses, the action group can 
also asses the extent to which the social objectives and their own needs coincide. 
30 The variation matrix (or variance map) was used for the fi rst time in the Industrial Democ-
racy program in Norway at the Hunsfos paper mill (Thorsrud & Emery 1971, pp. 206–208; van 
Einjatten 1993, pp. 36–37)
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A brief review of the organizational structure, including the social groupings and 
types of role, is required.
The workers also describe their roles in the production system. Their psycho-
logical needs31 can then be assessed in order to check whether their roles meet 
them and to analyze their perceptions of their roles, specifi cally the extent to which 
they see them as fulfi lling their psychological needs. (This can be accomplished by 
having representatives of personnel administration in the action group, either for 
this particular purpose or as a full member. Interviews could also be arranged.) 
The third action consists of fi tting the objectives of the production system and 
the directly related systems together. Emery characterizes these analyses only in 
general terms. The maintenance system is examined in as far as it affects the par-
ticular production system in terms of achieving its objectives. These objectives are 
determined according to the nature of the maintenance variance arising from the 
system, the extent to which the variance is controlled, and the extent to which the 
maintenance task should be taken into account in the operational design. Suppli-
ers’ and users’ systems are analyzed in order to determine the way in which, as en-
vironmental systems, they affect the particular production system. These analyses 
can lead either to a reduction in variance or to redefi nition of the objectives of 
the production system. It is also important to identify the forces operating in the 
wider departmental or work environment that either affect the ability of the pro-
duction system to achieve its objectives, or are likely to lead to a change in them. 
It is essential to be able to identify the development plans and general policies that 
have a high probability of being implemented.
In the fourth action, the designers gather all the hypotheses and proposals that 
have been developed during the analysis process in order to consider their viability 
and to establish the basis for a subsequent action program. Hypotheses are formed 
as the analysis of the technical system is being completed. These proposals will be 
modifi ed as further information is gathered about the social and environmental 
systems. The hypotheses also have to be tested against appropriate criteria, which 
must relate to the objectives of the production system in terms of quantity, quality, 
and general operating costs. They should also cover social objectives, such as those 
aimed at increasing the extent to which psychological needs are met in role design.  
The fi nal stage of Emery’s model is to make proposals. He did not include any 
action plan for carrying out the program as J.C Taylor did with his specifi c ”imple-
mentation action” and ”redesign plan”, for example. This suggests that Emery’s 
model of joint optimation was not meant to encompass continuous activity, and 
31 Trist (1993b, p. 588) defi ned six basic general psychological requirements that work roles 
have to meet.
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that its purpose was to construct a new constant production system during one 
process. This makes the actions of generalizing only temporary actions in which an 
external work designer or local manager, together with the action group, optimizes 
the social and technical systems. 
Moreover, the generalization applied in this design model is based on empiri-
cal comparison and the classifi cation of either the social or the technical elements 
of production. The representations used in all these actions are mainly the pro-
cedural models and guidelines, statistical methods, variance matrixes, maps, and 
given organizational models. The criteria of the production-system objectives in 
terms of quantity, quality and general operating costs are also important. 
The system as a new unit of analysis is much more extensive than a Taylorist 
task, which makes more versatile analysis of the variations in production possible. 
Socio-technical actions of generalizing seem to be based on perceptual-functional 
generalizing, which is evident in the practical applications. 
Participants Actions
An external 
designer, 
department 
manager 
alone or 
with an 
action group
1.
Initial 
mapping of 
the interaction 
between the 
enterprise 
and its 
environment
2.
Comparing 
the internal 
variants of 
the social 
and technical 
systems 
separately
3.
Fitting
together the 
objectives of
the production
system and 
of directly 
related systems
4.
Gathering
the hypotheses
in order to 
construct an 
action program 
for carrying out 
the change
proposals
Figure 6.1 The actors and four actions of socio-technical generalizing 
6.6 The spreading of socio-technical generalizing 
The practical implementation of Socio-Technical Systems Design has spread 
through the world in the form of semi-autonomous teams and socio-technically 
designed factories.
Semi-autonomous teams
STSD has come into prominence in showing that the mass product can be pro-
duced more effectively by semiautonomous and self-managed work groups (Em-
ery, 1993c, 210; Trist, Higgin & al, 1963). Pasmore et al. (1982, pp. 1192–1193) 
reviewed 134 reports of socio-technical experiments conducted between 1974 and 
1980 and found that the formation of semi-autonomous teams was most preva-
lent in socio-technical projects, and approximately 200 plants in the US had ad-
opted the practice in the early 1980s). Manz and Sims (1990) and Verespej (1990) 
1476 Trist and Bamforth’s study as the origin of the socio-technical...
predicted in the early 1990s that as many as 40 to 50 percent of American workers 
might be involved in some form of empowered team environment by the year 
2000. These applications span many industries in both manufacturing and service. 
The trend has also been widespread in many parts of Europe, especially in the 
Scandinavian countries (Grootings et al., 1989). 
Nowadays these work groups are defi ned according to their ability a) to select 
their own work methods, b) to take responsibility for certain decisions regarding 
production control and design, and c) to regulate the work pace with the help of buf-
fer stocks (Berggren 1990, pp. 243–244). According to Köhler and Schmierl’s (1992) 
account, one tenth of workshops manufacturing capital equipment in Germany had 
organized their production exclusively around cells or ”autonomous manufacturing 
islands”. It is justifi able to claim that these teams represent an alternative division of 
labor in production, and have become a source of qualitative change. The increasing 
numbers of articles claiming the superiority of STSD over lean production or advo-
cating combining the models (Manz & Stewart, 1997), point in the same direction.
Many analyses have shown that the problem with semi-autonomous groups is 
the limited infl uence they have on organizational practices as a whole. They are 
often only partial solutions, and problems in consolidating group-based work or-
ganization remain. (van Einjatten 1993, pp. 145–149; Trist 1981, p. 35).
Socio-technically designed factories
Toikka (1992, pp. 12–16) divides the development of the socio-technical design 
of assembly-line work into three phases. At fi rst, the intention was to lessen the 
harmful effects of assembly-line work without interfering with the conveyor-belt. 
Then the designers experimented by making some changes directly focused on 
the assembly conveyor. In the third and most radical phase, the conveyor belt was 
completely removed from assembly work. The best-known single example of this 
was Volvo’s automobile plant in Uddevalla, Sweden.
At the beginning of 1990, groups of 8–10 workers in the Uddevalla plant, were 
making cars from beginning to end without any assembly line as quickly as they 
were made on the assembly line: the production of one car entailed 48 parallel 
stationary processes with a job cycle of around two hours. 
The result of a special ”green-fi eld” design, the factory started functioning in 
1989.  The planning process was based on what was happening in the Volvo Kal-
mar plant and the design was extended from line to whole-car assembly. The new 
method was tested in a training shop during the design process. 
The training shop functioned as a production laboratory. The tests carried out 
there showed that it was possible, with appropriate materials arrangement and an 
effective administrative system, to learn how to build cars without the assembly 
148
line.  The manager in charge of training formulated the goal as follows: ”In the 
training shop we learn how to make complete cars. Both manual and intellectual 
functions are required: planning, organizing equipment and materials, assem-
bling, following up, and reporting. Assembly here involves more than just mount-
ing screws; it is also a matter of functional know how” (Berggren 1993, p. 150). 
The training shop was closed during starting year of the factory, however, because 
it had become so isolated that new assemblers needed retraining when they came 
out of it onto the factory fl oor. 
Nilsson, who was the only researcher who was able to trace the practical de-
velopment of this potential socio-technical system of generalizing, explained the 
principles of ”expanded assembly work” as follows.
To create the competence needed to master long-cycle work, such as expand-
ed assembly work, it is necessary to develop ”an inner monologue”. The inner 
monologue should co-ordinate the relationship between ”the work of the hand” 
and the ”work of the mind.”(…) The development of ”inner monologue” is a 
primary factor in the creation of a vocational identity in the centuries –old 
western European handicraft tradition, which is also applicable in the new 
world in the aftermath of the Taylorist phase of the industrial era. (…) Those 
who had learned the techniques became instructors for novice workers. This 
was much like the comprehensive training of the old apprentice- journeymen 
relationship in the guild system. (Nilsson, 1995, pp. 78–80)
Nilsson clearly saw expanded assembly work as a happy return to the craft principle 
of learning in and for production. When the plant started functioning in 1988, new 
employees began on a trainee’s wage, which increased in stages until the standard 
wage was reached. This wage could then be augmented with a qualifi cation bonus 
depending on how large a proportion of the car’s assembly the worker mastered. 
Workers at the highest competence level were able to build an entire car.
The process of reaching whole-car competence was designed to be a true test of 
skill and knowledge. The requirement in 1990 was that a worker had to be able 
to make a complete car with maximum of four small defects in at most twenty 
hours. Workers were required to have undergone training and then built cars 
for at least sixteen months before they could take the test at all. In 1990 there 
were a dozen whole-car builders among Uddevalla’s fi ve hundred or so assem-
blers. (Berggren, 1993, p. 161)
The bonuses were paid both to the individual worker as a team representative and 
to the team as a whole. The productivity bonus was initially based on the productiv-
ity of the entire plant and bore no relation to the results achieved by the teams. It 
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was changed in 1991 to a team bonus (Berggren 1993, p.161). The direction seemed 
towards individual rewards: if there is a bonus, there has to be a standard.32 
After four years of operation, the Volvo board decided to close the plant be-
cause of the merger between Renault and Volvo (Sandberg, 1995, p. 4). Berggren 
(1990) went on to talk about a new kind of identity in industrial production.  The 
plant and its predecessor, and the model, the Volvo Kalmar plant, have been her-
alded worldwide as symbols of socio-technical design. Socio-technicians called 
Uddevalla the ”Copernican revolution” of car production, and ”the place, which 
resolves the future of industrial work” (Berggren, 1990). Since the unexpected 
closedown of the Uddevalla plant no corresponding example of socio-technical 
production has been reported. Nevertheless, the experiment gave convincing evi-
dence of the potential of socio-technical design.
6.7 Assessing change in generalizing
Trist and Bamforth’s coal-face study brought out problems that arose when the 
Taylorist system of generalizing was implemented in coalmining. Taylor created 
his system for production activities in a relatively established factory in which 
there was little variation in the object and conditions of work, and tasks became 
frequent enough to be standardized, while Trist and Bamforth highlighted the un-
predictability of the object of the actions. This variation was in contradiction with 
standardized work operations, causing problems that, according to the research-
ers, threatened the very existence of coalmining. 
Trist and Bamforth found that the solution was in the limited work entity of 
mass production. They identifi ed a composite work method in the ripper team’s 
work and made it a model. The same form of work organization was found in 
the coal mine, and later in other mines. The composite group method was largely 
reminiscent of the previous pre-mechanized form of work. The group used, ad-
opted and developed rule-of-thumb methods concerning the use of tools and the 
division of labor. These perceptual-functional processes of generalizing occurred 
and were handed down directly to other workers. The generalizations were pre-
served in the methods of collaboration, and in the language and movements of 
the team members who belonged to the work team and could not be transferred 
to other groups in the mine or to other mines. This limitation was one reason why 
these kinds of generalizations were not compatible with large industrial units,  in 
which transfer and externalization were necessary. 
32 Toikka (2003) noted that because modern cars comprise 50,000 parts, the need for setting 
standards is understandable.
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The focus of interest for Trist and Bamforth was not in how the composite 
group method was developed, but in the fact that there seemed to exist an alterna-
tive to Taylorist-Fordist work organization. The composite method stemmed from 
pre-mechanical coalmining  from the late craft period, and its establishment did 
not require any specifi c developmental method. In this sense, the use of the team 
did not resolve the contradiction between standardization and variation in the 
object of the work. It only softened it by limiting the standardization. The team 
structure made it possible for the team to extend the generalization of the previous 
production type. The socio-technical system of generalizing was thus a hybrid of 
the mass-production and craft-type systems.
The authors’ observations that the composite group method was more effec-
tive and entailed fewer social problems than conventional mass production inspired 
many researchers to conceptualize work in new ways. It was the job of the socio-
technicans to criticize mass-production work as a manifestation of a ”technical sys-
tem”, but they also rejected the human-relations view of work as only a social system. 
The solution was not only in the relationships between these two subsystems, but 
also in the open-system concept that explained production as interaction between 
the socio-technical system and the environment. The concept inspired much new 
research and developmental work.  The socio-technical movement could not offer 
a permanent practical alternative to Taylorism, but it did develop a way of solving 
some of the problems caused by the Taylorist system of generalization.
Following their pioneering studies, the socio-technicians created new systems 
of generalizing that were based on empirical generalizations of social or technical 
entities. These processes have not been embedded as an element of production 
practice, however, but they have been used as separate interventions concerning 
the division of labor and the rules in the organization. In green-fi eld factories, 
socio-technical design has been based on perceptual-functional generalizing.
We could consider the development of socio-technical practice an expansion 
of the STSD concept. Trist and Bamforth questioned some aspects of the Taylorist-
Fordist system of generalizing in mass production. They analyzed the problems 
of collaboration and found a hybrid form of mass production in which a limited 
group of workers could carry out and plan their own tasks. This could happen 
in conjunction with or apart from the specialist-driven Taylorist-Fordist system. 
Because the ”new” model was a mix of the traditional perceptual-functional and 
the new type of abstract-empirical systems, it expanded only partially in the form 
of semi-autonomous teams and experiments with socio-technical factories. It was 
substantiated in consideration of the workplace as an open socio-technical sys-
tem, and in the application of developmental methods stemming from research 
on concepts such as socio-technical and open systems. This led to the expansion 
and diversifi cation of the STSD developmental method.
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7 Post-war experiments in Toyota as 
the origin of generalizing in fl exible 
mass production
7.1 The rise of fl exible mass production
The downswing period of the motorization wave brought with it a questioning 
of the principles of mass production in Western countries. Mass production was 
no longer considered the only key to high economic growth. Mass and structural 
unemployment increased in circumstances of low growth. The oil crisis that trig-
gered the downswing began to threaten US dominance in world markets.
The automobile industry as the carrier branch of economic growth repre-
sented fundamental structural, technological, and cultural change in production 
(Freeman and Louçã, 2001, p. 298). Japanese automobile producers challenged 
the Fordist manufacturing system. According to Freeman and Louçã, from the 
shop fl oor workers to the top management they were accustomed to thinking in 
terms of the entire production process. The Japanese seemed to have the ability 
to redesign an entire production system in industries as diverse as shipbuilding, 
automobiles, and color television. 
During the upswing period of the long wave, the usual business cycle in the 
automobile industry consisted of two or three years of prosperity with, at most, 
six months of recession. In periods of slow growth, however, the boom lasted at 
most six months to one year, with the next two or three years showing little or no 
growth, or even negative growth. During the high-growth phase, the application 
of the principles of mass production meant that the cost of the automobile de-
creased in proportion to the increase in quantities produced. However, fi rms had 
to carry the costs of over-capacity during periods of slow growth. Japanese auto-
mobile producers managed to reverse this dominating model of car production: 
they were able to reduce the prices even though the volume of production did not 
increase (Ohno, 1988a, p. 2).
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Several studies (Fujimoto & Clark, 1991) have shown that the average perfor-
mance of Japanese automobile assemblers in the 1980s was signifi cantly higher 
than that of their North American counterparts in terms of assembly productivity, 
manufacturing quality, product development, lead time and overall productivity, 
and by 1989 Japan was producing more cars than the United States (Fujimoto & 
Tidd, 2002, p. 77). IMPV research conducted in 1988 (Womack, Jones & Roos, 
1990) questioned the generally accepted Western opinion about the superior ef-
fi ciency of mass production. Using simple numbers and thorough and valid meth-
ods, the authors showed how the Japanese automobile plants produced cars in half 
the time it took Western plants applying the mass-production method. Moreover, 
the Japanese manufacturers produced more model variations, and more reliable 
products according to the generally accepted quality measurements. The IMVP 
report showed that average assembly-plant productivity was 17 hours per vehicle 
in Japan, 25 hours in North America, and 35 hours in Europe. This development 
was not nation-related, but was the consequence of a new Japanese concept called 
fl exible mass production.
7.2 The Toyota Production System 
Historically the Toyota Production System (TPS) was the fi rst model of fl exible 
mass production and combined many industrial innovations introduced by the 
Toyota Motor Company in 1945 –1971. Some of these also developed into a new 
system of work-related generalizing in Toyota’s factories. 
The creator of the TPS, Taichi Ohno, maintained that Western mass produc-
tion was based on the idea that selling price = profi t + actual costs. This principle 
no longer applied during the downswing period, when the excess capacity in car 
production begun to suppress demand.
Our products are scrutinized by cool-headed consumers in free, competitive 
markets, where the manufacturing cost of a product is of value to the buyer. 
If a high price is set because of the manufacturer’s cost, consumers will simply 
turn away. Cost reduction must be the goal of consumer products manufactur-
ers trying to survive in today’s market place. During a period of high economic 
growth, any manufacturer can achieve lower costs with higher production. But 
in today’s low growth period any form of cost reduction is diffi cult. (Ohno, 
1988a, pp. 8–9)
In Western mass production the customers were understood to be the last link 
of the production chain. The product was fi rst designed, then manufactured and 
fi nally distributed. The Japanese production model challenged this ”push model”: 
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it was the customers who set the selling price of the product and who pulled the 
goods they needed. 
According to Ohno, the pull model of automobile production is based on two 
main principles: just-in-time and autonomation. Just-in-time means that in the 
fl ow of the production process, the parts needed in the assembly reach the assem-
bly line at the time they are needed and only in the specifi ed amount and quality. 
Production is programmed from downstream in order to introduce, step by step, 
only the items needed for producing products that have already been sold. Just-
in-time production involves a series of innovations in the preparation and feeding 
of the work, in the production logistics, and in the management of the fl ows and 
stocks of intermediate and semi-fi nished goods. The purpose is to produce only 
what the market demands (Ohno 1988a, pp. 28–29; Coriat, 2002, p. 218).
The other principle, autonomation, also called auto-activation, is not as well 
known as the just-in time principle. It is based on the prevention of defective pro-
duction with regard to both machines and management. Machines are equipped 
with devices and automatic systems that prevent the production of defective parts 
or products. They are designed so that the line worker’s actions only stop because 
of the emergence of an abnormal situation. Therefore the line worker has to con-
centrate on the one machine that needs attention when the other machines are 
working well and can therefore take responsibility for several machines. Moreover, 
there is a basic rule that any line worker should stop the line if he or she notices 
an abnormality in the process. Thus the responsibility for product quality is del-
egated to the shop-fl oor workers (Ohno 1988a, p. 6; Coriat, 2002, pp. 217–218). 
Taiichi Ohno points out that the key principle behind the Toyota Production 
System is the elimination of waste33, muda in Japanese. (Womack & Jones, 1996,). 
Muda consists of the things that are not needed in the work at all, which Ohno di-
vides into seven categories: waste in the form of overproduction, in waiting (time 
on hand), in transporting, in the processing itself (too much machining), in stock 
on hand (inventories), in movements, and in defective products. Waste is a human 
practice that absorbs resources but creates no value. It has to be defi ned, recog-
nized and eliminated. 
All kinds of waste occur when we try to produce the same product in large, ho-
mogenous quantities. In the end costs rise. It is much more economical to make 
each item one at a time. The former method is the Ford production system and 
the latter is the Toyota production system. (Ohno, 1988a, p. xiv)
33 The notion ‘muda’ was basically an extended version of the same notion used originally by Hen-
ry Ford. Ford paid attention to the waste of human labor and to the waste of salvaged material.
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According to Ohno (1988a, p. 19), if work is understood to consist of ”real pro-
ductive work” and ”waste”, the current capacity could be equated to the sum of 
the two parts: current capacity = work + waste. Under this reasoning, zero waste 
increases the percentage of work to one hundred and results in the most effective 
production. In making only the amount needed, manpower must be reduced to 
trim excess capacity and match the needed quantity. The elimination of waste re-
veals any excess of manpower. The idea is not to lay off line workers, however, but 
rather to emphasize the economic signifi cance of their part in the development of 
production, something that is nonexistent in traditional mass production.
Working means actually advancing the process toward completing the job. 
Workers must understand this. (Ohno, 1988a, p. 58)
The Toyota company wanted to adopt the method of mass production in its own 
way. Kiichiro Toyoda34, the managing director of Toyota, announced this goal as 
follows: 
We shall learn production techniques from the American method of mass pro-
duction. But we will not copy it as it is. We shall use our own research and 
creativity to develop a production method that suits to our country’s situation. 
(Ohno, 1988a, p. 91).
On the one hand, Japanese innovations such as autonomation and Just In Time, 
which were made in the Toyota plant during the pre-war era, spurred the Toyoda 
family on to believe that it was possible to catch up to the volumes of Western mass 
production in the post-war situation, while the post-war circumstances, on the 
other hand, forced the family to do so. Taiichi Ohno often referred to the saying 
”necessity is the mother of invention”. 
In the following section, I will analyze the birth of the Toyota Production Sys-
tem and the work-related system of generalizing it involved, and trace the devel-
opments that produced the need and offered the opportunity for a new form of 
generalizing.
7.3 Toyoda’s innovations during the pre-war era
The fi rst signifi cant attempts at automobile production in Japan were the knock-
down assembly operations run by Ford and GM in the mid-1920s. American cars 
and trucks dominated the Japanese market between 1925 and 1935. Ford and other 
34 The Toyota factory name stems from the owner-family name, but the ‘d’ was changed to ‘t’ in 
1937. I will use the appropriate forms. 
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American manufacturers planned to build new plants in Japan but they were pre-
vented from doing so by the Japanese government, which introduced the Automo-
bile Manufacturing Enterprise Act in 1936. This Act effectively subsidized licensed 
domestic companies producing trucks, while ousting the American subsidiaries 
from the Japanese market. Japanese producers virtually took over the domestic 
market, which then produced between 30,000 and 40,000 units per year. Attempts 
to directly transfer the Ford production system to Japan thus came to nothing 
(Fujimoto and Tidd, 2002, pp. 87–88).
The Toyoda Automatic Loom was fi rst used in engine research and prototyp-
ing in a small corner of the company facility around 1931. Kiichiro Toyoda started 
to develop the idea of reverse engineering in the production of the Smith motor, 
a small engine commonly used for motorcycles and three-wheelers, and came up 
with a prototype engine. His vision at this early stage was to develop an automo-
bile and to compete directly with the American models in both price and perfor-
mance. Toyoda started building a prototype plant in 1934, the same year that the 
fi rst prototype engine was completed. As for the body, Kiichiro decided to adopt 
the streamline design that was fashionable at that time (ibid., p. 89).
When Toyoda started its automobile production, its initial attempts were more 
or less patchwork imitations of American technologies in terms of both prod-
uct and process. As the user of the technologies Toyoda was active in combining 
them and adapting them to the Japanese conditions. The Kariya assembly plant 
was completed in 1936. Its capacity was quite small compared with the American 
standard. Kiichiro’s goal was to attain the same level of unit costs when producing 
20,000 to 30,000 units per year as the Americans achieved when producing several 
hundred thousand units per year. Thus Toyoda modifi ed the Ford production sys-
tem to small batch production (ibid., 2002, p. 90).
Under the new production system, a series number was given to every 10 vehi-
cles produced and these numbers were used to keep track of everything related to 
these vehicles right down to the parts from which they were assembled. The pro-
ducer could thus monitor the progress of manufacturing by checking the number 
assigned to the parts in each process at any given time. Each phase of manufactur-
ing was carried out in synchronization with the fi nal stage (Toyota: A history of 
the fi rst 50 Years, 1988, p. 72).
Since the overall effi ciency was not as good as expected, Kiichiro wrote the 
words ”Just-in-time” on a banner and hung it on the wall of the plant, because 
there was great variation between the different manufacturing processes. 
People talk about having missed a train just by a minute but of course it’s possi-
ble to miss a train just by a second. What I mean by ”just-in-time”, is not simply 
that it is important to do something on time, but that it is absolutely essential 
156
to be precise in terms of quantity and not, for example, produce something on 
time but in excess, since excess amounts to waste.” (Toyota: A history of the fi rst 
50 Years, 1988, p. 69)
Kiichiro Toyoda visited universities and research institutes in Tokyo in order to 
acquire new knowledge that could be utilized in shop-fl oor work. He also wrote 
memoranda to his staff requesting changes in materials or manufacturing meth-
ods. He wrote these memos one after another in order to instill his new ideas in 
the minds of administrators and supervisors. The new rules and work-procedure 
sheets he compiled around this time formed a ten-centimeter-high pile when col-
lected. They included standards and attitudes to be observed by each department 
and person in charge, and concerned issues from design, production and the pur-
chasing of parts to employee welfare, all covered in minute detail. (ibid., p. 69)
Toyota established the Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation in 1937. A 
new assembly plant, much bigger than the one at Kariya, was completed in Ko-
romo the following year. This was where the company continued to select pro-
duction technologies appropriate to its limited scale of production (Fujimoto and 
Tidd, 2002, p. 90). The fi rst attempts at Just-in-Time production thus took the 
form of ”memorandum development”. 
In was taken as read in mass production that the machines produced many 
defective parts. The other pillar of the Toyota Production System, auto-activation, 
incorporated the idea that machines should be designed so that they could distin-
guish between normal and abnormal conditions. This invention had already been 
made at the time when Toyota designed its weaving machines. The autonomated 
machine for textile production was designed so that the loom stopped instantly 
if any one of the warp or weft threads broke. This design principle was applied 
in Toyota’s automobile production in the prewar era, and later incorporated into 
production management.
While Toyota was trying to construct its own mass-production system in the 
pre-war era, the traditional craft system persisted in many of its in production 
processes35. In an interview the production manager Taiichi Ohno suggested that 
craft skills were needed, but at the same time they prevented the adoption of mass-
production methods.
35 The Kariya plant was run under a contract system in which wages were determined on the 
basis of turnover for each work process. It was not possible to completely to apply JIT in practice 
because of the unevenness of the processes. The wage system was modifi ed in the new Koromo 
plant to support the JIT production principle. (A History of the fi rst 50 years, 1988, p. 71)
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Many elements of craft production persisted, and craft skills were required in 
job shop environments. Workers machined a variety of parts, while sharpening 
their own cutting tools. Process fl ows were often disturbed, work-in-process 
inventories piled up, and lack of balance in machine utilization occurred. (Fu-
jimoto & Tidd, 2002, p. 90)
Traditional craftsmanship and its ways of generalizing persisted in many plant 
operations.
There was a team of fi ve workers for each hammer machine: one for heating, 
one for rough hammering, two for shaping, and one for fi nishing. One in the 
hammer was called ”bo-shin”, who led the team as master and was responsible 
for production volume and quality. It was said that it would take three years to 
master heating and fi ve years to master hammering. Craftsmanship of the forg-
ing workers was remarkable. (ibid., pp. 90–91)
There were three big chains of events in Toyota car production: the process of 
creating mass production in the pre-war era, the process of creating small-batch 
production, and the process of transformation from craft to a new type of pro-
duction. The Second World War dramatically interrupted all these processes: the 
Koromo plant was bombed, for example. After the War the company had to be 
rebuilt from the ruins (Toyoda, 1987, p. 59).
7.4 The contradictions in production and their fi rst solutions
Post-War crisis
After the Second World War Kiichiro Toyoda introduced an ambitious three-year 
plan for catching up with America in the production of cars because, in his view, 
the Japanese automobile industry would not otherwise survive (Ohno, 1988a, 
p. 3).
Toyota’s production volumes were very small, however, its output in 1950 be-
ing only 2,685 cars. In the same year the world’s most effective Ford factory on 
the River Rouge in Detroit produced 7,000 cars a day. Toyota’s leaders carefully 
studied the production method used in Rouge. Given the small size and unprofi t-
ability of the domestic market the company had to look elsewhere. Moreover, the 
competitive situation in the domestic markets intensifi ed because huge foreign 
vehicle producers were anxious to establish plants in Japan. The Japanese govern-
ment issued a prohibition order on direct foreign investment in the Japanese mo-
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tor industry, however, which was a critical development in gaining a foothold in 
automobile production. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try put forward a series of plans to merge Japan’s twelve embryonic car companies 
into a Japanese conglomerate that could battle with the large American factories. 
The Ministry’s plan was based on mass production. Kiichiro Toyoda’s purpose, 
however, was to produce ”inexpensive high-quality automobiles, which were able 
to compete with those of top world companies” (Ohno, 1988a, p. 96). The catch-
up goal seemed to be impossible for two reasons. Surviving in the domestic car 
market was impossible because of the superiority of foreign mass producers, and 
because, in the long run, the domestic markets were too tiny. The possibility of 
producing cars for export also seemed weak because Toyota did not have modern 
mass-production machines or the money to invest in them. The company had to 
use the few mass-production tools it had and its craft equipment (Ohno, 1988b; 
Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990).
The ”raw material” was a further problem.  Car production involves manufac-
turing and assembling thousands of parts.  In the post-war situation the suppliers 
were not able to deliver the parts on time, which meant that the entire assembly 
plant might be idle for 20 days, waiting for parts to arrive. The assembly work was 
then done during the remaining 10 days. (History of Toyota, 141–142) Ohno also 
recalls that, after the Second World War, the increased number of orders because 
of the Korean War lead to a shortage of everything from raw materials to parts. 
Suppliers were also short of equipment and manpower, and assembly work was 
continuously delayed.
For this reason we could not do the assembly during the half of the month. We 
were forced to gather the parts that were arriving intermittently and irregularly 
and do the assembly work at the end of the month. (Ohno 1988a, p. 12)
The Toyota Company almost went bankrupt in the post-war years. The founding 
family proposed laying off a quarter of the workers, which led to a bitter labor 
dispute that lasted over two months. After protracted negotiations, the family and 
the union worked out a compromise. Twenty-fi ve percent of the workforce was 
laid off as the Toyoda family had proposed, but Kiichiro Toyoda resigned as presi-
dent in accepting  responsibility for the company’s failure, and the remaining em-
ployees received two important guarantees: lifetime employment and pay that was 
steeply graded according to seniority rather than to standardized job functions 
(Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990, p. 53–54). In Ohno’s opinion, the crisis taught 
the company that production increases and cost reductions had to be carried out 
within the small-lot production concept.
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We got a lesson from the crisis that productivity increase and cost reduction 
had to be accompanied by ”limited volume production”, which meant that we 
had to produce just enough to sell and just when we could sell. We learned that 
productivity increase for the sake of itself was no good, and that we should not 
simply imitate the American style mass production. (Fujimoto and Tidd, 1988, 
p. 91)
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990, p. 54) maintain that the Toyoda family adopted 
a novel approach to its workforce because of the agreement. They considered the 
workforce a fi xed cost – an even more signifi cant one than the company’s machin-
ery. The job contract ran from the time the new worker entered the company until 
he or she reached retirement.  It thus made sense to continuously enhance the 
workers’ skills and to gain the benefi t of their knowledge and experience. 
This history shows that behind the crisis were signifi cant developmental con-
tradictions that led the company to develop innovations that together formed the 
Toyota Production System.  The new system gradually replaced the late craft-type 
of production.
The fi rst contradiction was the huge gap between the production volumes 
that were necessary for the survival of the company and the prevailing volumes. 
The need for large volumes of production did not refl ect unrealistic management 
hopes, but was rather indicative of the economic conditions of survival. The pro-
duction of automobiles only for domestic markets was economically unprofi table, 
but on the other hand, the requirements set by foreign markets were extremely 
diffi cult to meet. The company would only survive by sharply increasing production 
to make automobiles available to the masses, but it only had capacity for small-lot 
production. 
The solution was surprising. The company decided to increase its small-lot 
production, which entailed assembling various car models on the same line in 
small batches. The batches were made as small as possible, in contrast to traditional 
mass production. This kind of technique had not been tried before, and its pur-
poseful development in Toyota soon began to produce new results.
The Toyota system was a response to the particular need in Japan to produce a 
small quantity of each number of models; following this, it developed into veri-
table system of production. On account of its origin, this system is particularly 
effi cient in conditions of diversifi cation. (Ohno, 1988b, p. 49)
Moreover, to the extent that consumer tastes become more diverse, more in-
dividualized and clients themselves more demanding…it became more and 
more urgent to develop production methods which allowed the individual fac-
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tory production of unique goods (…) accepting that (…) it is clear that mass 
production programming, i.e. the Ford system, cannot achieve this objective. 
(Ohno & Mito, 1988 p. 17)
During the fi rst fi ve years of post-war restoration, Toyota was forced to increase 
productivity without having suffi cient funds or equipment. No new machines 
could be bought. The usual method of transforming craft-based industry to mass 
production was to install mass-production machines, but  the company had to 
experiment with other methods. The second contradiction was between the demand 
for high productivity and the need to use traditional small-lot production machines 
and craft methods.
Because it was not feasible to invest in machines, the only possibility was to 
focus on ”soft” production methods such as standardization, changes in layout, 
job assignment, and investment in relatively inexpensive jigs (Fujimoto & Tidd, 
2002). 
The third contradiction was between the need to increase productivity on the 
assembly line and the irregular and haphazard activity of the suppliers. The main 
problem was how to increase productivity in a situation in which the suppliers’ 
and the assembler’s activities did not match. The implementation of the Kanban 
information system, beginning with the Kanban card, solved the problem.
The Kanban system, which became the most important tool in JIT production, 
also gradually developed through experimentation. The results of the experiments 
often surprised the workers as well as the managers. Ohno describes how he solved 
problems related to the Kanban system. 
There was no manual and we could fi nd out only what would happen only by 
trying. Tension increased daily as we tried and corrected and then tried and 
corrected again. Repeating this, I expanded the system of pickup by the later 
process within the company. (Ohno, 1988a, p. 32)
7.5 Building a system of generalizing to support the small-batch mass-
production system
The Two phases of the Toyota Production System
The general solutions to the Toyota production contradictions comprised the de-
velopment of the small-lot production system, the use of ”soft” methods in order 
to increase quality and productivity, and the creation of the Kanban information 
system. In this section I will trace the two phases in the development of the Toyota 
Production System. The fi rst phase consisted of developing ”all-out production” 
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by training the workers gradually to perform new kinds of operations and tasks, 
the objects of which were quite different from those in traditional mass produc-
tion. The second phase was one of refi ning processes of generalizing that were car-
ried out in the implementation of Total Quality Management 1961–1970. 
Extensive and successful experiments were carried out in 1945–60 in the form 
of multi-skilling the line workers, standardizing the tasks on the shop fl oor, using 
the suggestion system, developing team collaboration, using the Kanban card and 
visual process-control tools, and exploring the causes of the problems in small-
batch production. 
I will show how the successful results of these experiments made it possible 
to systematically apply processes of generalizing in order to improve and control 
small-batch processes. The system that was built in 1961–1970 followed the well-
known pattern of the Deming cycle: plan – do – act – check. It involved identify-
inga some deviation from the process as a problem, assessing the current situation, 
analyzing it, implementing and establishing corrective measures, evaluating the 
results, standardizing the method in order to prevent further recurrence, and fol-
low-up and consideration of the remaining problems.
Developing multi-skilled operators 
From the very start of automobile production in Toyota, the machines were 
equipped with devices and ”baka-yoke” fool-proof systems to prevent the manu-
facture of defective products. Because of these technological advances, the respon-
sibilities of the workers expanded to cover the many machines and processes that 
were part of the entire production fl ow. Traditional craft jobs were replaced by 
multi-task jobs. Multi-skilled workers were all-round players who did everything 
related to their trade regardless of the phase of the process or the work standards. 
Multi-skilling among line workers began in the pre war era.
Rearranging machines on the fl oor to establish a production fl ow eliminated 
waste of storing parts. It also helped us achieve the ”one operator, many pro-
cesses” system and increased production effi ciency two and three times. (Ohno, 
1988b, p. 14)
Ohno relates how the transition from a single- to a multi-skilled operator went 
relatively smoothly, although ”there was some resistance from the craftsmen”. The 
impact of multi-skilling on productivity was obvious. 
For example, there were three or four workers around one machine, particu-
larly when it was an important one, prior to the war. So simply assigning one 
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worker to one machine increased productivity by three, four times. Workers 
with craftsmen’s mentality resisted such measures, but labor saving was rela-
tively easy as the turnover ratio was very high at that time. (ibid.,15 )
Comparing the standards to the actual work performance
The shift from craft production to Taylor-type standardization progressed in the 
late 1940s at Toyota’s machine shops despite some resistance from traditional craft 
workers. Taiichi Ohno recalls the situation when he was made section head of the 
machine shop in 1946.
The fi rst thing that I did was standardization of jobs. The shop fl oor of those 
days was controlled by foremen-craftsmen. Division managers and section 
managers could not control the shop fl oor, and they were always making ex-
cuses for production delay. So we fi rst made manuals of standard operation 
procedures and posted them above the workstations so that supervisors could 
see if the workers were following the standard operations at a glance. Also, I 
told the shop fl oor people to revise the standard operating procedures continu-
ously, saying, ”You are stealing money from the company if you do not change 
the standard for a month”. (Fujimoto and Tidd, 2002, p. 92)
It should be remembered that work standardization at Toyota was accompanied 
from the very beginning by continuous improvement in standards by the line 
workers. Thus the standardization under Ohno resulted in continuous improve-
ment at the shop-fl oor level, which was not the case with Fordism, when work 
standardization tended to mean the freezing of standard operations.
It seems that the production engineers at Toyota fi rst carried out a Taylorist 
analysis in terms of a) defi ning the task, b) measuring the variation of movements, 
c) comparing the movements in order to create the standard, d) testing the stan-
dard, and e) teaching the standard. It was then the task of workers to compare the 
standard with the job, and change it if necessary.  The workers themselves began 
to compare their work operations to those defi ned in the standards. This was a 
turn away from Taylorist to a new ”Ohno type” of standardizing. Given the lack of 
detailed descriptions of the tools used in the improvement of standards, we have 
to assume that such improvement was based on these actions of comparison. An-
other major deviation from Taylor’s model was that no standard work sheets were 
made for individual line workers. 
The line workers were taught to carry out several tasks, which were inter-
changeable within one team. This meant that the productive actions, which were 
transferable from one line worker to another, became important objects of stan-
dardization (Coriat 2002, p. 221).
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For a production person to be able to write a standard work sheet that other 
workers can understand, he or she must be convinced of its importance.  
Making suggestions
As a result of the visit to Ford’s River Rouge Factory, Toyota adopted the Fordian 
suggestion system, under which individual workers could make suggestions for im-
provements in various technical and organizational areas. Ford’s suggestion sys-
tem has been criticized (Monden, 1983; Imai 1986) in that the real purpose was to 
do with labor management and not improvement. According to these interpreta-
tions, it was a system aimed at giving the line worker the sense that he was more 
important to the company than he really was.
Kiichiro Toyoda recognized the suggestion system as a competitive weapon: ”In 
order to survive in the competition with foreign automobiles in future, we have 
to reduce manufacturing costs by making use of our suggestions.” The purpose 
of Toyota’s Suggestion System was expressed in the slogan ”Good Products, good 
ideas”. The aim was to improve quality reduce the costs, and also to systematize 
spontaneous on-site suggestions, which had been a tradition since the company’s 
pre war era. The employees were encouraged not only as individuals, but also in 
teams and later in Quality Control Circles, to make improvement suggestions and 
also to implement them (A History of the fi rst 50 years, 1988, p.114; Monden 
1983, p. 126). 
From the speeding up of set-up times to collaboration on the shop fl oor
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, p. 51–55) give a good example of how the suc-
cessful process of rearranging the set-up time of die presses was an innovation 
that made it both possible and necessary for workers to identify problems and 
collaborate in order to improve the quality of the product.
In those times car manufacture started with a large roll of sheet steel. The work-
ers ran this sheet through an automated ”blanking” press to produce and stack fl at 
blanks that were slightly larger than the fi nal part they wanted. They then inserted 
the blanks in massive stamping presses containing matched upper and lower dies. 
The huge and expensive press lines used in mass production were designed to 
make a million or more of a given part in a year. Die changes typically required a 
full day from the production of the last part with the old dies to the fi rst acceptable 
part from the new ones. Western manufacturers found that they could dedicate a 
set of presses to a specifi c part and stamp these parts for months, or even years, 
without changing dies. Toyota’s production was a few thousand vehicles a year, 
however. 
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Ohno’s idea was to develop simple die-change techniques and to change them 
frequently using rollers to move them in and out of position and simple adjust-
ment mechanisms. Because the new techniques were easy to master and produc-
tion workers were idle during the die changes, Ohno hit upon the idea of letting 
the production workers also change the dies. Engineers did this work in Western 
mass production. 
From the late 1940s Ohno experimented endlessly with his technique for mak-
ing quick changes. By the late 1960s he had reduced the time required to change dies 
from one day to an astonishing three minutes, and had eliminated the need for die-
change specialists. In the process he made an unexpected discovery – it actually cost 
less per part to make small batches of stampings than to run off enormous lots. The 
consequences of this discovery were enormous. It made the workers in the stamping 
shop much more concerned about quality. It also effectively prevented the produc-
tion of defective parts, which were usually discovered long after their manufacture 
and had to be repaired at great expense, or even discarded. (ibid., p. 53)
To make this system work Ohno needed extremely skilled workers. If they 
failed to identify problems and did not take the initiative to devise solutions, the 
work of the whole factory could easily come to a halt. Holding back knowledge, a 
generally recognized feature of traditional mass production, would swiftly lead to 
disaster in the factory. This was the origin of worker collaboration in preventing 
production disturbances. 
Using the Kanban card 
Pondering upon the contradiction between the need to increase productivity in 
the fi nal production line and the haphazard activity of suppliers, Taichi Ohno 
turned to the American supermarket: 
A supermarket is where a customer can get (1) what is needed, (2) at the time 
needed, (3) in the amount needed. Sometimes of course, a customer may buy 
more than he or she needs. In principle however, the supermarket is a place 
where we buy according to need. Supermarket operators, therefore, must make 
certain that they can buy what they need at any time. (Ohno, 1988a, pp. 26)
Ohno (1988a, pp. 26–27) explained how the later process (customer) went to the 
earlier process (supermarket) to acquire the required parts (commodities) at the 
time and in the quantity needed. The earlier process immediately produced the 
quantity just taken (restocking the shelves). In automobile production this would 
mean that the downstream station had to come upstream to pick up just enough 
parts, whereas the latter would produce just enough to replenish what was taken 
by the former. He called the system he devised to link the upstream and the down-
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stream by using standardized returnable containers and reusable slips the Kanban 
system.
The Kanban system was adopted in the machine shop around 1953. To make 
it work Ohno produced pieces of paper listing the relevant part number of a piece 
and another and other information related to machining work. 
If a supermarket had its own production plant nearby, there would be the pro-
duction Kanban in addition to the withdrawal Kanban between the store and 
the production department. From the direction of this Kanban the produc-
tion department would produce the number of commodities picked up. (ibid. 
p. 28)
Ohno realized that all the movements in the factory could be unifi ed and system-
atized with the help of the Kanban. 
We felt that if this system were used skillfully, all movements in the plant could 
be unifi ed or systematized. After all, one piece of paper provided at a glance 
the following information: production quantity, time, method, sequence or 
transfer quantity, transfer time, destination, storage point, transfer equipment, 
container. (ibid., p. 28)
The economic signifi cance of the Kanban became important. 
It is not an overstatement to say that Kanban controls the fl ows of goods at 
Toyota. It controls the production of a company exceeding $4.8 billion a year. 
(ibid., p. 29)
The invention and use of Kanban meant fi ve things. First, the information about 
variations in markets and customers was delivered directly to the shop fl oor work-
ers, suppliers and subcontractors. Second, Kanban cards carried the information 
in the form of signs, numbers and words, not as tools. The signs did not directly 
affect on an article moving on the assembly line as machines or tools did. The 
generalizations fi xed in the signs were addressed by one person to another.  Third, 
this information affected every operation and all operators in the factory. The 
other side of the coin was that the use of the Kanban connected all operations 
carried out by the line workers to the logic of this kind of production fl ow.  In 
conventional mass production only the top of the hierarchy reacted to the market 
situation, whereas the Kanban brought the knowledge directly from the custom-
ers to the producers. Fourth, Kanban information was also changing information. 
The knowledge it carried became part of the work team’s problem-solving process 
166
in managing the variations within the small batches. Fifth, the use of the Kanban 
clarifi ed the role of managers and supervisors in the production. It immediately 
highlighted fl ow problems, thus facilitating their study and resolution. 
Kanban cards became a new kind of tool for shop-fl oor workers. They medi-
ated the generalized operations of managing the variation within the small-batch 
production process.
Using Andon as a visual tool 
Andon is a line-stop indicator that hangs above the production line. It was in-
vented as a tool for ensuring the economic fl ow of production. When operations 
are normal the green light is on. When a worker wants to adjust something on the 
line and calls for help, he turns on a yellow light. If a line stop is needed to rectify 
a problem, the red light is turned on. The workers were told that, in order to thor-
oughly eliminate abnormalities, they should not be afraid to stop the line. (Ohno 
1988, p. 121)
Andon was developed according to the auto-activation principle originally 
used in the design of machines. It was based on the idea that it was economically 
more profi table to stop the line in cases of defects than to keep it moving. It is also 
a way of handling single disturbances openly. These kinds of decisions belong to 
the line managers in conventional mass production. A further use of the andon 
was to enable the other workers to see the condition of the line. In this sense, it 
mediated a generalized operation that affected the entire production fl ow.
The ”fi ve whys” 
It was also the job of the team to question the root cause of the process deviation 
they had identifi ed, and to keep questioning it until a solution had been found and 
a new standard created. The entire procedure used in TPS revolved around repeat-
ing the question ”Why” fi ve times. Ohno characterized this method as a scientifi c 
approach: by asking ”Why” fi ve times and answering it each time we can get to the 
real cause of the problem, which is often hidden behind more obvious symptoms. 
He gives (1988, p. 17) an example:
1. Why did this machine stop?
There was an overload and the fuse blew.
2. Why was there an overload?
The bearing was not suffi ciently lubricated.
3 Why was it not lubricated suffi ciently?
The lubrication pump was not pumping suffi ciently.
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4. Why was it not pumping suffi ciently?
The shaft of the pump was worn out.
5. Why was the shaft worn out?
There was no strainer attached and metal scrap got in.
The team could use the procedure in order to fi nd the fi nal solution: attaching a 
strainer to the lubricating pump. 
Developing the Quality Control Circle 
With the minimizing of inventories through JIT and the Kanban system, the dis-
turbances were more commonly within and between the production processes: the 
nature of the production process changed radically. Although the Kanban made 
JIT production processes possible, it not only controlled the level it also began to 
stimulate the workers to sort out the disturbances. Moreover, problems to do with 
speeding up the set-up times and discussing the defects were not resolved at one 
go, but without their resolution normal working on the shop fl oor was almost 
impossible. (Monden, 1983, pp. 130–131)
Ohno grouped the workers at the work stations into teams, which had a team 
leader rather than a foreman. The team’s responsibility was to carry out a set of 
assembly steps that belonged to their own piece of the line.  The processes and the 
junctions of the processes became the object of these effective work units. (Womack, 
Jones & Roos, 1990, p. 54; Ohno, 1988, pp. 23–26). 
Toyota decided to adopt the system of Total Quality Control in 1961, and drew 
up a master plan. The implementation took three years under the guidance of two 
authorities on quality control, Professor Kaoru Ishikawa and Tetisuichi Asaka. 
Quality-control circles (QCC) were unoffi cial parts of the organization and 
were closely interlinked with the offi cial parts: the members of the group consisted 
of workers from the same work station. The circles were also administratively in-
dependent. The members decided themselves on the subject matter they wanted 
to handle, the courses of action they wanted to take and on their leader, a coach, 
who had his own responsibilities to the QCC, including record keeping. The line 
manager or the initiative committee had to process the initiatives of the circles 
within three weeks. In the decision was positive, the work team could put the im-
provements into practice immediately. If the process led to a negative decision, 
the decision maker had to give reasons to the circle. The main aim of circles was 
to formulate and continuously improve the standards, which was also the task of 
administrative and technical staff.
Ishikawa (1985; 1990) lists the fundamental ideas behind QCCs as follows: 
self-development, voluntarism, group activity, participation by all employees, uti-
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lization of QC techniques, activities closely connected with the workplace, vitality 
and continuity in QC activities, mutual development, originality and creativity, 
awareness of quality, problems and improvement.  Improvements in production 
fl ow were carried out through the stepwise problem-resolution procedure36 (Ishi-
kawa 1985, p. 147). The QCC had to address a number of issues: each one had to 
select its own theme independently, and then engage in the task of solving prob-
lems attached to it. 
There were four phases in the improvement process adopted by QCC: Plan-
Do-Check-Action. ”Plan” means planning improvements in current practices by 
using statistical tools; ”Do” means the application of the plan; ”Check” means see-
ing if the application of the plan results in the desired improvement; and ”Action” 
means preventing recurrence and institutionalizing the improvement as a new 
practice to be improved. The precondition for this kind of process is that all of the 
operations of the workstation are standardized. (Imai, 1986, pp. 62–63)
The problem solving in the planning phase consisted of four steps. The fi rst 
three were to defi ne the problem, identify the causes, and plan counter-measures. 
Brainstorming sessions or group discussion were used in defi ning the problem, 
which in practice was based on observation by the members of the workstation of 
their work process. Statistical tools, check sheets, paretograms, histograms and log 
booking were used for the data collection in the fourth step. Both statistical and 
qualitative instruments were used. 
The QCC identifi ed the most serious failures using statistical pareto-analysis. 
The most effective instrument for qualitative analysis is the fi sh-bone method, 
which is helpful in understanding the causal relations in the production process, 
and also in identifying problems (Ishikawa 1991, p. 42).
36 1) Deciding on a theme 2) Clarifying the reasons this particular theme was chosen 3) As-
sessing the present situation 4) Analysis of the causes 5) Establishing corrective measures and 
implementing them 5) Evaluating the results 7 ) Standardization, and prevention of recurrence 
of deviations 8)After-thought and refl ection, consideration of remaining problems 9) Planning 
for the future.
Figure 7.1 The fi sh-bone diagram (Ishikawa, 1991, p. 42)
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The process can be continued by analyzing the variation and elaborating on the 
data.  Special methods are also used for making corrective steps and for stratifi ca-
tion. Experiments with new arrangements are evaluated by means of before-and-
after comparisons. The results of the improvement processes typically involve the 
adoption of a new standard or of rules that might prevent the recurrence of the 
failure. The QCC also evaluates the results of this research process and considers 
possible new problems. Perhaps its most interesting feature is the linking of the 
quantitative or, let us say, graphical, presentation of cause-effect relations by sta-
tistical means.
7.6 Assessing change in generalizing
The Toyota Production System was developed with a view to resolving the contra-
diction that arose in the implementation of Taylorist-Fordist mass production in a 
long series in a situation in which the only possibility was to produce a number of 
different products. Flexible mass production of small batches replaced push-type 
line production with pull-type order delivery.
Three concepts were developed to master this new production type, carrying 
the generalizations that characterized the post-world-war period of 1945–1961: 
Just In Time and Autonomation described the new production type, and Waste 
referred to the methods that were used in making these principles concrete. 
Special tools that were developed to support the new type of production, such 
as the L-type production line, the development of special equipment including 
the die press, and the invention of production-control tools such as Kanban and 
Andon, are examples of the outcomes of this production design. They were arti-
facts that carried generalized operations and made the mass production of small 
batches possible. They were also outcomes of processes of generalizing that were 
based on many experiments and new kinds of planning. Their realisation would 
not have been possible without the development of teamwork structures and qual-
ity-improvement initiatives, and the use of multi-skilled workers. The use and 
design of production-control tools changed the process of generalizing, and the 
role of the planners and workers involved. The workers had to be able to use these 
tools and to collaborate in a new way, and the planners had to master the two-way 
information traffi c in the order-delivery chain.
The standardization that was effected by the workers and the search for the 
root cause of production mistakes were the fi rst representations that were used in 
the processes of generalizing. They were of help when the workers in the worksta-
tions began to form teams to solve the problems in the processes that comprised 
their own tasks and possibly also other processes on the production line. The 
workers’ own standardizing was a logical extension of the planners’ standardizing 
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task, and involved continuous ”restandardizing” as opposed to the stabilizing of 
the Taylorist-Fordist system. The workers’ and planners’ processes of generalizing 
changed, as did their mutual division of labor. 
After 1961 the advent of the quality circle and related tools enabled the confi r-
mation and spreading of the new system of generalizing. The actions consisted of 
a research process in which the variation in the process and tasks of a workstation 
were continuously compared with each other and with the norms, or the previous 
results of the process of generalizing. 
In sum, it could be said that the change from standardized to fl exible mass 
production followed the logic of expansive transformation, which also entailed 
the transformation of the distributed system of generalizing. The direct imple-
mentation of the Fordist-Taylorist system of mass production, which was based on 
long series, was more diffi cult in the post-war situation. Ohno with his assistants 
questioned the direct implementation and analyzed the reasons behind these dif-
fi culties in trying to combine traditional small-batch production with mass pro-
duction. Using the supermarket metaphor as a springboard he succeeded in mod-
elling the new pull-type of production system in which the object of the new kind 
of generalizing was the order-delivery chain. The production was a certain type of 
two-way information traffi c. The model was a combination of Taylorist-Fordist 
mass production, Total Quality Management, and new local innovations and prin-
ciples such as JIT, autonomation and Muda as used in Toyota. The implementation 
of the model took over ten years and became known as the Toyota Production 
System.  The concept, later termed fl exible mass production, lean production and 
process enhancement, came into general use in automobile manufacturing and in 
many other areas. The system of generalizing that was needed was quite different 
from that in Taylorist-Fordist mass production.
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8 The concept of a distributed system 
of generalizing
8.1 Elements of the system
In this chapter I present my theoretical conclusions from the analyses of these 
cases, thereby addressing my second research question concerning the general 
structure and dynamics of the dominant forms of learning in and for production 
that preceded the ICT revolution.  
According to the theories of the historical development of production dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, changes in forms of learning are part of the overall changes 
in forms of production. According to Marx (1973, p. 705), labor processes become 
increasingly interdependent in their historical development, in other words they 
become progressively socialized as they come increasingly to embody capabilities 
developed in the broader society rather than only those that emerge from private 
experience and the local context. This process of socialization is realized through 
a deepening of the social division of labor and the development of increasingly 
complex relationships of exchange and interdependence between occupations, 
organizations, industries and regions (Adler 2002).  It concerns not only the la-
bor process proper, but also the learning related to it. This means that learning 
processes also become mode widely distributed and dependent on ”capabilities 
developed in the broader society rather than only those that emerge from private 
experience and the local context”. 
In this chapter I will summarize my analyses of the three transformations of 
distributed systems of generalizing by viewing them as qualitatively specifi c aspects 
of the labor-socialization process. I will show in detail how the elements of the system 
of generalizing have changed in the transformations of production discussed.
I suggested in Chapter 4 that learning could be understood as a process of 
adopting, creating and changing practice-relevant generalizations. I identifi ed fi ve 
elements of the process of generalizing that explain learning in and for production: 
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1) the initial generalization that defi nes the object of attention and the ”sameness” 
in variation, 2) the variation within the object of attention that is used to reach 
a generalization, 3) the process of generalizing, and 4) the type of memory that 
preserves the generalization. The analysis revealed that generalization is always a 
social process in a community. Although an actor may produce the initial idea, the 
generalization is a product of social exchange. Thus the agent and the community 
of generalizing have to be seen as the fi fth and sixth elements of the system.
Studies concerning historical types of generalization have shown that it is not 
only the content but also the form that varies. This led me to add the dimension 
of the nature of the produced generalizations as the seventh element of the dis-
tributed system. The analysis of Taylor’s system in Chapter 5 revealed the specifi c 
form of the distribution of parts of the process in mass production. Therefore 
the division of labor and the forms and rules of exchange have to be added as the 
eighth and ninth elements.
I will now elaborate on this concept of a distributed system of generalizing on 
the basis of my analysis of the cases. This will help me to localize the reason for and 
the nature of the changes.  
All of the three transformations I have analyzed concern variants of industrial 
production. In each case, the context of the distributed system of generalizing was 
a production activity carried out by a group of actors operating machinery and 
specializing in some functions within the overall production process. In each case 
a new distributed system of generalizing was created. I will now describe each sys-
tem in terms of the specifi c features of the basic elements described above.
8.2 Three systems for generating production-relevant generalizations 
The Taylor system
The further socialization of the labor process in late craft-type production took 
place mainly through mechanization, in other words by developing and bringing 
new mechanical machines to factories to carry out specifi c functions within the 
production process. Up until Taylor’s, time this form of socialization was still slow 
and uneven. The introduction of new machines nevertheless required new oc-
cupational groups to use them and also demonstrated the speed with which they 
made it possible to produce industrial products. Nevertheless, only some of the 
functions within the production process could be mechanized, and many still had 
to be carried out manually. The mechanization-based further socialization of the 
labor process led to a deepening of the division of labor and further specialization 
within the factory. 
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Before Taylor’s work, the form of producing practice-relevant generalizations 
was based on experiential learning within occupational groups and ”gangs” that 
created rough, situation-bound generalizations on the basis of their accumulat-
ed historical experience.  These generalizations were preserved as verbal rules of 
thumb, as some individually developed improvements to machines and tools, as 
well as in specifi c forms of co-operation and work practices. The crucial limitation 
of this type of generalization was that it could only be transferred from one work 
group or one individual worker to another in the actual work context. 
The enormous growth in production capacity through the introduction of me-
chanical machines at the beginning of the 1900s collided with this limitation in the 
form of learning in and for production. This collision triggered the development 
of a new form of organization based on standardized work-task instructions and 
standards: the production-relevant generalizations were no longer created within 
the occupational group, but were produced though a specifi c process of measure-
ment, analysis and design by the planners in the planning offi ce. This new form of 
production was further developed as the transfer of work objects was mechanized 
through the use of the conveyor belt. 
The unit and the object of generalization in this system was a task within the 
production chain. The variation that made the generalizing possible was in the 
ways in which different workers carried out the same task, and the method was 
based on a comparison of the empirically devised different ”work methods” of 
various workers through the measurement of time spent on the task. This method 
of reaching a generalization concerning the optimal way of performing the task 
comprised two main processes. The fi rst was the ”time and motion study” analysis 
of the variation in performance of the task and the formation of a standard time 
and method: the planners applied representation methods generally used in me-
chanical design. The second process involved teaching the standard to workers and 
controlling how it was carried out. 
The ”general”, or ”the generalization”, that was reached was the norm time and 
the optimal way of doing the task. This type of empirical generalization was valid 
on condition that the object of the task and the tools used in performing it did 
not vary to the extent that the optimality of the work method would be lost. The 
system also implied that the optimum was the same for all persons who were suit-
able for the task. Neither did the generalization allow any variation in the division 
of labor, or any collaboration between workers. Every change in the material to be 
handled, the objective of or the tools used in performing the task, or in the organi-
zation beyond the limits of the standard, required a new process of generalizing in 
order to establish the optimum performance in this new condition. 
The generalization was preserved in the work standard that was a description 
of the optimal way of performing the task and the norm time that could be used 
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for performing it. The planning offi cer and other offi cials were the main agents in 
producing the generalizations, although the process required co-operation from 
the workers within the rules set by the planners.  Taylor proposed a functional 
division of labor between the planners. Of course, the generalizations had practi-
cal value only in so far as the workers applied them. Thus the workers were an 
important element in the system.  
As the coal-mine study and the developments in the Toyota car production 
illustrated, engineers applying the Taylor system met conditions in which its re-
quirements were not met, and which they had to modify by creating of alternative 
production-relevant generalizations. 
The Socio-Technical System
Trist and Bamforth studied the change of the labor process in the coal mine fol-
lowing the application of mechanical technology to a late-craft type of production 
process. The pre-mechanized means of production used by work groups in the 
mine were replaced with electric coalmining machines and conveyors operated 
continuously by shifts of workers according to the Taylor system. Trist and Bam-
forth’s study showed that the new system of generalizing was in contradiction with 
the unpredictable nature of the object of the coalmining activity. In their search 
for a solution to this contradiction they found one work team applying the ”all-in” 
method, which they thought might provide it.
The analysis of the work of that team led the researchers to redefi ne the unit and 
object of generalizing within the production process.  Individual work tasks were 
replaced by a broader task within the production chain that was given to a team. 
The work team could handle the unpredictable variation in the object and condi-
tions of its work. The system of generalizing was divided into two subsystems. The 
production process as a whole and the frame of the teams’ activities were designed 
applying the general principles of the technical design of production processes. 
However, within the limits and objectives set by the production management, the 
team was expected to apply the traditional method of experience-based percep-
tual functional generalizing.  The ”general” that the planners reached were norms 
concerning the relationships between parts of the production process, which were 
preserved as the tasks of teams. The generalizations the teams themselves reached 
were situated action patterns corresponding to different objects and conditions 
of work that were preserved in their habits, gestures and language. This type of 
perceptual-functional generalization was produced and handed down only within 
the framework of the team’s work. The rule was that the teams themselves should 
create and preserve the situated action patterns.
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Trist and Bamforth did not defi ne any new process or tools for achieving the 
kind of generalization the teams needed for mastering the variation in the object 
and conditions of their work. Ever since the coal-mine study this kind of per-
ceptual-functional generalizing carried out by work teams within their delineated 
areas of responsibility has represented the STSD ideal, as in green-fi eld-designed 
factories for example. Much theoretical work has been carried out and many pro-
cedures have been developed for delineating the work tasks of teams.
The unit and object of generalizing in Socio Technical Systems Design was two-
fold: the fi rst object was the delineation of the team’s tasks and boundaries for its 
”semi-autonomous” action within the production chain, and the second was the 
way the team performed the work task so delineated. Researchers characterized the 
former as the technical aspect of production design, governed by the laws of technol-
ogy, and the latter as the social aspect of production governed by social laws. They 
suggested a design method for mass production in which the technical aspect could 
be planned so as to allow the team to work in a way that was based on the use and 
development of perceptual-functional generalizations. This led to a form of organi-
zation incorporating the craft-type system of generalizing into the of mass-produc-
tion system in order to make it possible for teams to cope with variation, which could 
not be dealt with adequately in the Taylor system. Following Trist and Bamforth, 
socio-technicians have re-defi ned and systemized this one-time change method by 
developing new design models, but the main idea has remained the same.
The fl exible mass-production system
The Toyota Production System was the result of a unique effort to implement 
the principles of Taylorist-Fordist mass production in conditions in which it was 
not possible to produce long series of the same product, and in which the same 
production line had to be used for a number of different products. The Toyota 
solution to this contradiction between the unifying principle of Taylorist-Fordist 
production and the actual variation in products was to introduce a new form of 
production that turned the Fordist ”push-type” production-chain management 
around and replaced it with the ”pull-type” management of the order-delivery 
process. The mechanization and automation of the production phases were car-
ried out as part of this development.
The introduction of the new ”pull concept” also led to a radical change in the 
distributed system of generalizing and changed the way in which the tools devel-
oped for Taylorist-Fordist mass production were used. A new kind of subject and 
agent was created, the multi-skilled team. The Toyota car-production teams dif-
fered in two respects from those operating under Socio-Technical Systems Design. 
First, the team members performed a number of tasks according to the optimal 
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method, in other words they relied not on perceptual-functional generalizing but 
on empirical generalizations that they continuously and co-operatively changed. 
Second, they were empowered and obliged to improve the work methods and the 
design of the production process, and were taught to apply a number of methods 
themselves to eliminate recurrent disturbances and various forms of waste. 
Thus it was not a question of individual workers focusing only on their pre-
determined task as in the Taylor system, or of the team focusing on its own task, 
as in Socio-Technical Systems Design. On the contrary, the Toyota teams were 
mindful of the fl awless running of the whole production process, and intervened 
when necessary to prevent or settle disturbances and to reduce waste. The solving 
of production problems went beyond their manifest form back to the root cause 
in the earlier phases of the order-delivery process. Thus the object of the team’s 
problem-solving was the development of a sequence of actions within the process 
that had turned out to be problematic.  The generalizations created as solutions to 
recurrent disturbances and problems of waste incorporated performing specifi c 
tasks or sequences of tasks effectively in spite of the variation in the production 
process caused by changes in products and machine settings, and also by human 
error. The unit and object of generalizing was thus a problematic sequence of ac-
tions or operations within the order-delivery process. 
The basic method of generalizing was to analyze the causal chains within this 
process. One way of doing this was to take the ”Five-times-why” approach, the 
purpose of which was to fi nd the original cause of the disturbance in the worksta-
tions or other parts of the line. The other way was to use graphical representations 
of causal chains (the fi shbone model) and statistical data. The results of the pro-
cess of generalizing were preserved as changes in the tooling and in the ”kanban” 
signal system used in coordinating the production fl ow, and as improvements in 
the work-method descriptions and work standards designed by planners and im-
proved by the work teams. Teams, in collaboration with the planners, were the 
main agents in producing these production-relevant generalizations. The division 
of labor between the planners and the workers was based on the rule: planners 
plan, workers improve.
Cooperative processes of generalizing comprised quality-control procedures and 
”process-empirical” tools. The standards were set in order to continuously improve 
the processes rather than to establish certain work tasks permanently. Another dif-
ference from Taylor’s system was that the workers themselves became conscious of 
their own routines and changed them. This process of generalizing was fuelled from 
two directions. First, the management and experts who designed the work methods 
and the process helped the production teams and responded to their initiatives. 
Second, the teams improved the solutions offered by the planners and management 
on the basis of their observations and problem-solving processes.
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The characteristics of the three distributed systems of producing production-
relevant generalizations are summarized in Table 8.1 
Table 8.1 A summary of the analysis of the three distributed systems of producing 
generalizations
The 
components of 
the distributed 
system of 
generalizing
Standardized mass 
production
Socio-technical mass 
production 
Flexible mass 
production
The object of 
generalizing 
Task performance in 
the production chain
Group task in the 
production chain
Problematic sequence 
in the order-delivery 
process 
The variation to 
be mastered 
The different ways 
workers perform a 
task
The variation in the 
object and conditions 
of task performance
Disturbances and waste 
in the process fl ow
Method of 
generalization 
Measurement-based 
comparison
Team experience Analysis of the causal 
chains in the process
The produced 
generalizations 
Optimal way of doing 
the task
Situated action 
patterns of the team
Optimized process-
sequence/methods
The artefact 
that 
preserves the 
generalization 
Work-method 
description, work 
standard
Perceptual habits, 
action patterns and 
the language of the 
team
Work-method 
descriptions and 
changes in tools and 
signals
The agent and 
the community 
of generalizing
Planning offi cers and 
their offi ce
The designers and the 
team of workers 
Multi-skilled teams in 
collaboration with the 
planners 
Division of 
labor and rules 
used
The planner plans, 
the worker performs, 
rules of sanction and 
co-operation
Planners plan the 
frame of the team’s 
independent action 
Planners plan, workers 
improve
In terms of the distributed systems of producing production-relevant generaliza-
tions, the main feature common to all three examples is the emergence of the 
production planners and designers as the new subjects and agents of generalizing. 
The relationship between designers and workers differed in that in Taylor’s system 
it was polarized, Trist and Bamforth softened it, and Ohno turned it almost upside 
down at Toyota. During the motorization wave the signifi cance in terms of value 
creation of not only the work designers but also of other types of designers and 
planners has continuously increased (Ramirez & Wallin, 2000). 
The increasingly important role of planners and designers is related to the 
emergence of generalization through systematic measurement, comparison and 
design. Abstract empirical generalizations have been produced with the help of 
secondary artefacts that facilitate the division of labor and the exchange of partial 
solutions in the process of producing generalizations. In all three cases the dis-
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tributed system of generalization was brought out to support the optimization of 
the current production process, that is, in Bateson’s terms, to effect second-level 
learning.
Taylor’s contribution was to devise a way of producing fi xed, optimized al-
gorithms for performing work tasks. It was a solution to the contradictions that 
raged between traditional incentive management and the extensive growth and 
speeding up of mechanical production. Trist and Bamforth’s study revealed the 
contradiction between the varying objects of the activity and fi xed work methods, 
which was resolved by creating a space for craft-type perceptual-functional gen-
eralization within the industrial production setting. The resulting work organiza-
tion was a hybrid of late-craft work and the new rationalized production process. 
Trist and Bamforth did not create or fi nd any principally new ways of generat-
ing production-relevant generalizations. The establishment of semi-autonomous 
teams set limits on Taylorist rationalization and complemented it.
A similar contradiction between the fi xed production process and work meth-
ods and the varying object of activity arose in the development of Toyota’s pro-
duction system.  In this case, the resolution brought out a historically new kind of 
distributed system of producing production-relevant generalizations, as described 
above.  Fixed standards were replaced by constant re-evaluation and improvement 
of work methods and standards through collaboration between workers and plan-
ners. The workers were involved in using the secondary artifacts in developing the 
work methods.   
Toyota’s pull system of production coordination and the Kanban signal system 
were instrumental in the mastering of variation in the order-delivery process.  The 
production system was not unitary, but was rather a production-process platform 
on which various combinations of productive actions could be taken.  In this sense, 
it was based on two types of generalization, the fi rst concerning the necessary 
phases and tasks of production that were common to all products, and the second 
the set of productive actions necessary for producing a specifi c product.  The for-
mer is more basic and, in a sense, more theoretical than the latter, and describes 
the common structures in the production of a number of different products.   
Although the systems of generalizing described above are different, the process 
and the type of generalizations produced are rather well defi ned in all of them. 
The process has become a permanent part of the management system. In all cases 
the objective of the new system was the optimization of production. All of the 
processes were connected to a sequential production process. The ideas and rep-
resentations used in producing the generalizations were derived from mechanical 
machine engineering and technology; information technology had a role only in 
the autonomation of Toyota’s automobile production.
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8.3 The development of a new system of generalizing as expansive 
learning
The analyses of the three cases showed how the pioneers developed, in a long-last-
ing and complicated process, a new form of mass production and new systems 
for producing generalizations within it.  Despite the very different histories, these 
processes can be characterized as processes of generalization. The outcomes were 
the new forms of production and production-relevant generalizations.  
Compared with the type of well-ramifi ed problems in the systems of general-
izing that were developed, the object of these processes was much more vague. 
It was partly defi ned in terms of the various manifestations of contradiction be-
tween elements of the production activity: in Taylor’s case it was the contradiction 
between the need to master the production line and the old management system, 
and in the Trist and Bamforth and Toyota cases it was between rigid forms of 
generalizing and the varying object of the activity. On the other hand, the object 
was partly defi ned in terms of the actors’ visions of a new form of production and 
related normative stance, but also had, to a great extent, the character of an ”epis-
temic thing” as defi ned by Rheinberger  (1993, p. 28).
They are material entities or processes – physical structures, chemical reactions, 
biological functions – that constitute the object of inquiry.  As epistemic ob-
jects, they present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness. This 
vagueness is inevitable because, paradoxically, epistemic things embody what 
one does not yet know.
We could say that, in all three cases, a contradiction in the established produc-
tion practice made the understanding and resolution of the contradiction and 
the development of a new form of production into an epistemic object that moti-
vated those involved to engage in sustained search, inquiry, experimentation and 
development. The outcome in each case was a new, expanded idea of production 
and learning in and for it. In this process they criticized the prevailing produc-
tion concept, analyzed the root causes of the problems, modelled the new form 
of production, studied and experimented with new solutions, and implemented 
new forms of production through these experiments. Thus the pioneers were en-
gaged in a learning and development process that had all the characteristics of 
what Engeström (1987) has called expansive learning.
During this process the pioneers naturally focused more on the epistemic ob-
ject of creating a new form of production and less on the process and methods 
they used to reach their goals.  The nature of this kind of expansive learning pro-
cess attracted attention, and became the object of theoretical conceptualization 
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and empirical research only much later (see, for instance, Engeström, 1987 and 
Fujimoto, 1999)
Here we see two very different processes of generalization that represent two 
different levels of learning: fi rst, the processes of expansive learning that produced 
new forms of production and related systems of generalizing, and second, the re-
peated processes that resulted in new production-relevant generalizations within 
the created new system.  The former represents Bateson’s third level of learning 
that transforms the context of problem solving, and the latter his second level of 
learning, in other words solving the problems within the given context. Not only 
do they represent two different levels of learning, these two processes are qualita-
tively quite different and have produced qualitatively different kinds of generaliza-
tions. The former exhibits features of genetic-theoretical generalization while the 
latter has more the character of empirical generalization. As was shown, the time 
span in these processes was also quite different, years in the former and days and 
months in the latter.
8.4 The need and possibility to master the historical transformation in 
forms of production 
It appears that, as Freeman and Louca suggested (see page 63), the ICT revolution 
has triggered a new wave of socialization in labor processes. It will change the pro-
cesses of generating work-related generalizations in many ways. It is probable that 
new systems of generalizing such as mass customization and co-confi guration, 
will develop to meet the needs of the emerging new forms of production in the era 
of computerization. It is also clear that the new technology will provide new tools 
for producing generalizations, and will affect the communities within which these 
are created. My analysis does not shed light on these diverse trends, but there is 
one rather obvious change that will have a broad and general impact on learning 
in and for production.
The increasing investment in research and development will cut in half cycles 
of business, product and production concepts, and will increasingly transform 
second-level learning from separate processes into cycles of expansive learning. 
This will, fi rst of all, increase the need for interaction and dialogue between stra-
tegic management and grass-roots operations. Secondly, the growing importance 
of strategic transformations will highlight the need for mastering the historical 
change in the conditions and elements of activities as a form of variation that 
has to be managed (Ramirez & Wallin, 2000). This new, emerging object of gen-
eralization is in sharp contradiction with the empirical processes of generalizing 
typical of the three distributed systems of generalizing described above.  Mastery 
of the historical changes in the elements of the activity system requires third-level 
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learning that transforms the logic and structure of the whole system instead of 
changing or just optimizing the way individual tasks or processes are carried out. 
This calls for theoretical-genetic processes of generalization to overcome histori-
cally evolved contradiction between elements of the activity systems. The forms 
these processes take may be very different. It is also possible that there will be not 
only one dominant way of producing production relevant generalization as was 
the case during the upswing of the motorization wave, and that the methods will 
be much more manifold. In the next chapter I introduce a method that supports 
theoretical-genetic generalization in work communities, the Change Laboratory.
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9 ”Learning activity” as a historically 
new form of generalizing 
9.1 Expansive learning actions 
According to Engeström (1987, pp. 124–137), there is in our time a need and the 
potential for a new form of activity and learning that he calls ”learning activity”:
The essence of learning activity is the production of objectively, societally new 
activity structures (including new objects, instruments, etc.) out of actions 
manifesting the inner contradictions of the preceding form of the activity in 
question. Learning activity is the mastery of expansion from actions to a new 
activity. (Engeström 1987, p. 126)
The object of attention in learning activity is not on solving and preventing prob-
lems and disturbances within current practice as such. It is rather on recurrent 
disturbances and individuals’ double-bind experiences that are indicative of inad-
equacy or inner contradictions in the prevailing system and logic of the activity, 
in other words on the basic generalizations and concepts on which it is based. It 
involves the creation of a new generalization, a new, broader concept incorporat-
ing its object and motive so that its logic also changes.
What is specifi c to this kind of generalizing is that it suggests concept forma-
tion on the one hand, but on the other hand it is about changing the structure of 
the practical activity, including the tools, community composition and division 
of labor. It involves the questioning of the prevailing concepts used in mastering 
the activity intellectually, and replacing them with new ones. The object of the 
learning activity is the expansive transformation required in overcoming current 
or threatened crises.
Like any activity, learning activity is carried out through individuals’ intercon-
nected actions that are oriented towards the same object, and in this case it is the 
epistemic object of fi nding a way to understand the contradictory demands and 
double-bind situations in the current form of the productive activity. This is done 
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by following specifi c epistemic lines of inquiry as to the causes of problems in 
the current activity, and in fi nding new concepts. Engeström calls these actions 
expansive learning actions.
According to Engeström, expansive learning actions can be broken down into the 
following basic types:
questioning actions that involve criticizing some aspects of accepted prac-
tice and existing knowledge;
analyzing actions through mental, discursive or practical transformation 
in order to fi nd the causes or explanatory mechanisms: analysis evokes 
”why”questions and explanatory principles, historical-genetic analysis seeks 
to explain the situation by tracing its origin and evolution, while empirical 
analysis does so by constructing a picture of its inner systemic relations;
modelling the newly found explanatory relationship, in other words con-
structing an explicit simplifi ed model of the new idea that explains and 
offers solutions to the problematic situation. This happens in some publicly 
observable and transmittable medium;
examining the model by operating, running and experimenting with it in 
order to fully grasp its dynamics, potential and limitations;
implementing the new model, which means concretizing it and planning its 
execution by means of practical applications and conceptual extensions;
refl ecting on the process and consolidating the practice, in other words evalu-
ating the new model and the process, and consolidating its outcomes into a 
new stable form of activity.
In an empirical study of natural work teams Engeström analyzed the discussion 
in one team meeting and found that the members spontaneously took actions of 
questioning, analysing, modelling, and examining the model (Engeström, 1996). 
Learning actions as such are not expansive because they are only parts of the learn-
ing activity as a whole. An expansive solution is reached only as one potentially 
expansive learning action leads to another learning action, and these form a chain 
that leads to a change in the activity. The activity may take the form of small cycles 
of change in which partial resolutions of contradictions in an activity system are 
implemented locally in the work place in a new way that may lead to expansive 
transformation. The learning actions may make the understanding of the causes 
of problems and the creation of a new form of activity into an epistemic object 
for the practitioners, which then motivates further learning actions and leads to 
collaborative learning activity.
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9.2 Developmental Work Research – an intervention methodology for 
supporting learning activity 
Developmental Work Research methodology is a specifi c intervention methodol-
ogy developed by Engeström for carrying out learning activity in collaboration 
between a researcher interventionist and the practitioners. 
The interventionist’s task is to help practitioners undertake epistemic actions 
of analyzing the need and possibilities for change in their activity, to model the 
historical development of the activity system and its current developmental con-
tradictions, and to design a new concept as well as new representations and tools 
for the new activity. 
The research setting is a modifi cation of Vygotksy’s idea of developmental ex-
periment based on the method of dual stimulation, the purpose of which was to 
show that potential capabilities and emerging new psychological formations in 
the child could be identifi ed by analyzing the formation of new meanings, i.e. new 
generalizations. It provides practitioners with the tools for taking collaboratively 
expansive learning actions. 
In the process the researcher provides the practitioners with data about prob-
lematic aspects of their daily activities and disturbances in them in order to help 
them identify the need for change.  This corresponds to the fi rst stimulus, the tasks 
in Vygotsky’s method of dual stimulation. The general model of an activity system 
is provided as an intellectual tool for modelling both the systemic cause of the 
identifi ed problems and a new form of activity.
Figure 9.1 The setting of developmental work research for creating generalizations 
(Engeström, 1991, p.76)
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The Developmental Work Research setting comprises three types of artifacts that 
are used as instruments of expansive learning actions. Data-refl ection is used as 
a ”mirror” of daily practice and especially of its problematic aspects. The general 
model of an activity system is used as a tool for modelling the structure and inner 
contradictions of the local activity, as well as for creating a model of its new form. 
Analytical concepts and various representational means are used for analyzing the 
data in the mirror and for constructing alternative solutions for specifi c parts of 
the activity.
The phases of developmental-work-research-based intervention are depicted 
in Figure 9.2. The intervention process starts with an ethnographic analysis of 
current practice and of the various problems that practitioners experience in their 
daily work activities. This makes it possible to delineate the activity in question, 
and provides data to be used to mirror the practice. All of this helps practitioners 
to identify problems and to question aspects of current practice.  
The next intervention phase consists of three types of analysis of the work 
activity as a historically developed local system. The purpose of object-historical 
analysis is to identify the qualitative changes that have taken place in the activity 
system and to provide an initial hypothesis concerning its current inner contradic-
tions. Theory-historical analysis aims to analyze and to determine previous and 
current concepts that shape the local activity, and true empirical analysis to reveal 
and describe in detail the forms of actions and processes involved in the transfor-
mation of its objects: to what extent specifi c tools, rules and forms, and actions 
and processes are involved in the transformation of the objects of the activity, how 
specifi c tools, rules and types of division of labor actually mediate the activity, and 
what types of disturbances, ruptures and innovative new actions occur in daily 
practice.
Figure 9.2 The methodological cycle of developmental work research (Engeström 1987, p. 
323)
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The results of the historical analysis are crystallized in a model of the most preva-
lent inner contradictions in the activity system. The resulting hypothesis concern-
ing the systemic causes of problems is then enriched, specifi ed and corrected using 
the data from the empirical analysis. The theory-historical analysis provides sets 
of concepts for describing and discussing the qualitative variation found in the 
practitioners’ views of their tools and processes, and in the forms of their daily ac-
tivities. The analyses and the modelling of different aspects of the activity provide 
rich material for conceptual artefacts that practitioners can use in the production 
of the new concept for their activity.
The fi nal important and often time-consuming part of the intervention is the 
practical experimentation with the new concept and the new tools created in the 
preceding phases. It is in this phase that many new contradictions emerge that 
call for re-mediation of various aspects of the activity and its interaction with the 
neighbouring activities.
9.3 The Change Laboratory as a specifi c application of developmental 
methodology 
The Change Laboratory37 is a specifi c application of Developmental Work Re-
search, the purpose of which is to help the work community both to implement 
a deep transformation in its activity and to make incremental changes in its prac-
tices. 
On the basis of his observations in his research project ”Learning and Expertise 
in Teams and Networks” (Engeström, 1992), Yrjö Engeström formulated fi ve prin-
ciples for a new method of development, the Change Laboratory. 
First, the work redesign has to take place on the shop fl oor, close to the daily 
work while still preserving an analytical distance: there was a need for a new inter-
play between close embeddedness in work occurrences and refl ective distance tak-
ing. Second, practical problem solving and the construction of challenging future 
visions have to be combined: there was a need for a new kind of dialogue between 
solving specifi c problems and implementing future visions. Third, it has to be pos-
sible to manage multiple change processes with different developmental rhythms. 
Fourth, the methods and tools for everyday work and developmental activity have 
to be made to support each other: a new dialectic between practice and develop-
ment was needed. Fifth, the resources inherent in the existing structures and work 
37 The CL method is compared to other laboratory methods in Virkkunen, Engeström, Helle, 
Pihlaja and Poikela, 1997.
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practices have to be used in order to take up the new challenges and develop new 
products and services: a new kind of interaction between innovation and tradition 
was needed. (Virkkunen, & al., 1997, pp. 155–156)
The idea behind the Change Laboratory is to arrange a separate space as close 
as possible to the daily work being done. A team, work-group or work unit comes 
to the laboratory to analyze and develop its own work practices, initially with the 
help of a research interventionist. The process is typically carried out within a 
tight schedule because deep changes in work culture are needed in a short time. 
The method facilitates both intensive, deep transformations and day-to-day im-
provements. 
Figure 9.3 A prototypical layout of the Change Laboratory (Virkkunen et al., 1997, p. 16)
The developmental work research setting is realized in the Change Laboratory 
with the help of a 3 × 3 set of surfaces for representing the work activity. Participat-
ing workers face the surfaces so that their discussion becomes mediated through 
the representations of them. A scribe is appointed from among the participants to 
write down the ideas that come up. Video equipment is used to enable recordings 
of problematic aspects of the object of the activity to be shown later. Additional 
tools such as relevant databases and a reference library may also be available. Thus 
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the Change Laboratory provides a rich set of instruments, an instrumentality for 
analyzing disturbances and for constructing new models of work practice.
The horizontal dimension of the mirror, incorporating ideas and model sur-
faces, represents different levels of abstraction and generalization: models, ideas 
and data that mirror daily practice. Vertically the boards are divided into three 
surfaces, the lowest representing the activity in the past, the middle one represent-
ing the current situation, and the top one the future form of the activity. 
It is possible to enact a whole cycle of expansive transformations with the help 
of the Change Laboratory, but in general the process involves a smaller cycle of 
expansive change that is a part or phase of the whole (Engeström, 1999, p. 385).
The Change Laboratory process stimulates many kinds of socio-cognitive pro-
cesses that support theoretical-genetic generalization. When entering the labora-
tory, the participants bring their work-related, experienced problems with them 
and analyze them with a view to developing an activity system. They share their in-
dividual experiences with others, and record them on the surfaces. The movement 
between abstract and concrete takes place as they move between the three boards 
representing the mirror, the ideas and the model, or the primary, secondary and 
tertiary artifacts representing the problems of change at work. They also move be-
tween temporal layers – past present and future. Finally, the discussions encourage 
them to bring out different viewpoints and interpretations: the dialogue moves 
back and forth from one perspective to the other. When the participants go back 
to work, they consider the ideas developed in the laboratory from the perspective 
of the realities of their daily activities.
Work in the Change Laboratory typically starts by mirroring current problems, 
and moves on to tracing their roots of the current trouble by mirroring experi-
ences from the past and by modelling the past activity system. The next task is to 
model the current activity and its inner contradictions, which enables the par-
ticipants to focus their transformation efforts on the essential sources of trouble. 
They then set about envisioning a future model of the activity, including making 
it concrete by identifying ”next-step” partial solutions and tools. Subsequently, the 
stepwise implementation of the new vision is planned and monitored. Such a cycle 
induced in the Change Laboratory typically takes three to six months. This kind of 
cycle leads to the next one, and within them are smaller cycles of problem solving 
and learning.
The Change Laboratory tools consist of a comprehensive set, a system of devel-
opmental tools. The key concept characterizing the system is instrumentality. The 
instruments form a system that includes multiple cognitive and semiotic means of 
analysis and design, and also tools used in daily work and brought into the labo-
ratory for examination, reshaping and experimentation. The tool system enables 
the participants to engage in various kinds of socio-cognitive processes that may 
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generate a new kind of outlook, a different mentality. Moreover, the tools are un-
der continuous development: old methods are modifi ed and new ones introduced. 
(Virkkunen, & al., 1997)
The Change Laboratory method clearly represents the theoretical-genetic type 
of generalizing, which seems to be unique in work-related intervention methods. 
Moldashl and Brödner (2002, pp. 179-189) identifi ed three basic models of inter-
vention. The traditional, expertocratic model assumes that scientifi c knowledge is 
superior to practitioners’ knowledge, and allows the deduction of unambiguous, 
empirically provable design criteria. The intended effects will be achieved when 
the recommendations are detailed enough and their application is precisely con-
trolled. Secondly, it is taken as given in the proceduralistic model that the relevant 
knowledge is already present in the organization, and it only has to be mobilized 
by stimulating and moderating organizational communication. Thus the inter-
vention should focus on supporting the processes of self-organization by incor-
porating communicative procedures and broad participation: the interventionist 
is an expert in communication processes. The third model, refl exive design, goes 
beyond the other two. Refl exive intervention is a social medium of re-negotiation 
and self-refl ection for both organizational members and external experts. Accord-
ing to Moldashl and Brödner, generalized epistemological heuristics could be pre-
sented for such refl ective processes. This kind of refl ection also takes place in the 
Change Laboratory. The intervention is based on the expansive remediation of ac-
tions and activity rather than on general epistemological heuristics. This is made 
possible by creating conditions for joint learning and the carrying out of spe-
cifi c epistemological actions of analysing and modelling the practitioner’s activity 
system. Specifi c intellectual tools are provided for this learning activity. Further 
unique features of the Change Laboratory include the use of the activity system as 
the unit of analysis and development, the historical-genetic analysis of the inner 
contradictions in these systems for explaining the daily problems encountered, 
and the modelling of a new structure in which the current contradictions could be 
ironed out, and new tools planned for new kinds of actions that would make the 
change possible in practice (Virkkunen & al., 1997; Virkkunen, 2004).
Chapter 10 describes and evaluates an intervention in which the Change Labo-
ratory method was used for the fi rst time in a project that was carried out in Fin-
ish Post Ltd. in 1996. It incorporates a detailed narrative, and a description of the 
expansive learning actions that comprised the process of generalizing and the new 
generalizations and innovations produced, and shows how the organization dealt 
with the results of the learning activity.
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10 Triggering ”learning activity” in Finland Post 
Ltd. using the Change Laboratory
This chapter charts the process and results of launching a mail carriers’ learning 
activity in Finnish Post Limited. It begins with an explanation of the situation that 
led to the implementation of the Change Laboratory and an overall review of the 
project. The learning actions taken in the Change Laboratory and their results 
are then described, and the chapter ends with a discussion of their signifi cance in 
terms of delivery work at Finnish Post Limited.
10.1 The starting point 
The need to develop mail-delivery work at Finland Post Ltd.
Mail-carriers work run through many organizational changes in the beginning of 
1990s. The Finnish Post became in 1990 state-owned limited company that was 
no longer dependent on state budget. The new company had to let go of its 352-
year-old offi ce tradition and to face competition in its operations. It was converted 
into an incorporated company, Finland PT Group, in 1994. The businesses were 
divided in fi ve subsidiary corporations the biggest of which were Finland Post Ltd. 
producing traditional postal services and Telecom Finland Ltd. focusing on pro-
viding telecommunications services and acting as network operator.
Finland Post Ltd. serves individual households, businesses and communities. 
Businesses and communities are the most important customers from the fi nancial 
point of view: for example in 1996, 90% of the turnover was generated from ser-
vices for these customers.38 The proportion of fi rst-class mail deliveries decreased 
in the 1990s, but that of second-class letters grew slowly. The total amount of 
postal deliveries was still growing in 1995, but this trend was not expected to con-
38 Annual Report of the Finland Post Group, 1996, 4–5. 
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tinue. In its business plan for the late 1990s Finland Post Ltd. acknowledged that 
electronic communication would be a serious challenge for the company.
Mail-delivery work is labor-intensive. Up until the 1980s Finnish Post was the 
biggest employer in Finland39, and it was still the third biggest in 1998 with a 
workforce of 24,600. The largest employee group in the company was that of the 
mail carriers (11,400).
In 1994 activities of Finland Post Ltd. were divided into three business groups, 
each of which was responsible for a certain function and customer group. Publica-
tion and Delivery Services took care of delivering mail, direct-marketing material, 
addressed deliveries, and papers and magazines throughout the country. It was 
also responsible for providing services for paper and printing fi rms. The division 
of labor simplifi ed the transformation into a fi rm but created borders between the 
transport, delivery, sorting and sales operations. 
Mail carriers reach about 2.5 million Finnish households and businesses daily. 
The country is divided into 7,000 delivery routes, half of which are covered by van, 
approximately 1,300 by bicycle and about 2,000 on foot.40 The work comprises 
two main phases: sorting (pre-work) and delivering. Even though both phases 
have become more mechanical and automated in recent years, manual work still 
has an important role: 44% of the three million items delivered daily are still sort-
ed manually.41 
Mail-delivery work had been rationalized intensively in the 80s and 90s, result-
ing in a fragmented division of labor. A norm-time system had been established 
in order to measure the volume of work and individual job performance.42 Union 
representatives were often involved in defi ning norm times.
Early-morning and advertisement deliveries had been in competition for a 
long time, and the government made several decisions in the 1990s that intensi-
fi ed it. The expectation was that Finnish Post Ltd would also face competition for 
addressed deliveries, which it had been taking care of almost exclusively until then, 
by the end of year 1995.
The Head of Publication and Delivery Services aimed to improve the capacity 
of the delivery by trimming expenses. Operations were concentrated in fewer post 
offi ces, the work-measurement norms were tightened, and the number of em-
39 Based on the number of employees, the Post Offi ce was the biggest company in Finland in 
1980.
40 Annual Report of the Finland Post Ld, 1995, 18. 
41 Annual Report of the Finland  Post Ltd., 1995, 13. 
42 The Work time is divided into three phases: pre-work, delivery work and other tasks. A norm 
time has been devised for each phase. The total number of working hours is the sum of all the 
norm times of the workers or cells. Special gauges and coeffi cients are also used in counting 
working hours: daily standard and recovery coeffi cients and the post-offi ce local time. 
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ployees was reduced. Employers and the employee organizations agreed on new, 
tighter measurement norms in 1994. As a result, the delivery routes became longer. 
The wage structure was also changed and individual salaries were tied to perfor-
mance. In the same year the Head of Publication and Delivery Services decided 
not to renew the job contracts of part-time mail carriers. However, according to a 
survey, the consequences of these changes were not totally positive. The mail carri-
ers were dissatisfi ed with their employers’ activities, and an increase in the amount 
of sick leave caused a lot of extra expense to the company.
A ”Good Delivery” project was carried out in the post offi ces in 1994–1995 in 
cooperation between the employer and the labour union. The aim was to improve 
customer and employee satisfaction and to increase delivery profi tability by apply-
ing so-called participatory management. The head of the business group thought 
that the project did not improve profi tability enough: it apparently improved until 
1994, but then slowed down. No signifi cant opportunities were in sight to improve 
the competitiveness of the delivery operations by decreasing their costs.
Reports on delivery work and employee cooperation compiled at that time 
gave a dark picture in terms of coping with the competition. According to the 1990 
report, 40% of the mail carriers were against the idea of turning Finnish Post’s ac-
tivity into a business, while 25% were in favor. According to another account, 40% 
of the mail carriers were not familiar with the company goals. It was also pointed 
out in the reports that the mail carriers’ attitude to their work was self-interested: 
they did not appreciate delivery work as a profession and were primarily interested 
in the free time it gave them. The work community was more of a family commu-
nity than a results-oriented unit.
Markku Karkulahti (1994) investigated the delivery workers’ views by conduct-
ing in-depth interviews and concluded that the employees were not committed to 
the goals set by the management because they felt that the employer wanted to 
benefi t at their expense. According to Hannu Saira (1995), the mail carriers con-
sidered the work community important, and were loyal to their fellow workers. 
However, they did not believe that the management understood their daily work. 
They found the managers distant and questioned their authority. Karkulahti main-
tained that the Post Offi ce would not succeed in future competition because of its 
work culture. He suggested a change in supervisory work and an introduction of a 
team concept in mail delivery to increase the mail carriers’ work motivation.
The head of Publication and Delivery Services and representatives of the em-
ployee organization did not reach an understanding about developing delivery 
work. They therefore decided to organize a ”Developing Delivery Production” 
seminar in order to discuss the productivity problems. Six representatives of the 
employer and fi ve representatives of the employee organization participated in 
the seminar. Discussion topics included in-house entrepreneurship, the possibility 
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to rationalize and develop the work on the shop-fl oor level, responsibility taking 
on the individual and community levels, and the possibilities of developing team-
work in the delivery service. 
This led to the establishment of a small working group to devise a project plan 
that would improve work productivity and employee well-being at the same time. 
Some of the employer and employee representatives of the group had previously 
heard about the developmental work research method and thought it could be 
used in order to develop these ideas. The group came up with a suggestion for a 
development process based on this approach43. 
The head of Publication and Delivery Services contacted Professor Yrjö 
Engeström at the University of Helsinki, who suggested that the Change Labo-
ratory method could be used in developing the mail carriers’ work. A steering 
group was set up and six managers from the Paper and Delivery Group, fi ve rep-
resentatives of the Postal Union, and Professor Engeström as the external expert 
were invited to join. The board of the Postal Union confi rmed its participation on 
January 24th 1996.
According to the project plan, the idea was to develop a model for the deliv-
ery work that would both increase profi tability and improve employee well-being. 
Five post offi ces were chosen as pilots to carry out the development work.
Five pilot post offi ces join the project
The head of Publication and Delivery Services asked the regional directors to sug-
gest post offi ces in their areas that could participate in the project as pilot offi ces. 
The regional directors wanted to select good and viable post offi ces, but data con-
cerning positive job satisfaction among the personnel in the offi ces also affected 
their choice. Eventually the Turku 52 post offi ce, and offi ces in Outokumpu, Hätilä 
in Hämeenlinna, Hervanta in Tampere and Malmi in Helsinki were chosen to par-
ticipate in the change-laboratory project.
Representatives of the project group, the researcher44 and representatives of 
the personnel visited the candidate pilot post offi ces to introduce the method to 
the employees. The regional director, his representative and representatives of the 
Postal Union were also present at the meetings.
The mail carriers’ fi rst reactions to the project were positive, and those at three 
post offi ces (Turku, Outokumpu and Hämeenlinna) immediately announced their 
willingness to take part. Mail carriers at the Hervanta offi ce voted unanimously to 
43 Internal newsletter, 6.2.1996 on starting up the project.
44 The project research group comprised Yrjö Engeström and Juha Pihlaja.
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join while those in Malmi were the most reserved. They apparently had the en-
thusiasm, need and experience, but they feared that it might lead to the awkward 
situation of ”sawing off the branch on which they were sitting”. They also wanted 
an increase in salary. Finally they decided to participate in the project under the 
same conditions as the other pilot offi ces.
Compensation for the developmental work was agreed in negotiations between 
the Postal Union and the employer. There was also discussion about whether the 
supervisors – in other words delivery managers and representatives of the staff or-
ganization – would be able to take an active role in the change-laboratory discus-
sions. The project group decided that they would only take part as observers since 
the idea of the project was to hear the employees’ voices. 
The Change Laboratory, which became known in the project as Room 2000, 
was placed close to the mail carriers’ working space. An appropriate room already 
existed in three post offi ces, one was created at the Outokumpu offi ce by breaking 
down internal walls, and the men’s changing room was used at Hervanta. The cho-
sen post offi ces were very different in terms of quality, equipment, size, working 
area and number of personnel. 
The Hervanta post offi ce serves a growing suburb of the city of Tampere. The 
delivery area, with 25,000 inhabitants, includes roughly 11,000 households and 
520 businesses. In 1996 there were 22 delivery routes, two by van and the rest on 
foot. The number of mail carriers was 22, including fi ve women. 
Outokumpu is a little town that was developed around a mine. It has around 
9,000 inhabitants, of which 60% live in the centre and 40% in the surrounding 
district. Thirteen mail carriers made basic deliveries, most of them women. Of the 
eleven delivery routes, eight were serviced by van, three on foot. 
The Hätilä post offi ce Hämeenlinna, a medium-sized Finnish town, made ap-
proximately 12,000 deliveries daily. The majority of the customers were people 
living in apartments and houses. There were 14 full-time mail carriers and three 
reserves, mainly men, with a long history of delivery work. Of the 11 delivery 
routes, three were serviced by van, fi ve by bicycle, two by cart and one on foot. 
Malmi post offi ce is located in the northeast of Helsinki, and the delivery area 
consists of old housing estates, apartment blocks, industrial estates and shopping 
centers. The number of the postal deliveries in 1996 was around 20,000, of which 
some 75% went to households. Eleven delivery routes were serviced by eleven mail 
carriers, most of them by cart. A special feature in Malmi was that the mail carriers 
delivered to different routes daily, and were familiar with two or three other routes 
in addition to their own. 
Turku 52 post offi ce is located in a business center in the city of Turku. It made 
11,000 deliveries a day, of which nearly half were for the businesses in the area. Of 
the six delivery routes, two were business-enterprise routes and four were house-
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hold routes. A lot of express mail was delivered to the business enterprises which 
also made extensive use of the export and import services. Moreover, many old 
people lived in the area. Most of the mail carriers had been working for the post 
offi ce for more than ten years, some for more than twenty years.
10.2 The overall progress of the project
The mail carriers met for the Change Laboratory from seven to ten times, for two 
to four hours per session. The meetings were held every week or every second 
week. Because of the tight schedule, most of the meetings lasted approximately 
four hours. The researcher assigned tasks to the participants to be carried out in 
and between the meetings. Between the meetings for example they interviewed 
customers, made themselves familiar with reports of the team experiments carried 
out in mail-delivery work, and wrote meeting memos. They also produced mate-
rial for subsequent tasks.
The participants’ reports on the results of the Change Laboratory were put 
together as pilot reports45. One or two people compiled most of these reports, but 
some were compiled in small groups. 
The meetings followed the phases of the cycle of expansive learning, starting 
with initial questioning and ending with refl ecting on the process and consolidat-
ing the new activity model. The last analysis phase consisted of a seminar in which 
representatives of the Change Laboratory groups, the Publication and Delivery 
Services management, regional directors, and delivery managers, project supervi-
sors, members of the project group and representatives of the Postal Union par-
ticipated. Representatives of each pilot post offi ce presented their group’s analysis 
of the contradictions in the mail deliverer’s activity system. 
In the next phase, the Change Laboratory groups started to model visions of the 
delivery work in 2001 and to plan improvements that would be tried out in prac-
tice. The new models and experiments were processed further in the second joint 
seminar. The mail carriers presented a total of 23 proposals, including suggestions 
for trying out new services and changing the indoor-outdoor division of labor. The 
supervisory group agreed that the experiments would start in the beginning of May 
that year. The majority of them did start in the spring, but some required further 
negotiation. In some cases the mail carriers felt that the time given for preparation 
was not enough, and suggested that some experiments could be carried out after 
the summer.
45 Pilot reports, part 1, Work-development phases and current contradictions, 15.3.1996
45 Pilot reports , part 2, Visions for the year 2001 and suggestions for experiments 3.5.1996
45 Pilot reports, part 3, Reports from the experimental phase, 7.6.1996
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The supervisory group assessed the results of the project at a meeting held at 
the beginning of June. They thought it had been successful considering the tight 
schedule. In August, after the experiments had been carried out, the supervisory 
group decided to expand the project and to train twenty middle managers to be 
Change Laboratory instructors. While 82 mail carriers had participated in the fi rst 
Change Laboratory working wave, over 500 participated in the second one.
The pilot offi ces of the fi rst phase were made into exemplars of new forms of 
mail-delivery work, and the participants in the second phase could visit these as 
”aquariums” in order to collect and develop ideas for their own offi ces. The in-
novations of the fi rst phase were not directly transferred to the offi ces involved in 
the second phase, but were rather used as a basis for helping the mail carriers to 
develop their own solutions.
Extending the Change Laboratory project succeeded. Fifteen experiments were 
carried out during the fi rst wave, and new solutions were found, while 92 were car-
ried out during the second wave. The improvements generated during the second 
phase were quite similar to those of the fi rst wave: the mail carriers experimented 
with selling, teamwork and other new working arrangements, and also planned 
new service concepts.
At the end of the second phase, the Paper and Delivery Service manager asked 
a task-force group to summarize the results. A delivery supervisor, an instructor, a 
mail carrier and I were invited to join the group, the task of which was to propose a 
new concept of mail-delivery work for nationwide use that could be tried out. The 
task force presented its proposal for a new concept to the Paper and Delivery Ser-
vice management, the Postal Union, the pilot offi ces and the Change Laboratory 
instructors in April 1997. The proposed concept, which was based on the reports 
of the Change Laboratories followed the principle of mass customization. Many 
questions arose at this stage, development ideas were put forward, and criticism 
was voiced. The Chair of the Postal Union did not accept the concept because its 
representatives had not been included in the process. The Delivery 2001 Project 
decided on May 26th 1997 to set up a larger working group with union and man-
agement representatives.
At the same time, the entire Postal system was reorganized. Business groups 
that had earlier concentrated on deliveries and transport were united in a Pro-
duction business group. The persons appointed to manage the new unit did not 
know about the Change Laboratory method, but they and the union nevertheless 
approved the new concept of mail delivery work in August 1997.
The new head of the business group started a new project called ”The new 
model for production”. Although this project allowed for the application of the 
Change Laboratory method, the new management was not expecting results on 
the lines of the work done in the projects. Contrary to expectations, the new 
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project led to further rationalization, centralization, standardization of work 
performance, and outsourcing. This change of line in the development of mail-
delivery work did not, negate the initial results of the Change Laboratory, which 
were surprisingly positive. The innovations and the results of the fi rst and second 
waves and the construction of the new delivery concept refl ected a new type of 
learning in and for production at the grassroots level within the postal services. It is 
therefore useful to analyze how the innovations were introduced and what hap-
pened when these results of this new process of generalizing were put forward. 
The following description of the Change Laboratory work in the fi ve pilot post 
offi ces is based on the reports and memos written by the participants as well as on 
the notes made by the researcher and some videotaped recordings of the meetings. 
A few extracts from the discussions are included to give the reader a better idea 
about the nature of the discussion in the sessions.
At the outset, I as the researcher introduced the tools of the Change Laboratory, 
the way of working in it, and the project plan. In each offi ce the participants agreed 
on how the process would be followed in their case. In order to initiate learning 
actions the research group planned a series of tasks for the participants. In what 
follows I will describe how these tasks were carried out, what kind of learning ac-
tions were taken, what the outcomes were, how the Change Laboratory tools were 
used, and how these various elements interacted with each other.
10.3 Expansive learning actions in the Change Laboratories
Questioning the prevailing practice
The researcher’s task in the fi rst phase of the project was to launch learning actions 
to do with questioning the current work practices. He fi rst explained the purpose 
and method of the fellow-worker interview and issued a ready set of questions.46 
The employees interviewed each other in pairs and then the researcher asked them 
to describe the results. The results of these interviews and subsequent discussions 
were written in the Mirror/Present fi elds.
As a positive thing in their work the mail carriers in the Turku 52 offi ce ap-
praised their personal time use: the more quickly one covered one’s route, the 
46 The interview questions:
When did you start working in this post offi ce?
What was the work like at the time?
What are the differences in the working customs between now and then?
What kind of turning points or phases have there been at your work place? 
Tell me about the best experiences in your work. Name one specifi c incident!
Tell me about the worst experiences in your work. Name one specifi c incident!
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sooner one would get home. ”Going home early makes it feel like having the af-
ternoon off” (Turku 52 meeting, February 21st 1996). The motive for work, i.e. 
the object the of activity, seemed to be free time as Karkulahti had maintained 
in his study. Analysis of the employees’ negative experiences that were taken up 
in the interviews revealed that the turn of the National Post Offi ce into a limited 
company changed the rules concerning the employees’ working. ”Nowadays you’re 
sitting on a much less stable chair, it goes from under you a lot more easily” (Turku 
52 meeting, February 21st 1996). The mail carriers in all the other pilot offi ces ex-
pressed similar concerns. 
One described a bad experience when he had to do the delivery by himself for 
the fi rst time. Another who had earlier worked in a factory found the chances of 
making mistakes surprisingly high. Her colleague added: ”You might be doing the 
deliveries wrong, doing the change of address wrong; there are so many mistakes 
you can make with one letter” (Turku 52 meeting, February 21st 1996). This led 
to a discussion about training time, the consequences of mistakes, customer com-
plaints and the management system of the Post organization.
In the Change Laboratory discussions based on the peer the questioning of 
current practice took the form of narratives concerning problematic situations 
and observations concerning problematic aspects of the activity.
Analyzing the mail-delivery activity historically and empirically
The second stage of the Change Laboratory process was to encourage the partici-
pants to trace the historical development of the ”essential systemic inner relation-
ships” of mail-delivery work. The purpose was fi rst to create a picture of the major 
developments and turning points in the ten previous years, and then to analyze the 
current situation by means of action research. The tasks given to the participating 
mail carriers consisted of a) analyzing the results of the co-worker interviews, b) 
tentatively defi ning the development phase of the mai-delivery activity in each post 
offi ce, and c) specifying these development phases. 
The results of the co-worker interviews concerning changes in the activity were 
used to launch the learning action of historical analysis: they were written on the 
Mirror/Past surface.
The researcher fi rst asked the participants to look at the material that had been 
collected on the Mirror/past surface and to describe the phases they had observed 
in the development of post-offi ce work. The phases that came up in the discussion 
were written down on the Ideas/Past surface. The participants were then asked to 
observe how different factors in the delivery work had changed over time using the 
activity-system model on the Models/Present surface.
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The employees where then asked to analyze critically their interpretations of 
the development phases. They looked once more at what they had written down 
and specifi ed their observations about the changes of work on the Mirror/Past 
surface, and the model of the old way of working on the Models/Past surface. 
A wealth of material was collected in Turku 52, and it was clear from the re-
sponses that many changes had taken place. The mail carriers analyzed the differ-
ences in working methods between now and then by fi rst discussing the changes 
in the work environment.
B: Well, the work environment has become more pleasant. We used to work in 
that old, cold, draughty offi ce, where the temperature was minus two at best, 
when you were sitting by the window, and so on. So yeah, that’s what it was. 
And we probably had about ten square meters of space for ourselves. So yeah, 
they’ve changed, so that now, now the working environment is more human 
(Turku 52 meeting, February 21st 1996).
The mail carriers suggested that there had been two periods of development: the 
eras of Lemminkäinen Street and Data City. The change was analyzed with the 
help of the activity-system model. The participants were very enthusiastic about 
the analysis.
Figure 10.1 Modeling work transformation from Lemminkäinen Street to Data City
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The group obviously thought that this result was a true achievement: ”That tri-
angle model sure is one of a kind” (Researcher’s fi eld notes, 22.2.1996). Other 
participants were also enthusiastic. Although ”mail always had to be delivered into 
boxes”, as one deliverer joked about the stable character of the work, the work with 
the activity-system model showed that there had also been qualitative changes. 
The changes in the object only seemed quantitative in that the workload had in-
creased. The researcher also asked the mail carriers to analyze the contradictions 
that had led to these historical changes, but as this seemed to cause confusion the 
subject was dropped.
The mail carriers in Hervanta identifi ed three phases of development. Pre-1975 
was ”The era of Pispala”, which a few of the older employees talked about. It was 
before the Hervanta district had been built, when experience and customer service 
were appreciated. They called the years 1976–85 ”The era of stagnation” and used 
excerpts taken from the delivery manual of 1985 by way of illustration in their 
report. The excerpts showed how tightly the work was controlled and specifi ed at 
that time in the instructions and rules. The tasks, division of labor, working time, 
letter size and postcard size were all laid down. The work was based on regulations 
and orders that remained unchanged for a long time. The following period after 
that was the ”The era of change”, when civil servants were replaced by mail-deliv-
ery workers, and backpacks by carts.
The Hätilä mail carriers thought that their current work practice had evolved 
over three ten-year periods of development. The 1970s was ”the decade of central-
ized delivery”, the 1980s ”the time of decentralized delivery”, and the 1990s ”the age 
of turmoil”. The employees considered the closing down of the post offi ces the bad 
side of the age of turmoil, which they thought had led to the ”era of business”.
The mail carriers in Outokumpu also divided the history of their work into 
three phases. When small post offi ces abounded at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s 
there were four village post offi ces in Outokumpu that also functioned as meeting 
places for the villagers. When the mail delivery was centralized, the post offi ce was 
placed in Outokumpu town center. Two worker groups, with different pay, job 
contracts, collective agreements, and working time, were established. The employ-
ees called the development stage that led to the current work arrangement ”the era 
of stress”. Village shops-cum-post offi ces replaced village post offi ces. The number 
of delivery vans increased, the schedules tightened, and there was continuous time 
pressure. New work-measurement and wage systems were taken into use. 
The Change Laboratory participants at Malmi divided their delivery work into 
four developmental stages. The sixties was ”The era of work pride”, when the mail 
carriers were civil servants and proud of it. The 1970s and early 1980s were ”the 
era of negligence”, 1985–90 ”the era of crisis” and the present was ”a stable but 
chaotic time”.
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Although the periodizations of the development of the delivery activity were 
partly based on superfi cial landmarks of change, the resulting discussion high-
lighted the essential changes. The historical analyses produced the fi rst hypothesis 
according to which the competitive situation triggered the need to develop deliv-
ery work. There were also other companies interested in the same customers, i.e. 
the same object.
Using this initial hypothesis as a guide, the researcher group planned a set of 
tasks that were supposed to launch the participants’ learning actions of analyzing 
the present work situation. The results of these empirical analyses were then dis-
cussed in a joint seminar, after which the researcher group presented their sum-
mary. The main purpose of these actions was to identify the main contradictions 
within the activity system.
The researcher brought excerpts from video recordings he had made of the 
mail carriers’ work to the meeting as material for analyzing the current work prac-
tices in each offi ce, and for identifying typical disturbances. After watching the 
recordings the employees were asked what they thought were the biggest problems 
and threats in mail-delivery work. The answers were fi led on the Mirror/Present 
surface.
The researcher then explained the participants the idea of using customer in-
terviews as a way of collecting information about customer needs and postal ser-
vices. He handed out a customer-survey form47 planned by the researcher group 
for them to consider and suggest amendments, and gave advice on how the inter-
views should be conducted. Each participant interviewed at least one customer on 
his or her route. The results of the customer survey were fi led as mirror material 
on the Mirror/Present surface as customer needs and customer feedback.
The next task given to the participants was to asses unused business potential in 
the current form of the mail-delivery work. They summarized their thoughts on 
the Mirror/Present surface by answering a series of questions48 planned by the 
researcher group. The observations brought up in the discussions were fi led on 
the Ideas/Present surface.
47 Questions:
1. What services are available to you in your local post offi ce? 
2. What are shortcomings in the services of the post offi ce?
3. Does the post offi ce fail to provide some services relevant to you? If so, what kind of ser-
vices? 
4. How could the post offi ce improve the services that especially concern you?
48 Questions:
1. What kind of services does your post offi ce fail to offer?
2. What kind of competition benefi ts does your post offi ce fail to offer?
3. What working equipment is unused or is inadequate? 
4. What kind of teamwork opportunities remain unexploited in your delivery work?
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On the basis of these analyses the researcher asked the participants tentatively 
to identify the main inner contradictions in the current form of mail-delivery activity 
with the help of the model of an activity system depicted on the Models/Present 
surface.
He then introduced the next task and learning action, which was to of analyze the 
results in terms of used customer benefi ts and competitive advantage. He used a four-
fi eld diagram on the Ideas/Present surface to illustrate the concept of competitive 
advantage. The concept was described in terms of two dimensions: cost savings 
and customer benefi ts related to productivity. The researcher asked the partici-
pants to estimate whether the possible competitive advantages of Finland Post 
Ltd. in terms of mail-delivery could be described with the help of the diagram. 
After due consideration he asked the mail carriers to choose examples of products 
to be used in the estimation. The sample products, customer needs, competitive 
advantages, and the positive and negative outcomes of the possible changes in the 
mail delivery activity were then analysed.
The participants where then asked to specify the hypothesis concerning the inner 
contradictions within the system of their current work activity on the Models/Pres-
ent surface.
Those in each Change Laboratory then wrote a collaborative report of the 
analysis phase. The task given to them by the researcher was to describe the devel-
opment of the mail-delivery work in their post offi ce and to analyze the contradic-
tions within their current work practice. One of them was also asked to present 
the results of the analyses at a seminar held for all pilot post offi ces on March 23rd, 
1996. 
In Turku 52 the results of the analyses revealed that the threats and disturbanc-
es the mail carriers continuously came up against involved services for business 
customers, changes in work measurement, and an increased workload caused by 
advertisement deliveries. On the basis of the customer interviews, they stated that 
businesses should be serviced better because they were the most important clients 
of Finland Post Ltd.
The private customer brings such a small profi t, it’s not worth it. But business 
fi rms are the ones that pay for the mail. (Turku 52 Change Laboratory meeting, 
11.3.1996) 
However, the current regulations and the new standards prevented the mail car-
riers from developing co-operation with business fi rms. According to the new 
regulations, fi rms had to put their mail boxes outside, thus obviating the need 
for the deliverer to enter the premises. This eroded the service and removed the 
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opportunity to do sales work indoors. The mail carriers thought that this kind of 
cost cutting was wrong and that the rules should be changed: the post should be 
delivered indoors. Some of them said that, in spite of regulations, they did that in 
any case. They felt that Finland Post Ltd. would benefi t from the sales work, but 
that work measurement was an obstacle. 
According to the Turku 52 mail carriers, the increased amount of advertis-
ing material and wide variation in amount also caused disturbances. Coping with 
the advertising material was a strain: placing the advertisements in-between other 
mail took time and increased the physical strain. 
E: I had to make my own bunches of advertisements, which I carried with the 
mail, for example three, there’s been three, could be, could be even four, that 
I’ve carried like that. I had to make my own bunches and throw them into the 
box and then I took them from there, behind the backpack, and then with the 
mail, there’s been this much stuff per stairway with the mail. So it really comes 
to health factors here, it’s bad for my back when there’s so much stuff. (Turku 
52 Change Laboratory meeting, 11.3.1996) 
The large amount of advertising material compared with the number of letters 
also amazed the mail carriers. They considered letters to be more important than 
advertisements, and feared that the increasing numbers of advertisements would 
increase the possibility of making mistakes in sorting other deliveries. They sus-
pected that if a lot of advertisements were to be delivered to households at the same 
time, their effect would be weakened. Nevertheless, they considered advertisement 
deliveries an important challenge given the competitive situation in Finland Post 
Ltd., and felt that this aspect could be developed. They saw the advertisement situ-
ation as a two-edged sword. 
G: ...it might sound crazy to others, but Finland Post Ltd. does not do all the 
advertisement deliveries and it would be a huge competition benefi t if it did, 
anyway it would be a big asset, it would make us a bit like a monopoly … 
(Turku 52, Change Laboratory meeting, 11.3.1996) 
The researcher used the activity-system model to interpret the initial analysis of the 
contradictions in the current work practice. His conclusion was that the measure-
ments and boxing regulations were obstacles to improving service and advertise-
ment delivery. There appeared to be a contradiction in the delivery-activity system 
between the changed object (quality in the customer contacts, delivery peaks, and 
the increased amount of advertisements) and the rules (the work standardization, 
boxing regulations). The increased amount of advertising and the morning rush 
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were indicative of changes in the object of work that created pressure to provide 
new models for the division of labor. The researcher suggested that there might be 
another contradiction between the object of the activity and its division of labor 
could. The mail carriers thought that they could sell postal services to business 
fi rms instead of merely conveying the message, but they did not have the appro-
priate tools. In the researcher’s opinion, this was indicative of another emerging 
contradiction between the changed object of delivery work and the tools provided 
for carrying it out. These analyses of the inner contradictions of the activity sys-
tem were fi led on the Models/Present surface.
The mail carriers in the Hervanta post offi ce considered the small working 
space, the group leader’s lack of time, taking care of special shifts in sorting, and 
arranging van shifts the biggest problems in their work. Although they described 
the historical phases with the help of the activity-system model, their attempts 
to summarize the underlying systemic causes of the many observed problems as 
inner contradictions within the current activity system did not lead to a clear con-
sensus or model of the main contradictions. 
In the Hätilä Post Offi ce the mail carriers focused on customer service, thus 
making the object of the work more multi-layered. They were developing cus-
tomer contacts at the same time as coping with a larger volume of deliveries, in-
cluding an increasing amount of advertisement material. They also considered 
the centralized sorting of the routes a threat because it would reduce the work in 
the post offi ce. Their analysis showed that the changed and unstable character of 
the object of their work activity was in contradiction with the current division of 
labor, rules and tools in use. 
According to the analyses compiled by the employees in the Outokumpu Post 
Offi ce, the regulations concerning business activities were in contradiction with 
the customers’ wishes. This contradiction was concretized as a pricing problem. 
The Post Offi ce lost customers to competitors even in a small town like Outo-
kumpu because of the pricing regulations. This was indicative of a contradiction 
between the object, the business opportunities and the rules. On the other hand, 
the rapid changes in delivery volume required a more fl exible division of labor. 
The current measurement system made it more diffi cult to try out new solutions, 
and consequently there was also a contradiction between the object of work and 
the division of labor.
The Malmi mail carriers described the contradictions in their report as follows:
Pipeline thinking appears to be a constant obstacle. Others are easily blamed 
and it’s not recognized that we ourselves have an effect on the results in the 
post offi ce. (...) The inner collaboration is problematic. Should Finland Post 
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Ltd. try to create new customer needs in the future and then develop its ser-
vices to satisfy these needs? How far can we go in cutting costs and expenses 
without the service quality suffering too much? Work rationalization is being 
approached in two different ways: intensifying and developing might lessen the 
number of jobs. On the other hand, we could try to expand and broaden the 
jobs (the amount of delivered mail and other possible services). (Malmi report, 
20.3.1996)
The project group arranged a seminar for 23rd March 1996 at which the analyses 
were processed further. The head of the Paper and Delivery Services, representa-
tives of the employee organization, employees from the pilot post offi ces and the 
researchers all took part.
Many employees voiced their fears that the new developments would mean 
lay-offs. One from Hätilä described this contradiction as follows:
If you have ideas, you’ll get sacked, meaning this reorganizing. And if you don’t 
have ideas, you’ll get sacked too. This lack of confi dence in the system, is this the 
post offi ce’s way to eliminate things. (Seminar discussion 23.3.1996)
Another from Malmi talked about the same contradiction.
We have also had this discussion going on about whether to expand the object 
or not and on the other hand about the developing, are we sawing of the branch 
we’re sitting on. Does all this developing have to be about digging our own 
graves? We might know that that’s not what it has to be, but I suppose it’s kind 
of like what we see as a threat.
Another way of thinking is that we can try to infl uence the increasing work-
load. To develop via that, so that we won’t be just sitting around thinking that 
the only effect all the developing will have is to get fi ve of us sacked. (Seminar 
discussion, 23.3.1996)
The seminar was apparently an exceptional event in the history of developing the 
mail-delivery work. The employees, the head of the business group, the area su-
pervisors and the head of the labor union had not previously sat down together 
to analyze problems in the mail-delivery work. The seminar seemed to strengthen 
the employee’s  and management’s beliefs that new activity models could be cre-
ated in the context of the project.
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The head of the Paper and Delivery Services business unit, addressed the seminar 
after the employees had voiced their opinions: 
This much I can say; during these past few hours my belief in this project has 
strengthened by at least a hundred percent. (Seminar discussion, 23.2.1996) 
In the closing speech he commented on the fears arising from the developing and 
the confl icting feelings of the mail carriers:
I can assure you that you won’t get sacked for having good ideas! (Seminar 
discussion, 23.3.1996)
The mail carriers from the post offi ces fi nished their presentations by giving names 
to the next phase in the development of the mail-delivery work: 
The era of experiments! (Outokumpu); Space Station Alfa! (Turku 52); The 
unknown future (Hätilä); A development phase involving the employees, so 
it’s like this Delivery 2000 project (Hervanta); Malmi Post Offi ce Ltd, Drive-in 
Postal Services, A small multi post offi ce lives in all of us! (Malmi) 
The Union representatives also thought that the seminar was exceptional. 
I thought it was an exceptional seminar. It had a consistency that has never 
appeared here before. First of all, a big manager of the Post executive team, all 
area managers and union managers were all present. Then from the research 
side there were the Helsinki University people. And then in this forum it was 
mainly the mail carriers who were asked to say what they had been up to for 
the past couple of months: performing to this kind of group, and using all these 
new kinds of terms about the subject, and speaking in a theoretical manner. 
These research triangles came to life and the style of speaking was just totally 
different than before. (Interview with the union representative Eero Saarinen, 
February 14th 1998)
After the seminar the research group refl ected on the project so far. Even though 
the contradictions reported by the workers were local, there were similarities. They 
referred to certain dilemmas (”If you develop, you get sacked, and if you don’t 
develop, you get sacked”), refl ecting the primary contradictions between use value 
and exchange value within the elements of the activity systems as well as secondary 
contradictions between the elements.
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One common observation among the mail carriers was that the workload had 
increased. They often used the term ”stress” in relation to the new developments. 
They saw the increased workload as a cost-cutting measure that jeopardized the 
quality of the service in terms of problem-free delivery and employee competence. 
Nevertheless, the growing workload was not considered only a negative phenom-
enon. The employees felt the tension: the new competitive situation meant that 
Finland Post Ltd. had to compete for delivery business, thus a bigger workload 
increased their job security, while a decreasing one would have been a threat.
This duality was considered by the researchers to be indicative of the latent na-
ture of the secondary contradictions. The sheltered monopoly position of Finland 
Post had offered protection against the aggravation of the secondary contradic-
tions between the elements of the activity systems, and acute crisis was the result. 
The elements of work depicted in the activity system model were internally tensed 
(Figure 10.2). Normally the receiving customer was understood as the object of the 
activity system. In the Change Laboratory discussions the mail carriers brought up 
another course of development. The mail carriers’ work was not only an end of the 
logistic process but they were working daily near the customers as well. Develop-
ing locally new services to the customers could also broaden the object. 
Figure 10.2 The Researcher group’s interpretation of the inner contradictions
Developing the services seemed to be an impossible task from the mail carriers’ 
point of view. The delivery work was standardized, and offering new services did 
not fi t into the standard. The measurements used in planning the work and defi n-
ing the salary structure presupposed individual work, which did not suit the joint 
customer-service model suggested by the employees. The tight regulations and 
the measurement system were obstacles that hindered the local development of 
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the work in each post offi ce. Employees were not free to decide about their own 
working arrangements or division of labor, even though this kind of independent 
thinking was encouraged. The rules controlling the activities were thus internally 
contradictory.
The idea of expanding the object of work brought up problems in the inner 
and outer divisions of labor. As parts of a limited company, the business groups 
sometimes focused on their own activities without considering the general good 
of Finland Post Ltd.. More emphasis was placed on what did and did not belong to 
individual jobs than on cooperation: the mail carriers deliver, they do not transport 
or sell; drivers transport, they do not deliver mail or sell; salespersons sell, they do 
not transport or deliver mail.49 The examples given in the reports also showed that 
this kind of division of labor was uneconomic for Finland Post Ltd. as a whole. 
It was not only the external but also the internal division of labor that was 
problematic. Each deliverer only concentrated on his or her own tasks – a situa-
tion that was fostered by the centralized management practice and the measure-
ment system. On the other hand, expanding the object of post offi ces, in terms of 
increasing the level of independent planning and cooperation between business 
groups required fl exible cooperation between the mail carriers and other employ-
ees. This inner contradiction in delivery work is described in Figure 10.2 as a ten-
sion between independent solo work and teamwork, and between the collaborat-
ing business groups and the fl exible crossing of group boundaries. 
Modelling the new principle of mail-delivery work
The main purpose of these actions was to fi nd solutions in each post offi ce to the 
contradictions they had found, to model a future vision for the work, and to plan 
the fi rst experiments toward implementing the new model.
After the seminar the researcher used the activity-system model to present the 
results of the analyses on the Model/Present surface in Change Laboratory meet-
ings. He also put together a video presentation of the analyses by taking the parts 
of the videotaped seminar in which the pilot-offi ce representatives described the 
contradictions and making another tape which he then presented as mirror mate-
rial in the Change Laboratory sessions in the local post offi ces. He asked the em-
ployees to comment on the videotape and to compare the researcher’s conclusions 
49 The gap between selling and delivering was seen as causing daily disagreements between the 
offi cials and the mail carriers, about workspace use and tools for example. Dividing the activi-
ties into business groups seemed to have widened the existing gap between the mail carriers and 
the offi cials.
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with their own views. The purpose of this task was to allow each participating post 
offi ce group to elaborate on and clarify its pre-seminar interpretation.
The objective in this phase was to help the participants to fi nd solutions to 
the contradictions and to analyze them. The researcher invited them to take part 
in thought experiments in which they would model and examine a possible new 
system of mail-delivery work that would resolve the contradictions found in the 
current delivery practice.
The researcher gave the Change Laboratory groups material on the team ex-
periments with delivery work that had recently been conducted in two Finnish 
post offi ces, and on the practice in Swedish post offi ces. He asked the participants 
to familiarize themselves with this material and to analyze the solutions offered. 
Their observations were written on the Mirror/Future surface. This was followed 
by a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the various team so-
lutions, and the results were fi led on the Ideas/Future surface. The reactions of 
the Turku 52 participants were very critical. Although they considered the experi-
ments ”interesting”, their immediate response was ”It’s nothing. Bullshit!” They 
thought the examples were threatening rather than promising (Turku 52, Change 
Laboratory discussion, April 11th 1996). 
The reactions were not totally negative, however. One deliverer thought the 
experiments had clearly illustrated how the work should not be done. Another 
thought that some experiments, such as piecework remuneration, could perhaps 
be taken up. A third deliverer supported the idea that a new kind of division of 
labor regulated from the shop fl oor could replace team work.. This would require 
”some kind of cells”, although he thought that the groups mentioned in the ex-
ample were too large (Turku 52 Change Laboratory discussion, March 11th 1996)
The researcher then asked the participants to imagine and write down a story 
in which the contradictions in the activity system would be resolved in the near 
future. These stories were written separately for each element of the system. The 
ideas were collected on the Idea/Future surface and the participants were asked to 
summarize the contents of their story in a few words that were then inserted into 
each element on the Model/Future surface. 
After this, the researcher asked the participants to suggest concrete solutions 
in small groups. He also asked them what they thought should be the fi rst step 
toward the planned vision. All ideas were fi led on the Idea/Future surface.
As another task aiming at modelling the future form of the activity the researcher 
asked each deliverer to take fi ve minutes to come up with some concrete solutions 
to the contradictions found in the analysis, to consider how the object of work 
could be expanded and what the consequences should be. This produced many 
ideas for improvement. 
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The Turku 52 mail carriers put forward an idea for a new service, which they 
called ”A security service for the elderly”. To give an example of the modelling 
discussions in the Laboratories I will in the following describe the evolution of 
this idea. 
Mail deliverer G came up with the new product idea. He considered the elderly 
to be a target group that required extra services: ”I thought that some kind of help 
for the elderly would be useful. And it involves all kinds of things. There are a lot 
of elderly people on the route who need help.” Mail deliverer B asked if they could 
take on the home-help’s work as a sideline. The idea was to combine the work of 
the home-help and the mail carrier. G believed that if the post offi ce advertised 
their services for the elderly, people would seize the opportunity. 
Deliverer C said that he was not a home-help, and did not have the necessary 
training for it either. Mail deliverer A also resisted the idea: ”It’s diffi cult to imagine 
a delivery fi rm doing the work of a welfare worker.” The researcher suggested that 
some of the tasks that home-helps did could be done by the mail carriers because 
”you go to the door daily”. Mail deliverer A responded that the home-help’s work was 
not suitable for a delivery organization or compatible with the company’s license.
 
A: So I would just say that Finland Post Ltd. is a delivery organization like any 
other that has trailers, delivering stuff, or a ship that transports stuff or people. 
On ships you have other things, I know, but it’s quite diffi cult to imagine a 
delivery fi rm performing welfare workers’ tasks. It’s not even compatible with 
our company’s license.
Mail deliverer G, who had originally made the suggestion about starting a service 
for the elderly mentioned that nothing was said about combining anything in the 
conversations. 
G: It wasn’t said that anyone had to be a home-help, but that we would think of 
some little jobs that we could do … 
There were two suggestions put forward in the discussions that concretized the 
original idea and were written on the Change Laboratory’s board in an attempt to 
bring the focus back to solutions that were compatible with delivery work: ”charg-
ing for deliveries home” or ”if someone receives some sort of money and can’t 
come and fetch it, to draw it and deliver the money”.
L referred to fi remen who go and collect the corpses of elderly people who have 
been dead for a long time, and produced the fi rst new service idea: ”The idea is that 
the deliverer goes there daily.” Mail deliverer A gave the service a name and asked 
for it to be recorded on the Change Laboratory board: ”Hey, put the words security 
service.” L repeated: ”Yeah, hey, a security service!” The researcher only managed to 
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repeat half of the term: ”Yeah, security…” when the excited A interrupted: ”Yeah 
security, security service in that the mail worker visits daily.”
The next step was to implement the idea and expand it. Mail deliverer A de-
scribed the procedure: ”The mail worker rings the doorbell daily and says hello”. 
They thought that close relatives might also approve of the service when ”the 
mother is living all by herself and a ”mail boy” visits her on weekdays and rings 
the doorbell”.
 Other ideas for expansion were pondered on and discussed, but the security 
service was brought up again from time to time. The mail carriers kept elaborating 
on the new service and considering the possible obstacles. They also thought about 
the possibilities of applying the same idea to customers other than the elderly.
In the process of designing a new course of action the Change Laboratory 
groups developed models of an ideal post offi ce, which were very similar in different 
groups. They all emphasized the responsibility of the deliverer and the indepen-
dent functioning of the post offi ce. The idea of expanding the object of work by 
creating new services and by broadening the scope of the basic delivery task and 
the new local deliveries was also common in the visions.
The object: The customer who receives and sends. Customers are noticeably more 
demanding nowadays (competition). Postal services have become versatile and 
the mail-order proportion has increased. Firms are being offered tailored and 
directed post-offi ce services. Malmi post offi ce is capable of separating Lada 
drivers and dog owners so our customers can direct their advertising. Services 
to private customers (receivers) have also improved: the boxes come where the 
customers want them. Customers are no longer given orders. (Malmi Change 
Laboratory report May 3rd 1996)
Figure 10.3 Turku 52’s model of the future post offi ce
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The mail carriers said that their future work would involve intensive collaboration 
with customer companies and would be based on information and communica-
tion technology.
Three delivery drivers are starting their fi rst round of the day. Rush starts down-
stairs because we are starting to run out of spring-season materials. But there 
is no cause for alarm since we can order the products straight from the biggest 
mail-order fi rms because of the amazing EDP connections. (Hervanta Change 
Laboratory group report, May 3rd 1996)
The Change Laboratory groups’ future vision depicted post offi ces as independent 
profi t centers in which self-directed teams of mail carriers operated a messenger 
service by delivering incoming mail and offering new services to business and pri-
vate customers.
The next stage in the Change Laboratory process was to agree on the kind of re-
forms that were necessary for realizing the future visions and to decide what would be 
the fi rst steps that the post offi ce would take to implement the new activity model. 
Two of the fi ve units, Turku 52 and Outokumpu, experimented with teamwork 
and new service products, and another two at Malmi and Hätilä, concentrated on 
developing new service products and overcoming the bottlenecks between pro-
duction lines. The fi fth unit, Hervanta, decided to try out teamwork.
The employees in Hervanta wanted to see whether they could improve the mail 
fl ow and reduce overlap between Paper and Delivery and Transportation Services. 
The test team consisted of four mail carriers who would jointly take care of sort-
ing, transportation and delivery in two business areas and one suburban area for 
two weeks. The employees wanted to test customer reactions by conducting a sur-
vey among the businesses in the area.
The Malmi mail carriers discussed the purpose of the experiments, suspecting 
that the resulting changes would be minor. They were enthusiastic about their 
own local vision but not necessarily about the experiments. Eventually, ”after Pih-
laja persuaded us”, they ended up carrying out six different experiments.
The purpose of delivering registered letters in connection with basic deliveries was 
to improve the service standards at a reasonable price. The mail carriers planned 
this service to benefi t small and medium-sized businesses in the area. The purpose 
of combining local transportation and delivery services was to cut out the overlap of 
two parallel production lines. The Malmi mail carriers wanted to advertise the lo-
cal fi rms and companies on the delivery routes. Advertisement deliveries would be 
offered to local advertisers at a reasonable price, thus introducing regional com-
petition. As part of the advertising campaign, post-offi ce products would be adver-
tised on the delivery carts, which would be made more visible. The introduction 
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of mail carriers as stamp sellers would give them experience of creating customer 
contacts and sales work. Finally, starting an export service for businesses in addition 
to basic deliveries would reduce the overlap between business groups. 
Outokumpu planned a teamwork experiment in the centre and the surround-
ing area. The team would consist of two persons and would work in sorting and 
delivery work. Four mail carriers in the surrounding area would form a team that 
would do the sorting together. The aim of the shop and pharmacy experiments was 
to offer a delivery service to the inhabitants of the surrounding area and people in 
their summer cottages. The mail carriers also planned to offer additional export 
and import services to businesses and to change the delivery routes accordingly. 
They hoped to be able to price these services competitively, and planned to start 
the experiment at the same time as three mail carriers from the neighboring local-
ity were transferred to their offi ce.
The Hätilä mail carriers planned a special home-delivery service for non stan-
dard shaped packages. A fl yer would be sent to customers telling them they could 
ring the post offi ce and order the service. Small entrepreneurs were also to be 
offered the chance to get their advertisements delivered to their areas of choice, in 
connection with the normal mail delivery. There were also plans to sell, install and 
label mailboxes for the customers in the area. The new product idea was that the 
mail carriers would be assisting the residents of the old people’s homes in the area 
with their mail matters and would sell them stamps, postcards and packing mate-
rials once a week. Another idea was to try an express-delivery collection service in 
conjunction with the normal mail service.
The Turku 52 mail carriers planned to make changes in the division of labor. 
They would form two delivery teams, which would make their work more fl exible. 
The aim was to balance the workload, develop professionalism, learn a way of tak-
ing responsibility, and work at peak periods. The idea behind selling stamps was 
to increase revenue, create customer contacts and improve the image of the post 
offi ce. The security service for the elderly was the new product that was meant to 
increase post-offi ce revenue. It was aimed at elderly people who did not have daily 
support because their families lived far away. The mail carriers assumed that the 
families would want someone to visit elderly people on a daily basis, or at least 
weekly. The aim of the internal work-guidance project was to train new and old 
employees in special tasks.
Implementing the new activity model and refl ecting on it
The researcher’s role was small in the implementation phase. The mail carriers 
were asked to report any problems and achievements connected with the experi-
ments, and to analyze how the goals had been realized and how they wanted to 
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continue the experiments. The role of the project leaders became more prominent 
during this phase.
The Hervanta mail carriers carried on their teamwork experiment for three 
weeks. They thought that the best outcome was that businesses received their mail 
earlier. They sent enquiries about the effects of earlier deliveries to companies. 
70 companies replied, and most of them, 63, thought that earlier deliveries were 
positive.
These mail carriers considered a good team spirit and the possibility to vary 
their tasks daily to be the benefi ts of teamwork. The delivery part of the work 
went well and they were satisfi ed with it, as they were with the bunch deliveries 
managed by the team. The biggest problem was the big workload in sorting. The 
amount of work amazed them, but they could not say why they felt there was so 
much more work to do:
We still weren’t able to fi gure out why there seemed to be an endless amount 
of sorting and putting the deliveries in order in the mornings. And if we’d 
counted the working hours from the work that was done, this kind of situation 
would never have arisen. We’re still trying to work it out … (Hervanta Change 
Laboratory’s fi nal report, 7.6.1996)
The supervisory group considered the Hervanta team experiment partly success-
ful. In particular, the results of the customer survey were considered useful. The 
group thought that the Hervanta work community was capable of analyzing the 
problems and shortcomings brought up in the experiments, and wanted to con-
tinue with the group. However, the narrow scope was seen as a disadvantage: only 
one team had taken part in the experiment even though the whole work commu-
nity followed it closely.
All of the development ideas in Malmi required elaborating. The mail carriers 
worked in small groups developing each product, and the new procedures were 
supposed to start in September of that year. However, the carriers were still sus-
picious about the success of the experiment and demanded more extensive 
changes.
Deliverer M: I would say that they’re O.K. but they’re still just a scratch on 
the surface because the establishment needs bigger changes that are impossible 
within the scope of this project. 
Interviewer: What kind of changes?
Deliverer M: To eliminate the bottlenecks between the production lines for ex-
ample. 
(Interview with a deliverer, 30.5.1996)
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The supervisory group thought that the Malmi mail carriers had transformed 
their product ideas into product concepts well. A weakness in the planning was the 
failure to address the problem of the internal division of labor, which still often 
came up in the discussion.
What complicated the implementation of the Outokumpu plan was a dispute 
between the management and representatives of the employees about how to car-
ry out the reforms. The mail carriers had planned to try out teamwork at the time 
when the deliveries handled by Viinijärvi were to be transferred to Outokumpu 
under the management’s plan. Teamwork required rearranging the routes and jobs 
in the whole post offi ce. The mail carriers made this complicated arrangement 
themselves, which was exceptional because this work was usually done by produc-
tion designers. 
The teamwork was as extensive as it could have been in the circumstances. The 
export and collecting services were absorbed into the normal deliveries. The route 
changes eliminated the overlapping of the Paper and Delivery and Export Services. 
After one week, the employees found the results of the experiments to be good. 
The Outokumpu mail carriers also tried stamp selling. This had been done 
previously in isolated areas but it was now being tried out in the population cen-
tre. The mail carriers themselves advertised this service. The product designers 
criticized the advertisement later because it did not reach the usual standards of 
Finland Post Ltd., but in any case the stamp selling produced a profi t.
Before launching the shopping and pharmacy service the mail carriers conducted 
a customer survey. Only 5% of the people contacted replied, and of those only a few 
positively. Soon the sales dried up because a local entrepreneur had the idea of start-
ing his own delivery service. The post-offi ce mail carriers thought that the obstacles 
they had encountered brought out the overlapping aspects of their unit’s activities 
and the organizations’ inability to respond to the challenges of competition:
What can we do when there’s so many obstacles and overlapping in the orga-
nization? Our competitors take post-offi ce customers and they will carry on 
doing so if we are not able to respond to the challenges. (Outokumpu Change 
Laboratory group report, 7.6.1996) 
The supervisory group thought that the Outokumpu team achieved promising 
results in spite of the short experimentation time and the fact that the mail carri-
ers’ work had turned out to be more versatile. The mail carriers had come up with 
inventively good ideas and had conducted customer surveys related to them. The 
group also appreciated the mail carriers’ commitment to development.
With a view to bringing the product ideas of the Hätilä mail carriers in Hä-
meenlinna to fruition, fi ve groups were formed and experts were called in from 
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selected area offi ces. Only one of the experts called his small group together in 
time. As a result, the mail carriers lost interest. They saw the experiments as a chal-
lenge, but they doubted that they would ever be carried through as the following 
excerpt illustrates.
Deliverer: I think that some of them might be realised, I don’t doubt that, but 
there are also disputes between the production lines. Feels like that. (Interview 
with the Hätilä mail carriers 6.6.1996)
The reluctance of the area representatives to design product concepts stopped the 
design work. As a result, the mail carriers did not write the report themselves. 
Instead, the area offi ce employees, who claimed that they were too busy to partici-
pate in the small-group working in the Hämeenlinna pilot post offi ce, did it. The 
Supervisor group decided that the Hätilä post offi ce would carry out the experi-
ments with the support of the area unit. Both were told to improve their coopera-
tion and to carry out the experiments during that autumn. 
Turku 52 experimented with a new kind of division of labor. The eight mail 
carriers formed two teams, which they called ”cell-teams”. The teams cut down on 
their working hours and improved customer service. Business customers received 
their mail one-and-a-half hours earlier than before, and export services were car-
ried out in the promised time, in practice one hour earlier than before.
The experiment activated the whole group. The workload was divided equally 
among all people in the cell and the working hours did not increase. Because of 
the rotation the professionalism of the mail carriers increased. (The Turku 52 
Change Laboratory group’s report, June 7th 1996)
The mail carriers wanted to have more time for the experiments so that they would 
become familiar with most of the work tasks. They said in the interviews on May 
5th 1996 that working in cells ”brought up some mutual understanding and coop-
eration”, and that the experiments ”brought some new color to the work” and ”a 
spirit of solidarity developed without us even noticing.”
In one of the experiments the mail carriers started to sell stamps, which they 
publicized by distributing information about the new service in their area. As a 
result of negotiations with the area leaders, they were given money belts and price 
lists. The customers ordered stamps from them en route or by phone and received 
them the next day. In less than three weeks stamp sales on four routes made FIM 
3,300 profi t. The mail carriers were enthusiastic about the results of the experi-
ment.
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The results and the goodwill generated after such a short time and a little ad-
vertising exceeded all expectations. The mail carriers thought that the experi-
ments should defi nitely continue. The method worked and did not increase job 
stress. (…) The profi t from selling stamps could be distributed to the deliverer 
or to the post offi ce as a bonus. (Turku 52 Change Laboratory group report, 
June 7th 1996)
In the context of internal work guidance, the mail carriers suggested that training 
in product knowledge and the use of the delivery-order directory should be given 
to fourteen new employees. They produced the training materials themselves. All 
the permanent workers in the post offi ce gave practical guidance to all newcom-
ers. The mail carriers felt that the experiment was a success and suggested that it 
should be continued.
They also produced an action plan for the security service for the elderly. The 
experiment was agreed with the city social services of the city. It started in Sep-
tember of the same year and was given a warm welcome. It received wide publicity 
and was established as a regular post-offi ce service. This service expansion became 
a topic of discussion in Turku and other cities.
The employees in the Turku post offi ce also visited other post offi ces and 
brought back some new ideas and working methods.
We found this to be a cheap and a pleasant way to develop and consolidate the 
working methods in the delivery. (Turku 52’s Change Laboratory group report, 
June 7th 1996)
The supervisory group considered Turku 52’s experiments very successful. The 
post offi ce functioned very independently during the whole process, held meet-
ings when necessary, contacted management to help with the organization, and 
bravely started using the new models in their work.
The group suggested in their meeting that the Turku 52, Outokumpu, and 
Malmi post offi ces could operate as ”experimental aquariums”, which would func-
tion as pioneers and set examples to other post offi ces during the next stage of the 
project. The same opportunity was also given to Hervanta ”if it could clarify its 
visions and fi nd a way of continuing the team experiment”. The development of 
the Hätilä post offi ce was left to the area management.
After the experiments had been carried out, the researcher asked the employees to 
estimate the good and bad sides of the solutions. The observations were written on 
the Mirror/Future surface. The researcher then asked the employees to think about 
which contradictions in the current practice could be resolved with each experiment 
and to analyse how the experiments had worked and how they might continue.
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Refl ecting the results in the fi nal seminar
The Delivery 2000 project was motivated by the Publication and Delivery Services 
management’s concern about the tougher competition. The business-group leader 
considered competition still to be a challenge when he spoke in the fi nal seminar:
I’m more convinced, after these past fi ve months, that the road we are walking 
on now is a substantial factor in how Finland Post Ltd. will hold up in the fu-
ture. So my faith has become stronger in this Delivery 2000 project that we are 
really genuinely looking for development from the grass roots. I’m not saying 
it’s the only way but I believe it’s the best way to get through the competition 
situation and challenges that will come along. (business group leader, August 
10th 1996)
The supervisory group thought that the experiments highlighted opportunities for 
increasing productivity and employee well-being, and demonstrated a new kind of 
enthusiasm among the mail carriers for developing their work. The management’s 
attitude comes out well in the following extract in which a deliverer from Turku 
asked about the signifi cance of the experiments and the new ideas:
Deliverer from Turku: Are the ideas we’ve brought up worth anything? These 
are awkward questions. But if we don’t get an answer it’s hard for us to know 
whether to continue or not.
Business group leader: I think this is a philosophical question. If this kind of 
question is being asked, I sure will answer. The ideas presented here are good 
and they should be continued. If I were to say anything else I would wreck the 
whole project at once. I don’t want to do that. This Finland Post Ltd. is full of 
experts with different opinions, but from my point of view the work that has 
been done in these pilot offi ces give us a method for dealing with the compe-
tition. We won’t deal with it by having a few wise experts at head offi ce; they 
never could take care of it. They can create models and intelligent strategies but 
they can’t put them into practice. And that’s what I’m counting on in this proj-
ect; that what you have done, you can also do in practice as long as you’re given 
the right tools, because this comes from your own motivation. (Discussion in 
the fi nal seminar 10.8.1996) 
After the fi nal seminar the supervisory group decided to expand and support the 
project. Some of the experiments in the local post offi ces changed shape , however, 
and were consolidated in a different way at the same time as the Change Labora-
220
tory project was expanded. The success of the innovations developed during the 
project indicated that the new activity concept could be expanded. In the follow-
ing I will fi rst describe how the experiments were consolidated in each post offi ce, 
and then, I will summarize how these developments were connected to the contra-
dictions of the current delivery activity. 
Consolidating the improvements
The Hervanta mail carriers did not continue with the teamwork after the experi-
mental phase, but they did start negotiating with the Tampere Export and Deliv-
ery Services about taking care of special deliveries from the Hervanta offi ce. After 
some teething troubles the service began to function. 
Pair work replaced the team experiment, one of them taking the key van route 
and the other a walking route in turns. This helped to increase their route knowl-
edge, the work became more varied, and replacements were easily found for the 
key van routes. Thus the pair work increased fl exibility and special deliveries could 
be made on time. This kind of work was becoming more common in Tampere:
This Delivery 2000 did have an effect in that we started planning things more 
independently and taking on more work. It’s impossible to imagine that hap-
pening before. (Interview with a deliverer, January 1998)
The Hätilä post offi ce area manager decided to start the export of special deliveries 
that the Change Laboratory had suggested in connection with bunch service si-
multaneously in the whole Hämeenlinna area. This changed the van mail carriers’ 
work contribution in a positive direction.
When we discussed the experiment we decided to start it in the whole city. So 
we think that our project had some sort of consequences. (Hätilä Change Labo-
ratory group report, November 15th 1996)
The Export and import service experiment was abandoned because the represen-
tatives of the transport and delivery service wanted to keep it in their own business 
group. The delivery service for non-standard shaped packages started in Septem-
ber 1996, but there was not enough demand for it. The mailbox installation and 
labeling service attracted a lot of attention at fi rst, and around 50 mailboxes were 
labelled over the two weeks. After that, customer interest declined. There was no 
interest in the installation service. The advertisement delivery service offered to 
small entrepreneurs did not arouse interest either: only a few of them responded 
to the survey. According to the local representatives of the Business Service group, 
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these kinds of services were not compatible with the activities of the Publication 
and Delivery Services group. The Hätilä mail carriers still advertised the service 
experiments in their areas and also received some publicity in local television and 
radio programs.
Turku 52 succeeded in implementing four new improvements in the following 
spring. Teamwork, selling stamps, and in-house training were established proce-
dures that were still being followed at the beginning of 1998. The cell teams were still 
being used particularly to ease backlogs at peak periods. Stamp selling gave a steady 
yearly profi t. There have been no further visits to or from other post offi ces.
The mail carriers agreed with the social-welfare services to offer a security 
service for the elderly without charge for six months. This gave the home helps 
more time to spend with their elderly clients. The mail carriers on the three routes 
involved visited over 20 elderly people during the experiment. The service made 
the news on national television and the local television and radio channels made 
several programs about it. It also featured in local and national newspapers. The 
service became established in the post offi ce and the time spent on it by the mail 
carriers is made up as holiday days. A few other post offi ces started up a similar 
service. The Turku 52 mail carriers won an award of FIM 15,000 for this service in 
the 1997 quality competition organized by Finland Post Ltd.
The Malmi mail carriers in Helsinki began their experiments in autumn 1996, 
although only half of them had been started up by October. The fi rst one to get off 
the ground involved the sale of stamps, which customers could buy directly from 
the deliverer or order by telephone. Sales were high during the fi rst month but 
then fell a little. Nevertheless, the service became established and the mail carriers 
receive a special payment.
Experiments to cut out the overlap of delivery and transport work started up 
at the turn of September-October 1996. There were a lot of problems with the sell-
ing and advertising campaign. The intention was to paint the delivery carts yellow 
and to fi t plastic pockets on them to advertise postal products. The painting was 
clearly a challenge:
Lappeenranta post offi ce said that the carts couldn’t be painted, that the paint 
would come off. But we suspected that they just wanted an easy life. Painting 
the carts hasn’t been tried anywhere yet but the deliverer A used to be a profes-
sional painter and he thinks we could do it, paint one fi rst to try it out. Modern 
paints are quite good. (Deliverer interview, August 26th 1996)
Painting the delivery carts became a question of principle regarding the whole 
development project. The delivers would have wanted the supervisor to make a 
more determined effort to carry it out: the painting became symbolic ”because the 
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idea was completely ours” (Deliverer interview, August 26th 1996). The carts were 
eventually painted and were also fi tted with plastic pockets for the advertisements. 
The advertising space was being well used in the autumn.
The main achievement in Malmi was to combine delivery and transport work. 
At fi rst the van drivers offered export services to some businesses in the area, as the 
mail carriers had planned. The drivers’ work was more versatile, but the mornings 
became really busy. The arrangement was changed so that one deliverer helped the 
drivers during the morning rush.
The mail carriers’ request for compensation for the new duties was put on hold.
The whole thing will dry up if the money doesn’t start running! (Malmi Change 
Laboratory group report, October 27th 1996)
The mail carriers expanded the experiment in autumn 1997. A team of six or seven 
people comprising van drivers and mail carriers were involved in the experiment 
on a daily basis. 
This shift to combine transport and delivery was apparently successful and an 
exceptional development, and heralded the combining of the Delivery and Trans-
port business groups a year later. In 1997, the Malmi mail carriers received the fi rst 
prize of FIM 30,000 for their invention in the ”quality Act” organized by Finland 
Post Ltd.
When the experimental phase started in Malmi in August, the mail carriers 
thought the developments were makeshift and that they would not take the busi-
ness in the right direction. In the opinion of one of them at the beginning of 1998, 
they had given up their development ideals. Did the connection between the ex-
periments and the visions still exist?
Well, in a way it annoys me that we haven’t succeeded with the experiment as 
we planned: in the Malmi Post Offi ce Ltd direction. People think this might 
not be our own operation at all. We could have rotated our own people in those 
duties. Our own deliverer became a substitute. Their expertise could very well 
have been used. (Deliverer interview, February 26th 1998) 
The Outokumpu mail carriers continued with their special deliveries, export and 
import services and stamp selling after the experimentation period.50 Special de-
liveries as well as exports and imports were managed by introducing a new work-
50 The Post Offi ce management group decided in autumn 1996 that the mail carriers would sell 
Christmas stamps on their routes throughout the country – a result of the experiments carried 
out in the city of Salo and the Change Laboratory project. The service was profi table and it was 
offered again in 1997. 
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ing procedure. Stamps and postcards were also sold at summer events and in a 
local old people’s home. Businesses and private customers have become used to 
buying stamps from the mail carriers. Selling activities are increased during the 
Christmas period, around Valentine’s Day and before Easter. The 1997 sales target 
was reached in half a year. What the mail carriers still considered to be a problem 
was that they were not getting compensated for the selling.
The three delivery teams continued operating in the spring. Given the spread 
of the population, teamwork meant increased cooperation in the sorting. If some-
one noticed that the normal time for beginning the delivery round has passed he 
or she lent a hand.
In the spring of 1997, the mail carriers decided to break down the two- and 
three-people teams in the central city area. They had decided to continue sec-
tor sorting and did not return to individual route sorting. In conjunction with 
breaking down the teams they planned new delivery routes. Four cart routes were 
changed to bicycle routes, which also increased van use. The division of labor in 
the sorting offi ce was also changed.
The mail carriers planned the new routes completely independently and an-
nounced their plans only to the product designers: a new practice began to de-
velop.
Interviewer: How did this planning get started?
Supervisor: We took a map and started from there. 
Interviewer: Did you invite the team separately in order to do the planning?
Supervisor: No. First we did the routes. The van drivers drew theirs, then the 
center mail carriers. We had that map there on the table at least a week.
(...)
Interviewer: How did the production designer feel about his change?
Supervisor: He didn’t say. He didn’t really say anything about it. I seem to re-
member we asked him to come by. He gave us a tip about working hours ac-
cording to how we had planned the routes. We haven’t measured it any more 
accurately since then. 
Interviewer: Have the delivers complained that the measurement is bad or that 
it should be checked?
Supervisor: No they haven’t. We’ve had some discussions about how we should 
take the measurement. Well then they said there was no need, that it was fi ne 
with them. Everything’s quite all right according to them. (Supervisor inter-
view, February 26th 1998)
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The relationship of the experiments to the developmental contradictions of the 
work activity
Given the later progress, the developments that came out in the Change Labora-
tory fell into fi ve categories: 1) those that never went beyond the idea stage, 2) 
those that were abandoned after the experimental stage, 3) those that became es-
tablished, 4) those that extended within and outside the post offi ce, and 5) follow-
up developments that were put forward as solutions to the problems encountered 
in the experiments. Table 10.2 includes details of what happened to the develop-
ments and an interpretation of which contradictions were meant to resolve.
The four-month Change Laboratory process produced in all 23 ideas, 13 of 
which became established. Five of these stayed in their original form, fi ve were 
extended and three resulted from follow-up developments.
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Table 10.1 Contradictions in the delivery work and the experiments as solutions.
                       The  contradiction 
An element 
of the activity 
system 
The 
development 
of the 
experiment 
Object: 
expansion or 
improving the 
present
Internal 
division 
of labor: 
collaborative 
or solo work
External
division of 
labor: the 
borders or 
collaboration 
between the 
production 
lines 
Rules: 
workplace 
regulated or 
centralized 
norms and 
measures
Number of 
experiments
Remained an 
idea 
Outokumpu: 
shop and 
pharmacy service
Malmi: 
registered letters 
to fi rms
Hätilä:
export and 
import service
3
Abandoned Turku 52
Visits to the other 
offi ces
Hätilä
a. postal service 
for elderly people
b. customized 
advertisement 
delivery
c. delivery of non 
standard shaped 
packages 
d. mail box service
Outokumpu
Center area 
team
Hervanta
team
7
Established Malmi 
a. stamp selling 
b. sales and 
advertisement 
campaign
Turku 52 
in-house training
Outokumpu
district area 
team
Turku 52
cell team
5
Extended Turku 52 
a. security service 
for elderly people
b. stamp selling
Outokumpu
Stamp selling
Malmi
The 
combination 
of delivery 
and transport 
services
Hätilä
Express letter
export
5
Followed-up Hervanta
work pair 
rotation
Hervanta
Express export 
and import 
service
Outokumpu
Route 
planning
3
Realized and 
not realized 11+2=13 5+0=5 3+1=4 1+0=1 20+3=23
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Three ideas were not tried out at all, two of which were connected with the 
object of the work and one with the division of labor. The suggestion about regis-
tered letters at Malmi was abandoned because of disagreements between the post 
offi ce and the head of Finland Post Ltd.; the other two were abandoned because of 
disagreements between business groups.
Seven ideas were given up after the experimental phase. Five of these concerned 
the object of the work and two the division of labor. The plan to extend the ob-
ject of work was given up because the new services proved to be unprofi table and 
customer interest in them declined after their initial enthusiasm. The abandoned 
ideas of teamwork concerned the internal division of labor and they proved not to 
function well. Even though the team experiments were not continued in either of 
the cases, the mail carriers did not return back to the individual work model but 
created new forms of cooperation. 
The fi ve improvements that had become established as permanent elements of 
work aimed at changing the object of activity and division of labor. Two of them 
involved the introduction of teamwork in which the mail carriers’ strengths were 
utilized in terms of sorting and levelling peak-time loads. The establishment of 
these new services was problematic and the employees suspected that the experi-
ment that had started out so well was now in danger because of the lack of a sup-
port system.
Five improvements were extended after the experimental stage. Three of these 
had to do with the object of work and two with the external division of labor. The 
stamp-selling experiment had its effect on a national scale. The security service for 
the elderly became established and there were plans to try it in Turku and other 
parts of Finland. Cooperation between transport and delivery services has gradu-
ally improved in the Malmi Post Offi ce. It was expected that it could be extended.
Two of the follow-up improvements concerned the internal division of labor, 
new pair-work models, and a new kind of work rule involving route planning. 
The new services led to increased productivity in delivery work, and especially to 
increased cooperation between transport and delivery services. This new coopera-
tion appeared to require a new kind of pair work and teamwork among the mail 
carriers, as well as a new kind of work planning in the post offi ce.
The improvements set out in Table 10.1 are simplifi ed. In reality they were 
more varied and included many changes in various parts of the work. However, 
the table does show the progress of the developments that arose from the Change 
Laboratories.
The mail carriers saw the possibility of developing their work by extending the 
object of their activity. In connection with this they came up with a suggestion 
regarding the division of labor, which needed follow-up in the work communities 
and discussions with the area management, designers and representatives of other 
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business groups. This led to attempts to devise new, more independent rules for 
local offi ces.
10.4 Assessing the experiment
The Change Laboratory experiment in Finland Post Ltd. showed the surprisingly 
creative nature of the conceptualization of a new system. It demonstrated that 
it was possible to implement a new system starting with small experiments that 
could be developed and diffused. It also showed the increase in initiatives among 
mail carriers and new collaborative possibilities between top management and 
workers on the shop fl oor.
The experiments and new ideas produced in the Change Laboratory project 
were based on the mail carriers’ analysis of the threat posed by a reduction in the 
amount of the work. This threat could be interpreted as a consequence of two 
big changes caused by the IT revolution in the Finnish Post’s markets. The fi rst 
of these occurred during the economic depression in 1990 when part of the Post 
Corporation focused on the development of new services based on new informa-
tion technology. Delivery as a traditional postal activity had to survive economi-
cally independently without support from the new services. The second change 
appeared fi ve years later when the volume of the main product of Finland Post 
Ltd., the letter, had begun to decrease. Two years after the Change Laboratory proj-
ect Nikali (1998, p. 156) showed in his dissertation that the 360-year-old tradition 
of mail delivery as the main service and source of income at Finland Post Ltd., 
with its constant increase in volume had begun to fail because of the increased use 
of new information technology. E-mail had begun to replace customary mail, and 
there has been a consist decrease in the number of delivered letters since 199651. 
The saturation point of letter-mail development was reached in the same year in 
which the Change Laboratory experiment was carried out in Finland Post Ltd. The 
mail carriers understood this development and they were worried about their jobs. 
The tools and processes of learning through which they designed new services, 
experimented with them and reorganized their work were, in my interpretation, 
attempts to resolve this crisis. In hindsight their analysis of the dilemma between 
improving traditional work patterns and expanding the work still seems relevant.
The mail carriers raised two questions: what kind of services Finland Post Ltd. 
could produce locally, and how this could be done. Answering these questions lead 
to experiments that generated new variation in the delivery work. Some of the new 
51 In recent years the increased number of bills from telecommunications companies to their 
customers have, paradoxically, caused a delay in this development. 
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forms of work resembled semi-autonomous team solutions, but the core of the 
new services could be seen as an attempt to customize the services according to the 
needs of the local customers. These experiments could be seen as the seeds of new, 
mass-customized delivery work, with some of the marketing and product design 
begin carried out on the shop-fl oor level with the support of centralized product 
development. The new ways of independently dividing, planning and standard-
izing the work on the shop-fl oor supported this concept.
It is interesting to note that the new activity concept went beyond the project’s 
original starting points, which highlighted in-house entrepreneurship, the pos-
sibility to rationalize and develop the work on the shop-fl oor level, responsibility 
taking on the individual and community levels, and the opportunity to develop 
teamwork in the delivery service. The mangers and union leaders set these goals, 
but the way in which the objectives could be met was a mystery to them. The proj-
ect came up with a much more radical suggestion: a vision to expand the object 
of delivery work. The original goals of the project were included in the vision but 
they were only a part of the more radical concept. 
One reason why the project started was that management was disappointed in 
the results of the ”good delivery” project carried out before the Change Labora-
tory. ”Good delivery” was a homemade combination of several participatory de-
velopmental techniques (such as double teams) that are widely used in socio-tech-
nical-design projects. The Change Laboratory achieved better results.
The Finland Post Ltd. case showed that it was possible to produce expansive 
learning actions within the Change Laboratory. The main result of these actions 
was a new concept concerning the object of the delivery work. While customers 
had previously seen mainly as receivers, the mail carriers began to view them also 
as senders. Given this new concept they could direct their developmental work: 
model a new kind of activity system, invent new product ideas and experiment 
with them. The experiments succeeded in increasing the profi tability of the post 
offi ces as well as improving employee well-being. The Change Laboratory also 
improved the collaboration between workers and top managers. In some cases, but 
not all, the middle managers, designers and union representatives also supported 
the Change Laboratory work.
As a result of the later development of the Change Laboratory project a large 
work group including union and management representatives (see page 197) pro-
duced a concept52 of mass-customized mail-delivery work that was approved by 
52 Helenius, Heikkinen, Kaatrakoski, Niemi, Palmolahti, Palonen, Peltoniemi, Pihlaja, Rantala 
& Saarinen:  Luonnos jakelutyön uudeksi toimintamalliksi,  [Outline for new activity model of 
delivery work] Suomen Posti Oy, 1997.
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the management of the business group and union leaders on 8.8.1997. The con-
cept suummarized the results of the project and suggested ways of customizing the 
services and making them more fl exible. The management did not put the concept 
into practice, however. Because of this, too, the new kinds of learning actions the 
carriers took did not develop into a new form of activity, i.e. into a sustained learn-
ing activity connected to the new delivery activity. There appear to be three main 
reason for this.
The fi rst reason is connected to the diffusion processes that followed the fi rst 
Change Laboratory wave. Although these processes are not the object of my study, 
I offer some observations here. It turned out that the majority of management and 
trade union representatives did not approve of the direction in which the Change 
Laboratory project was heading, although it had been formally approved. 
The second reason lay in the way in which the process of the fi rst Change Labo-
ratory wave was carried out. Although the common seminars improved the inter-
action between the workers and the top managers of the business group, some pro-
duction designers, product designers and other middle managers resisted the mail 
carriers’ implementation actions. This resistance could be interpreted as a contra-
diction between the prevalent activity concept and the new one the carriers were 
attempting to implement. The key actors, the production designers53, planned and 
standardized the routes of each deliverer in the post offi ce. They analyzed the daily 
variations in each mail carrier’s work tasks using videotaped data and computer-
ized information on the variation in mail quantities. Although they had access to 
more and more advanced technology, they applied the same abstract-empirical 
system of generalizing that Taylor once advocated. This system has a long tradition 
in the Postal Service. It provides a basis for the collective bargaining with which it 
is associated and on the other hand it enables the parties to negotiate the extent of 
the routes, for example. The negotiators have to be able to use it and to change it. 
The product designers and middle managers54 work was also organized to support 
this system and to keep development separate from delivery work. 
When the deliverers engaged in the Change Laboratory project began to imple-
ment the ideas that were products of the theoretical-genetic generalizing, the new 
and the old ways of producing generalizations collided. The implementation of 
the new product ideas, such as stamp selling, a sales and advertisement campaign, 
the delivery of non-standard-shaped packages, the mail-box service, the shop and 
53 There were over 60 production designers working in Finland Post Ltd.
54 Following the project, in 1998–1999, two coaches from second phase, Anu Rantala and Olli 
Palonen, carried out a large project for foremen using the tools of developmental work research. 
This project produced a team organization for foremen that is still in use in Finnish Post Ltd.
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pharmacy service and customized advertisement delivery, started to aggravate the 
contradictions. The reactions to the improvement suggestions among the middle 
managers and union leaders could be seen as a sign that there were later disagree-
ments about the direction of the new development of the business activity.
This raises an important question concerning the Change Laboratory method 
as an alternative way of producing generalizations and of changing the bifurcated 
system of generalizing typical of mass production. I demonstrated in Chapters 5 
and 8 that the central subject of the distributed system of generalizing in the Taylor 
system was the designer. The developmental method applied in the Change Labo-
ratory emphasizes learning on the shop fl oor with the support of top managers. 
The empirical case highlighted the central role of the planners and designers, how-
ever, who resisted the new form of learning. The question thus remains of how to 
engage the designers in these kinds of projects. To what extent would it be possible 
to carry out the cycle of expansive learning in delivery work without changing the 
other related activities at the same time? If it is possible to produce the kinds of in-
novation and collaboration discussed above within the Change Laboratory, where 
in the larger organization and by whom should the change be initiated, and how 
could the results be integrated into the established practices? 
The third reason why the new type of learning did not develop into a sustained 
system in the delivery work was that the expected competition did not materialize. 
The ”real” reason for starting the project was the expected market situation that a 
new competitor would trigger. Because the Finnish Government did not give one 
large delivery company permission to enter the markets during the Change Labo-
ratory project, one of the motives behind the project disappeared. The project’s 
analyses indicated that postal delivery work was in a need state. The contradic-
tions had not yet developed into second-order contradictions that would manifest 
themselves as individual worker’s double-bind situations, to which radical change 
would have been the only solution. The solutions that were produced were solu-
tions to the fi rst-order contradictions, such as between ”receiver” and ”sender” 
within the object of the activity system. According to the theory of expansive 
learning, such solutions are necessarily much more hypothetical than ones based 
on second-order contradictions. This is also why their affect on the direction of 
the development is smaller than that of the solutions of second-order contradic-
tions (Engeström, 1995, pp. 88–90).
The challenge that the carriers’ solutions raised seemed very demanding. The 
experiments they planned and carried out brought out the need for more fl exible 
use of standards and the local customization of services. It is possible to inter-
pret this to suggest that the project brought out the need in Finland Post Ltd. to 
take radical steps in two directions at the same time: that of mass customization 
because of the radical change in the object, and that of fl exible standardization, 
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which according to Victor and Boynton’s theory is a precondition for mass cus-
tomization.
On the other hand, in the spirit of self-criticism, we might think that while ”the 
sender” of post as a new hypothetical object of activity began to affect the devel-
opmental project, the other side, ”the receiver”, was left without suffi cient consid-
eration. The increase in delivery effi ciency, however, probably also fell within the 
zone of proximal development of the activity. It could be that the new concept 
affected the project to the extent that the developmental work was locked in a 
one-sided vision.
The implementation of the Change Laboratory nevertheless showed the need 
to break away from mass production and its distributed system of generalizing. 
The strong tradition of abstract-empirical generalizing dominated the daily rou-
tines, work instructions, collective bargaining, union leadership, management, 
production design, and many other organizational and professional structures. In 
the historical part of this study I only analyzed the original forms of learning in 
and for production. The distributed system of abstract-empirical generalizing was 
institutionalized in Finland Post Ltd. and embedded in the structure and media-
tors of the production activity. Developmental efforts that do not correspond to 
this model are easily regarded as invalid or only as solutions to personnel motiva-
tion problems, and projects that suggest radically different concepts of productiv-
ity are easily considered ”bumbling”. The strong tradition of and confi dence in the 
omnipotence of the abstract-empirical system of generalizing may affect the way 
the production is considered and performed so strongly that, although productiv-
ity could be increased by using other methods, or other systems of generalizing, 
such solutions are rejected as inappropriate. This is also a challenge for the meth-
odologies aimed at triggering new forms of theoretical-genetic generalization in 
and for production.

233
11 Summary and discussion of the 
results of the study 
The objective of my research was to fi nd a way to conceptualize learning in and 
for production so as to allow for the analysis of its historical change. My basic as-
sumption was that forms of learning are connected to forms of production, and 
that they should be studied as historically changing. 
My fi rst research question was: ”How can the ongoing qualitative transfor-
mation of the content and institutional forms of learning in and for production 
be conceptualized and located historically?”  In seeking an answer I had to ask 
a more profound methodological question concerning how to conceptualize the 
phenomenon in order to make possible the study of its historical development. As 
answer I would say that if we are to understand learning as a changing phenom-
enon we should see it as the adoption, application and development of generalized 
operations, the carrying out of which is mediated through tools and concepts, i.e. 
artifacts used in production.  
The artifacts objectify externally a generalized representation of reality that is 
important in performing a specifi c operation. More specifi cally, learning in and 
for production could be understood as an artifact-mediated process of general-
izing what is essential for accomplishing an action or a joint activity with the help 
of earlier generalizations. The artifacts that meditate the production activity, and 
which vary in different types of production, thus become crucial in the analysis of 
production-related learning in that they objectify the generalizations and mediate 
the resulting new operations.  
Relying on Freeman and Louçã’s theory of techno-economic paradigms, I fi rst 
located the current change in learning in and for production in the transition 
from the mass-production-dominated techno-economic paradigm of the motor-
ization-based long wave of economic development to the new techno-economic 
paradigm of the new wave based on ICT technology.  This transition started in the 
1990s.  I also came to the conclusion that the main models of mass production 
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are embodied in the Fordist-Taylorist model, the socio-technical model and the 
model of fl exible manufacturing. 
In order to be able to conceptualize the nature of the change I had to answer 
my second research question: ”What were the principles and general structures of 
the dominant forms of learning in and for production preceding the ICT revo-
lution?” In doing this, and with a view to mastering the huge body of historical 
material on the development of production, I decided to search for the ”ancestors” 
of the basic variants of mass production. Instead of just describing the generalized 
solution, the new model of production in its fi nal form, I analyzed the processes 
through which it was formed following Leont’ev’s principle that the true nature of 
a generalization is not apparent in the outcome and can only be revealed by ana-
lyzing the process that produced it. In this case the generalization to be understood 
was a specifi c model of production and the related system of learning in and for 
production.  
In analyzing the processes of how the ”ancestors” created the main variants of 
the model of mass production I relied on the reports and descriptions of the initial 
series of experiments that led to the fi rst version of the new form of mass produc-
tion and the related system of generalization. In chapters 5–7 I analyzed the pro-
cesses through which Taylor’s system, the system of semiautonomous teams and 
socio-technical work design, and the fl exible production system were created.
As a result, I could state that the Taylorist system of generalization evolved as a 
solution to the contradiction between traditional forms of generalizing developed 
in craft work and the new requirements based on enormous growth in produc-
tion capacity through the introduction of electrifi ed mechanical machines.  In my 
analysis, the ”ancestor” of the various forms of learning in and for mass production 
was the new distributed system of optimizing the methods for performing repeat-
ed tasks. The variation that was necessary for this type of generalizing consisted of 
the various ways individuals had developed for performing the task. This variation 
was analyzed by specialized planning offi cers with the help of time-and-motion 
study, and objectifi ed in a new type of secondary artifact, the work standard that 
comprised the ”one best method” to perform the task. The generalized operations 
embedded in the standard were thus results of empirical generalization through 
comparison. The process of creating new generalized operations was divided into 
two main parts: the research and design of the method by the planners, and the 
workers’ appropriation and learning to carry out the designed operations.
Algorithmic generalizations describing the correct way of performing a task 
require that the task, incorporating the material, the relevant conditions, the ob-
jectives, the tools and other components of the activity, remains the same. The 
new system created problems of motivation and morale, which in turn became an 
object of intensive research and development.  A new form of production was de-
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veloped only when contradiction between the rigid form of generalization and the 
varying object of the activity also aggravated within production activities. The de-
velopment and extensive diffusion of Socio-Technical Systems Design was based 
on this contradiction of Taylor-type production. The system of semiautonomous 
work teams resolved it by creating space for craft-type experiential generalizing 
within the context of mass production. The same basic contradiction between the 
rigid form of generalizing and the varying object of production was resolved in an 
entirely different way in the fl exible manufacturing system by broadening further 
the object of attention of the workers and creating dialogue between teams of 
planners and doers. 
My analysis revealed four dominant forms of learning in and for production 
that have preceded the ICT revolution: craft-type learning based on perceptual-
functional generalizing in which the generalized operations are mainly preserved 
as social practices and forms of primary artifacts, and three variants of distributed 
systems of learning in and for mass production that are all based on:
– the division of labor in producing production-relevant generalizations
– the use of secondary artifacts as a means of preserving the generalizations and 
exchanging partial results between the parties in the distributed process
– an abstract empirical method of generalization that is fundamentally based on 
the comparison of cases. 
The object of generalization expanded in Socio-Technical Systems Design and the 
fl exible manufacturing system, and the interaction between the related parties has 
changed from unilateral control in Taylor’s system through peaceful coexistence 
in the socio-technical system to creative dialogue in the fl exible manufacturing 
system. 
My third research question concerned the possible contradiction between 
mass-production-type systems of learning in and for production and the emerg-
ing new structures and production dynamics of the ICT era.  As I pointed out in 
the introduction of this study, there is much evidence of a lack of mastery of the 
necessary transformations in production.  My analysis suggests one hypothesis 
concerning the root cause of the problems in managing change.  The forms of 
empirical generalization on which the distributed systems of generalizing in and 
for mass production are based do not allow one to master historical change and 
new kinds of variation in the elements of production. The potential new layer of 
generalizing in and for production could thus consist of the theoretical-genetic 
forms of generalizing.  
In chapters 9 and 10 I explained Developmental Work Research methodol-
ogy and the Change Laboratory method of supporting a collaborative process of 
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theoretical-genetic generalization in the form of expansive learning activity, which 
is required for the practitioners’ involvement in an expansive reconceptualization 
and remediation of activity.  The experimental application of the Change Labora-
tory in Finnish Post Ltd. demonstrated that, with the help of an external inter-
ventionist, the post carriers were able to institute a theoretical-genetic process of 
generalization concerning the principle of their activity. This process produced a 
viable new model for the post delivery activity. On the other hand, the new form 
of learning did not become a stabilized practice, but succumbed to the strong in-
frastructure of the mass-production-type distributed system of generalizing.  
As an individual case the Change Laboratory provides an example of the im-
plementation of theoretical-genetic generalizing. and demonstrated the diffi culty 
of changing the system of generalizing. The new form of generalizing in and for 
production contradicted the established abstract-empirical form of generalizing. 
As I see it, the need for new form of generalizing was not strong enough to moti-
vate the production designers and middle management to develop this new form 
of activity and learning. There was thus a remarkable move fi rst towards theoreti-
cal-genetic generalizing and then reverting back to abstract-empirical generaliz-
ing. This contradiction could be seen as a methodological and practical challenge 
for further research and for the development of learning in and for production.
The signifi cance and generalizability of the results of my study lie not in its 
empirical representativeness, but in the theoretical analysis.  The main result is 
a conceptual scheme for analyzing learning in and for production as a histori-
cally developing phenomenon, a scheme that could be used in empirical studies 
on forms of such learning. The limitations in the applicability of the results are 
related to the theoretical ramifi cations of the object of the study.  The concept 
of a distributed system of generalizing is based on the mass-production reality 
of single-organization production. Production is increasingly being carried out 
by coalitions of organizations, and new distributed systems of generalizing will 
also probably be increasingly distributed among a number of collaborating or-
ganizations.  These new systems of learning are currently the object of intensive 
research. The limitation imposed by my unit of analysis does not make the results 
irrelevant. On the contrary, the fi ndings help to identify the differences between 
the emerging new systems and the old ones. Understanding this difference is of 
enormous importance, because much of the emphasis in new information tech-
nologies and learning is still on applying new technology to old forms of learning 
instead of building qualitatively new forms.
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